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Abstract
In the early 1980s, the American legal system introduced a novel legislative model for tackling the age-old 
problem ofracist violence. Within less than three decades, this novel legislative model was adopted by 47 
states across the US, and was ‘imported’ by dozens legal systems around die globe. Legislatures and 
advocacy organizations portray the introduction o f hate crime laws as an effective instrument for 
minimizing the disproportionate vulnerability o f racial minorities to criminal victimization. Scholars have 
praised their virtues in symbolizing the commitment o f the state to providing racial minorities with equal 
concern and respect. Yet there is something curious, even paradoxical, about the deployment o f  
criminalization -  a coercive form of governance so often associated with the perpetuation o f structural 
disadvantage — with such emancipatory ends. This study considers how the embedding o f  hate crime 
policies within institutional and political structures which reflect broader patterns o f racial and class 
inequality affect their suitability to achieve their declared emancipatory aims.
In pursuing this goal, I place hate crime policies within broader historical and theoretical perspectives. 
Historically, I consider the way in which the idea o f  “pro-black” criminalization has been framed and 
institutionalized from the slavery era to the present. Theoretically, I exp fore a range o f  socio logical and 
socio-legal questions regarding the distinctive institutional and ideological functions played by “pro­
minority” criminalization regimes. I define “pro-black” (or “pro-minority”) criminalization as comprisingof 
legislative and enforcement arrangements that are specifically aimed at protecting African-Americans (or 
other minority groups). My analysis shows that, throughout most o f  American history, “pro-black” 
criminalization regimes (including hate crime policies) were embedded withinbroader policy structures 
which worked to stabilize fundamental aspects o f  the prevailing system o f  racial stratification. This 
pattern was rooted in institutional and ideological features that are likely to characterize “pro-minority” 
criminalization reforms in various other contexts o f  social inequality. Overall, I argue, while “pro­
minority” criminalization reforms serve to alleviate particular forms o f  violence and degradation which 
minorities are disproportionately subjected to, they also work to stabilize the broader systems o f  social 
inequality within which these symptoms are embedded.
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Chapter 1: Introduction
The struggle o f man against power is the struggle o f memory against forgetting  
Milan Kundera
A. Introduction
The problem of bias-motivated victimization of Afiican-Americans has been one of the most devastating 
aspects of American racial history. Throughout the slavery era, blacks were routinely subjected to 
whipping, as well as to multiple other forms of physical and psychological abuse.1 Less than two decades 
after Emancipation, spectacles of public torture lynching became widespread across the American South.2 
Conducted in front of crowds ofhundreds and sometimes thousands, “lynch victims were hung from trees, 
from utility poles, (and) from bridges”.3 The mass migration of Afiican-Americans to the North during the 
first half of the twentieth century was met with a surge of Klan terror, which served to drive them away 
from white neighbourhoods.4 With the intensification of black civil rights protest in the 1950s, black 
churches became targets of firebombing and terror.5 These horrific reminiscences of the black experience 
continue to rankle in the collective consciousness of Afiican-Americans.6 They also provide white 
America with an appalling reminder of the measure of brutality which can thrive even within a 
constitutional order that defines its ideals in terms ofrespect to liberty and equality under the rule oflaw.
In the early 1980s, the American legal system adopted a new legislative model for 
solidifying the protection of African-American victims. At the core of this new model lies the idea 
of enhancing the offender’s penalty if he intentionally selected his victim because of her actual or 
perceived racial identity.7 This new model has been institutionalized through the enactment of hate 
crime laws. The term hate crime was first introduced into criminal codes in 1981, when the states of 
Oregon and Washington were the first to enact this new model of penalty enhancement legislation. 
To date, 47 states and the District of Columbia have adopted at least one piece of hate crime
1 Stampp (1956: 171-191: describing the routine use o f  such methods as chaining and ironing, whipping, 
branding, mutilation, and mauling with dogs).
2 Garland (2005: 803).
3 Ibid, 805.
4 Klarman (2007: 115).
5 Branch (1988: 793-802).
6 Kennedy (1998: 48).
7 Jenness (2001:295-301).
2legislation.8 Congress developed a distinct legal framework of penalty enhancement for bias- 
motivated perpetration of federal offences.9 The issue of hate crime became a salient topic on the 
national political agenda. Senior politicians have used the most prominent forums of American 
politics for manifesting their support of furthering hate crime legislation (including, the State of the 
Union Address10 and election debates between presidential candidates).11 In the official website of 
President Barack Obama, the pledge to “strengthen federal hate crime legislation” is placed at the 
top of the administration’s agenda for “criminal justice reform”.12
While hate crime legislation seeks to protect other categories of victims in addition to Afiican- 
Americans, it gained a special significance as a symbol of America’s progress towards curing the racial 
wounds left by the systems of slavery and Jim Crow.13 Hate crime laws are perceived as effective instruments 
fir minimizing the disproportionate vulnerability of Afiican-Americans to criminal victimization. They are 
also praised for symbolizing the commitment of contemporary American society to denouncing racism and 
to eradicating symptoms ofbigotry.14 Yet there is something curious, even paradoxical, about the deployment 
of criminal law -a system so often associated with the perpetuation of structural disadvantage -  with such 
emancipatory ends; and this raises some important question about tire validity of this conventional account 
The first goal of this study is to examine a couple of historical questions which are central to any serious 
attempt to assess the validity of this accepted lore. First, in what respects do hate crime policies depart from the 
legal regimes through which the problem of black victimization was tackled in earlier stages of American 
history? Second, to what extent are hate crime policies susceptible to institutional and political pitfalls similar 
to those which inhibited the protection of Afiican-Americans in the past?
8 Shively (2005:9).
9 Hate Crime Sentencing Enhancement Act (Pub. L. § 103-322). In October 2009, Congress passed the 
Matthew Shepard and James Byrd, Jr. Hate Crime Prevention Act, which was signed into law by President 
Barack Obama as a division o f the National Defense Authorization Act for 2010 (H.R. 2647).
10 See examples in Broad and Jenness (1997: 3).
11 “Bush Stance on Bias Crimes Emerges as Campaign Issue”, NY Times Oct. 13 (2000). 
http://querv.nvtimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9F06E7D8153FF930A25753ClA9669C8B63.
12 http://www.whitehouse.gov/issues/CIVIL RIGHTS/.
13 The unique salience o f  racist violence as an epitome o f  “hate crime” is reflected in the inclusion o f  this 
form o f  bias-motivated victimization within the hate crime statutes o f  all 47 states in which such legislation 
is in force (as well as in federal penalty enhancement laws). By comparison, sexual orientation is currently 
included in the hate crime statues o f  31 states, and gender in 27 states. See: Anti Defamation League State 
Hate Crime Statutory Provisions (http://www.adl.org/99hatecrime/intro.asp) . Moreover, a time-sensitive 
analysis o f the evolution o f  the hate crime canon reveals that, by 1988, racially-motivated violence was 
already included in all hate crime statutes throughout the nation. By then, both gender and sexual 
orientation were recognized by only one fifth o f the states (Jenness (2001: 301 -306)).
14 On the expressive dimension as a central virtue o f  hate crime legislation, see: Lawrence (1999: 163-169).
3From a broader perspective, the recent proliferation of hate crime laws raises important and 
timely questions regarding the potential contribution of criminalization reforms to the pursuit of social 
equality. This proliferation was part and parcel of a wider trend in contemporary law and politics. Over 
the last decades, progressive social movements and policymakers have turned with new vigour to 
mobilizing criminalization reforms as a means of facilitating egalitarian social change. This has resulted 
in the introduction of various new categories of “pro-minority” criminalization, i.e. criminalization 
policies that are specifically aimed at tackling the victimization of women and minorities (in addition to 
hate crime, key examples would include stalking, sexual harassment, and various amendment to rape 
and domestic violence laws). As our historical discussion will show, the idea of “pro-minority” 
criminalization is not novel. But its current salience on the broader agenda of progressive activists should 
urge us to develop a better understanding of how such criminalization regimes operate and of their 
characteristic virtues, limits, and boomerang effects as a vehicle ofprogressive reform.15
AL The Contribution of the Study to the Literature on Law, Race and Violence in 
American History
In order to address these questions, I will explore the evolution of legal responses to bias-motivated 
victimization of Afiican-Americans from the slavery era to the present By placing hate crime 
policies within this context, I take a distinctive approach vis-a-vis the existing literature on hate 
crime. As will be discussed in detail in section B of this chapter, scholars have offered various 
interpretations of the social and political forces which led to the emergence of hate crime legislation 
since the 1980s. The success of hate crime policies in meeting their stated goals has also been the 
subject of a lively debate. However, the underlying methodological assumption which informed the 
various positions in these debates was that it is possible to understand the underpinnings and 
consequences of hate crime policies by focusing on post-1970 social and political developments.16
15 Throughout the dissertation, I employ the concept o f  criminalization as an analytic framework for exploring 
the entire range o f  social and institutional practices through which societies define, identify and respond to 
“crime”. To emphasize, the practices which constitute formal legal definitions o f  crime (most notably, legislative 
and judicial acts o f lawmaking) are central to this inquiry. However, my investigation takes on board a much 
broader and de-centralized terrain o f discourses and practices. This terrain encompasses the interactions between 
both institutional actors (including policing and prosecutorial agencies) and non-institutional actors (most 
notably, social movements) while negotiating the definitions and enforcing the legal rules through which 
societies label and respond to “racist violence”. For a theoretical elaboration o f the explanatory power o f this 
approach to studying processes o f criminalization, see: Lacey (1995); (2007); (2009).
1 For example, James Jacobs and Kimberly Potter open their influential study on hate crime with the 
following statement: “to understand why American society passed hate crime laws in the 1980s requires
4In this study, I challenge this conventional mode of framing the inquiry. I argue that in 
order to comprehend the origins, functioning and effects of hate crime policies, we have to place 
them within a much broader (and more complex) chronological perspective. This perspective 
encompasses the shifting forms of activism, lawmaking and enforcement practices through which 
the problem of black victimization has been tackled throughout the entire evolution of American 
race relations. When placed within this context, it becomes clear that the idea of introducing a new 
criminal category for combating the victimization of African-Americans is far from being a post- 
1970 innovation. Interestingly enough, legislation which (at least in some important respects) 
appeared to protect slaves’ human dignity and physical integrity, was first introduced in the 
antebellum South, when legislatures and courts developed a distinct body of law for penalizing 
“slave abuse”. In the early 1870s, when Klan terror began to surge in ex-Confederacy states, 
Congress enacted new legislation which authorized the federal administration to prosecute white 
supremacist interferences with freedmen’s civil rights.17 While the scale of white supremacist terror 
had soared during the late nineteenth century, this deterioration cannot be ascribed to the dearth of 
applicable criminal laws. After all, the entitlement of African-Americans to equal protection had 
been solemnly enshrined in the Constitution only two decades earlier.18 Following the founding of 
the NAACP in 1909, campaigns for the enactment of a federal anti-lynching bill gained 
considerable support among national politicians. Although this campaign failed to yield the passing 
of a federal anti-lynching bill, it elevated public concerns and awareness of the problem of black 
victimization. In 1968, Congress passed new legislation which made it a federal crime to interfere 
with African-Americans’ participation in a range of “federally protected activities” because of racial 
bias (these activities include voting, jury service, enrolling in public schools or colleges).19
The failure of the existing literature to consider whether there are significant continuities 
(and thus to specify the differences) between hate crime laws and the legal reforms introduced in 
different periods for tackling the victimization of African-Americans might reflect the assumption 
that these reforms belong to under-developed phases in the evolution of American race relations.
examining the history o f the post-World War II period, especially the civil rights movement and the 
subsequent triumph o f  identity politics”. Jacobs and Potter (1998: 5). Accordingly, they devote only 3 
pages o f their book to discussing earlier legislative models for tackling biased-motivation victimization o f  
African-Americans. A similar approach is taken by Broad and Jenness (1997) and by Maroney (1998).
17 18 USC §241,242.
18 Garland (2005: 809); Kennedy (1998: 36-47).
19 18 USC §245.
5This observation resonates with a conventional Whiggish view which “posit[s] an historical 
rupture that separates, roughly speaking, pie-1954 from post-1965 race relations”.20 According to 
this view, the landmark legislative and judicial reforms spurred by the Civil Rights Movement 
have revolutionized American politics and society in ways which dismantled the ideological and 
institutional mechanisms that precluded the adequate protection of black victims hitherto.
In contrast to this view, the approach underpinning my study stresses that the trajectory of 
American racial relations was shaped by a continuous dialectics between patterns of continuity and 
patterns of change, rather than by historical ruptures between incommensurable configurations of 
race relations. This approach draws on a growing body of literature on the racialized character of 
American political development.21 Scholars within this paradigm have demonstrated how 
institutional and ideological patterns which crystallized during slavery, Jim Crow or the early 
ghettoization of the Northern black population continue to influence the forms, functions and 
outcomes of race-related policies in the present. One of the main challenges of this approach is to 
steer clear from reifying the deterministic power of the legacies of slavery and Jim Crow to preclude 
a meaningful amelioration of the conditions of Afiican-Americans in the present As phrased by 
Robert Lieberman, “just as we cannot assume that the past is dead, we should not presume that its 
ghosts always haunt present-day politics in the same way”.22 Nevertheless, I will attempt to show 
that, when applied in a way which is heedful of avoiding this methodological pitfall, the ‘racialized 
political development’ framework provides a more illuminating interpretive framework vis-a-vis 
the frames of analysis which inform the existing literature on hate crime laws.
In this context, the study explores the transformation of the forms of activism, legislation 
and enforcement which have shaped legal responses to the problem of black victimization in four 
successive eras in American racial history. In the second chapter (166923-1865), I examine the 
evolution of legal responses to the victimization of blacks in the colonial and antebellum periods. 
Throughout these periods, the institution of slavery shaped the economic, political and social 
conditions of the overwhelming majority of African-Americans. In the third chapter (1865-1909),
20 Lieberman (2008: 213).
21 King and Smith (2008); Lowndes (et al, 2008); Lieberman (2008).
22 Lieberman (2008: 225).
23 Although the first African slaves were brought to the New World already in the early seventeenth 
century, the first legal source which defined the scope o f  criminal responsibility for violence inflicted upon 
slaves was recorded in Virginia in 1669. Morris (1996: 164).
6I look at how the rise and fall of the Reconstruction project shaped political and legal responses to 
the problem of white supremacist violence (at both die regional and national political arenas). In the 
fourth chapter (1909-1968), I explore the way in which the rise of the Civil Rights Movement, 
and the broader transformations which American society experienced throughout this transitional 
period (including, the incorporation of blacks into the national economy and electorate; the 
entrenchment of the New Deal model of government; and the impact of Cold War dictates on 
domestic civil rights policy) had transformed the character of public debate and policymaking in 
this field and led to the revival of federal civil rights criminalization policy. In the fifth chapter 
(1968-2008), I probe how the transformation of American politics and society in the wake of the 
landmark civil rights reforms of the 1960s gave rise to new forms of activism and lawmaking 
around the problem of black victimization, and consider how the social and institutional changes 
which took place during this period had affected the implementation of hate crime policies.
With regard to each of these four periods, I pose two major questions: first, what were the driving 
forces which shaped the distinct character of legislative and enforcement responses to the prevailing patterns 
of black victimization? Second, what were the consequences which followed firm foe introduction of (or 
from foe Mure to introduce) new legal regimes for tackling foe vidimization ofAfiican-Americans?
Methodological Issues
Because this work is intended as a contribution to interdisciplinary legal scholarship rather than to 
the non-legal disciplines on which I draw, my treatment of these questions might in some respects 
differ from how a specialist working squarely within these disciplinary fields would have examined 
them. It is important to clarify some of the major differences, and to acknowledge the limits of my 
argument, in particular with respect to its possible contribution to the historical literature.
The study does not aim to explore new archival data about the origins and functioning of 
“pro-black” criminalization. Rather, its account of each period seeks to synthesize the evidence 
established by the existing literature in order to construct a new interpretation of the role played by 
“pro-black” criminalization regimes in enabling and constraining the mobilization of egalitarian 
racial reform. The decision to focus on secondary literature was based on the realization that, given 
the vast scope of the topic (covering more than 350 years of legal, political, and social 
developments), it would not be possible to conduct comprehensive and rigorous archival research
7on each of the periods. Given the burgeoning interest in this field in social theory, social history and 
political science over the last twenty years, the secondary literature is itself both extensive and rich. 
The selection of the secondary literature materials was based on thorough literature reviews and the 
exercise of academic judgment about the most authoritative and persuasive scholarly works on each 
period (taking into account criteria such as the frequency of citations and the academic reputation of 
journals and publisher of each source). The decision to focus on the secondary literature was by no 
means intended to contest the crucial importance of archival research in historical scholarship. The 
purpose was to construct a workable frame of analysis which would enable us to examine the 
explanatory potential of the evidence on how and why new regimes for protecting black victims 
were debated, enacted, and enforced in the past, with the ultimate aim of gaining a better 
understanding of current explanatory and political challenges in the field of “pro-black” 
criminalization. I acknowledge that, if the purpose of this study would have been to make a 
contribution to the historical literature per se, a more extensive independent use of primary sources 
would have been needed (rather than, as attempted in this thesis, a focus on selecting the secondary 
sources that are recognized as most authoritative in summarizing the archival evidence). It is my 
hope that the analysis in this dissertation could serve as a basis for follow-up investigations which 
would utilize archival works in order to deepen and enrich the analysis developed in my study.
Inevitably, given the immense volume of literature on American racial history, the task of 
organizing the evidence into a meaningful and coherent narrative entails moments of selection. My 
interpretation focuses on how “pro-minority” criminalization has served to facilitate the delivery of 
both political legitimation and practical coordination of aspects of social organization. To clarify, the 
focus on this theme as a major thread of the interpretation is not aimed at dismissing the plausibility of 
alternative narratives. For example, other readers might have preferred to give stronger representation 
to personal narratives of the lived experiences of victims or to look more closely at the evolution of 
regulatory regimes from one era to another. These are highly important issues,24 and I believe that my 
own interpretation provides a basis for further consideration of them in the future.
24 As John Braithwaite (2003) has argued, there are important explanatory and analytic insights that can be 
gained by locating the development o f  modem crime-control and penal institutions within the broader 
genealogy o f the evolution o f  rationalities, techniques and strategies o f  regulation in modem societies. At 
the same time, as Braithwaite acknowledges (Ibid, 24), genealogies o f  regulation would inevitably face 
their own explanatory limits, and might benefit from conducting a dialogue with alternative interpretive 
frameworks (including, I would suggest, the one developed in this study).
8In the context of the contribution to legal scholarship, my primary motivation is to move 
beyond the explanatory limitations of studies of criminalization which do not attach due attention to 
questions of historical context Given the enduring dominance of analytic and doctrinal thinking in 
criminal law scholarship,25 it is important to construct such a historically-contextual framework for 
understanding the forms and functions which “pro-black” criminalization has taken and served in 
different periods in order to gain a better grasp of its potential and limits today. In particular, I believe 
that the value of my contribution to interdisciplinary legal scholarship should be examined with 
respect to two main criteria First, whether the study sheds light on the patterns of similarity and 
dissimilarity with regard to the way in which the problem of black victimization was tackled by the 
American legal system in different historical periods. Secondly, whether this contextualization can 
enrich our understanding of normative and explanatory questions (with which the current hate crime 
literature engages) that cannot be fully understood when examined within the conventional frame of 
focusing on post-1970s developments in American society. Admittedly, a better understanding of the 
past does not always provide a privileged prism for coming to terms with these explanatory and 
normative challenges. For example, by identifying the origins of earlier regimes of “pio-black” 
criminalization, I do not mean to assert the existence of a direct lineage between these regimes and 
hate crime laws 26 However, as I will try to demonstrate, by taking a closer look at the past than has 
been taken by other students of hate crime laws, it is possible to construct a comparative prism which 
can improve our understanding of the social and political functions of “pro-black” criminalization.
A2. The Contribution ofthe Study to a Sociological Theory of “Pro-Minority” Criminalization
On the basis of this historical inquiry, this study seeks to probe some more general sociological 
and socio-legal questions regarding the nature of “pro-minority” criminalization policy. As noted 
above, the post-1980 proliferation of hate crime legislation coincided with the emergence of 
various other novel “pro-minority” criminal categories. The hate crime campaign itself served as 
a medium through which various minority groups had politicized their experiences of 
victimization, and used such campaigns for furthering broader struggles for political and legal
25 See: Norrie(2001: 7-8); Farmer (1996: chapter 1); Lacey (2009: 950-958).
26 As recognized by David Garland, one reason which warrants steering clear o f  asserting such a lineage 
would be that, even if  their emergence was a product o f particular historical forces, such regimes — through 
being subjected “to change, reconstruction, partial success or downright failure” — might have come (over 
time) to facilitate unanticipated (and sometimes competing) political projects. Garland (1985: 4).
9recognition.27 For example, the Hate Crime Statistics Act (1990) was the first federal statute in 
which the commitment of the State toward gays and lesbians was officially recognized (even if in 
the very limited form of compiling evidence of their victimization).28 The problem of 
victimization has also become an increasingly salient issue on the feminist reformist agenda.29 
Over the last decades, feminist scholars and activists have effectively spotlighted the way in 
which long-established forms of defining and enforcing sexual violence mirrored (and in turn 
reinforced) patriarchal norms and social institutions which permeate the political and social 
fabrics of Western countries.30 Some feminist campaigns triggered substantial reforms of the way 
in which pervasive problems such as rape31 and domestic violence32 are being tackled by the 
criminal justice system. Others prod legislatures to outlaw additional forms of sexist conduct (e.g. 
stalking33 and sexual harassment34).
By and large, this recent wave of “pro-minority” criminalization reforms has ameliorated 
many of the institutional shortcomings which hampered the protection of marginalized minorities 
in the past. As Bernard Harcourt has shown, some of these campaigns have generated a profound 
impact on legal and political thinking by unveiling the coerciveness embedded within social 
practices that were traditionally conceptualized as “harmless wrongdoing” in the liberal 
tradition.35 However, as I have argued elsewhere, the fact that these campaigns gained ground 
within a political setting suffused with populist forms of “governing through crime” has 
inevitably constrained their ability to initiate policy reforms that address the root causes of these
27 It is important to note that my decision to focus on placing hate crime laws within the context o f African- 
American history is in no way meant to minimize the significance o f  the disproportionate vulnerability o f  
other minority groups (including gays and lesbians, women, Asian-Americans, and Latinos) to bias- 
motivated victimization. The focus on African-Americans stems from a recognition o f  the unique (and 
under-studied) role played by the victimization o f  this group in shaping American political and legal 
history. I believe that my historical study is not only compatible with similar inquiries into the evolution o f  
legal and political discourses on the problem o f  minority victimization in other contexts o f  intergroup 
inequality. It actually serves as a basis for such inquiries, which I hope to pursue in the future.
28 Crimes motivated by bias toward the victim’s sexual orientation were included in federal sentencing 
enhancement schemes only in October 2009. As noted earlier, various states have included such provisions 
from the 1990s onwards.
29 Brown (1995: chapter 3); Bumiller (2008); Simon (2007: 188-191); Smart (1989).
30 MacKinnon (1991a).
31 Smart (1989: chapter 2); MacKinnon (1991b); Temkin (2002).
32 Mills (2003); Bumiller (2008).
33 Kamir (2001: chapter 8).
34 Schultz (1998).
35 Harcourt (1999: 140-154).
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forms of victimization.361 believe that the achievements, pitfalls and unintended consequences of 
each of these campaigns can only be fully illuminated by means of a close historical investigation 
of the specific political and institutional forces which have shaped their forms and outcomes. 
However, in order to prevent such studies from becoming unable to see the wood for the trees, 
the sociology of criminalization has to make a progress toward developing a general explanatory 
framework for understanding the conditions of existence and the modus operandi of “pro­
minority” criminalization regimes. With this purpose in mind, although this research examines a 
series of case studies related to the protection of a particular minority group within a particular 
national context, I attempt to integrate the major historical observations of this inquiry with a 
broader theoretical analysis of the nature of “pro-minority” criminalization as a discrete terrain of 
activist, legislative, and enforcement practices.
In pursuing this aim, I will mainly focus on the following questions: How does the 
interplay between social structure and human action (agency) shape the way in which social 
movements frame the political meanings of the problem of minority victimization? What are 
the forces and incentives which impel policymakers to adopt new models of “pro-minority” 
criminal legislation in response to such campaigns? What are the institutional determinants 
which affect the enforceability of “pro-minority” legislation? How do the distinctive features 
of criminal law as a medium through which the State37 constructs the meaning of social harm 
(e.g. its focus on individualizing blame; its implicit prioritization of punishment as a suitable 
form of redress) affect the way in which we tend to think about the sources of and solutions 
to patterns of minority victimization? What are the virtues of criminalization campaigns as 
strategic vehicles within broader struggles for political emancipation? What are the attendant 
costs which such strategic mobilization is likely to entail?
36 Aharonson (2010).
37 Throughout the dissertation, I will use the term State as a socio-scientific concept, referring to the set o f  
institutions that possess the authority to enact and to enforce criminal laws. It is important to emphasize that the 
forms o f  institutionalizing the power to criminalize have transformed markedly throughout American history. 
These transformations reflected broader shifts in the allocation o f legislative prerogatives and enforcement 
responsibilities between different layers o f  the American governmental system (i.e. between state-level, local and 
federal governments). As I will show, political debates over the desirable and feasible role o f criminal law in 
protecting African-Americans not merely mirrored pre-existing ideas about the required allocation o f  these 
prerogatives and responsibilities (and, implicitly, about the normative commitments and regulatory goals which 
the State ought to pursue). They also played a constitutive role in shaping these ideas.
11
B. Rethinking the Origins of “Pro-Minority” Criminalization through 
Engaging with the Hate Crime Literature
So far, I have indicated the intended contribution of this study to two broad fields of 
historical and sociological scholarship. In this section, I move to engage more directly 
with the literature on hate crime, which serves as a point of departure for developing 
these broader historical and sociological investigations.
The existing literature on the origins of hate crime legislation offers three 
alternative theses for explaining why this new legal framework emerged in the early 1980s. 
Each of these historical theses is premised on a distinct underlying theory of the conditions 
under which “pro-minority” criminalization reforms are likely to be materialized. In this 
section, I will critically discuss the flaws o f each of these theses and of the underlying 
theories upon which they are based. This critique will be twofold. First, I will argue that the 
theses advanced in the existing literature have failed to explain the interrelations between 
the proliferation of hate crime legislation and concurrent trends which took place in 
American politics of crime during the 1980s. Second, I will argue that their underlying 
theories regarding the conditions which enable the emergence of “pro-minority” 
criminalization regimes are lacking in their explanatory power of earlier phases in the 
history of “pro-black” criminal lawmaking. On the basis of critique, I will sketch the 
distinctive thesis which this study develops for explaining the conditions of existence of 
“pro-black” criminalization (including the recent emergence of hate crime policy).
Bl. Why Hate Crime Legislation Emerged in the 1980s? A Critique of the Existing Literature
I. The “rising tide o f bigotry-motivated violence ” thesis: the first conventional thesis suggests 
that the emergence of hate crime legislation in the early 1980s was responsive to rising 
recorded levels of bigotry-motivated violence. According to criminologists Jack Levin and Jack 
McDevit, for example, in the early 1980s, American society witnessed a “rising tide” of 
bigotry-motivated violence against various marginalized minorities.38 In response, 
policymakers had to devise new legal tools which would be better equipped to addressing the
38 Levin and Mcdevitt (1993).
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unique nature of this type of criminality. In particular, it is argued, this rampage of hateful 
violence demonstrated the urgency of adopting harsher and more determinate sentencing 
schemes in order to increase the deterrent effect and to send a clearer message of moral censure.
This thesis should be criticized for espousing a naive understanding of the 
triangular relationship between the social events which are labelled as “crime”, crime 
statistics, and anti-crime policymaking. It is true that, in the mid 1980s, a rise in the 
recorded rates of bias-related crimes had been documented both by police departments 
and by NGOs.39 However, as the literature on the methodological and political aspects of 
the production of crime statistics illuminates, the statistical representation of crime trends 
relies upon a myriad of contingent factors, e.g. the way in which the offence is defined, 
the extent to which police departments allocate resources and formalize the procedures of 
investigation and documentation of such conduct, and the willingness of victims and 
witnesses to report their experiences to the police.40 In the case of hate crime statistics, it 
is clear that all of these variables were transformed drastically in the period in which this 
“rising tide” is believed to have taken place. The concept of “hate crime” is a neologism 
which gained currency in legal and popular discourses only in the 1980s.41 From the 
1980s onwards, dozens of specialist watchdog organizations were established.42 These 
organizations have devoted an unprecedented amount of resources to monitoring and 
reporting data on the rates o f hate crime. As James Jacobs and Kimberly Potter have 
demonstrated, much of this data is based on vague and all-embracing definitions or on 
flawed methods of measurement.43 Even after the introduction of the Hate Crime 
Statistics Act in 1990, striking cross-state variations in legal definition of hate crime 
persist,44 as well as significant variations in its modes of policing.45 Hence, despite the 
popularity o f the “rising tide o f bigotry” thesis in media discourses o f hate crime, it 
appears to be highly speculative.
39 Jacobs and Potter (1998: 57).
40 Maguire (2007); Reiner (2007a: chapter 3).
41 Jacobs and Potter (1998: 3).
42 Jenness (2001: 285).
43 Jacobs and Potter (1998: 47-49).
44 Jenness (2001: 301-306); Perry (2001: 8).
45 Hall (2004: 150-167).
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The “rising tide of bigotry” thesis also reflects a crude understanding of the 
relationship between crime and criminal justice policymaking. The conditions which impel 
and enable policymakers to introduce new penal “solutions” to social problems are shaped 
by various determinants which are endogenous to the political process. These determinants 
include the electoral interests invested in supporting or opposing such legislation;46 patterns 
of media coverage;47 and the amount of resources available to interest groups mobilizing 
for and against such reforms.48 Accordingly, an analysis of the conditions which facilitated 
the proliferation of hate crime legislation in the 1980s must take on board the way in which 
the unprecedented political fecundity of “governing through crime” during this period 
created new electoral opportunities and incentives to adopt a new form o f anti-racist 
criminalization.49 As I will argue in chapter 5, this examination reveals that the hate 
crime campaign had borrowed its major themes and “solutions” from populist trends 
which gained currency in post-1980 American politics of crime. This observation entails 
both explanatory and critical implications which are completely obfuscated by the “rising 
tide” thesis. Most importantly, this observation urges to move beyond the manifested 
appearance of hate crime policy as an instrumental response to a clearly-defined social 
problem and to look more closely at how the nexuses between hate crime policies and 
some of the more problematic components of contemporary law and order politics have 
shaped both the character and the implementation of these policies.
In addition, the core assumption of the ‘rising tide’ thesis — namely, the existence of 
a causal relationship between levels of crime and legislative reforms - cannot be usefully 
applied for explaining the development of “pro-black” criminalization policy in earlier 
epochs of American racial history. For example, the upsurge of lynching in the late 
nineteenth century did not generate any reform of legislative or enforcement policies. This 
dreadful episode in American racial history (which will be analyzed in chapter 3) clearly 
demonstrates that the ebbs and flows of “pro-black” criminalization policymaking do not 
directly correlate with the fluctuations of recorded rates of racist victimization.
46 Lacey (2008: 69-75); Simon (2007: chapter 3).
47 Beckett and Sasson (2004: chapter 5).
48 Gottschalk (2006: 37-40).
49 Aharonson (2010).
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IL The "enlightenment o f racial attitudes” thesis: The second conventional interpretation of 
the emergence of hate crime laws maintains that, independently of whether the scope of 
bigotry-motivated violence had actually increased during the 1980s, American society 
experienced dramatic changes in racial attitudes and thus came to perceive traditional forms 
of racist conduct in a new (and more critical) light.50 Following the “civil rights 
revolution”, it is argued, various symptoms of America’s racist culture (and, more recently, 
of its sexist and homophobic creeds) had been called into question. Because criminal law 
serves as a medium through which societies express and enforce compliance with their 
fundamental moral values, these cultural shifts have been reflected in legislative reforms 
which convey the community’s sense of disapproval of such conducts. In turn, hate crime 
legislation not only mirrors but also constructs popular solidarities with minority victims.
While this interpretation possesses an element of truth, it ultimately fails to provide a 
satisfactory account both of the timing of the proliferation of hate crime legislation and of the 
overall trajectory of “pro-black” criminalization policy throughout American history. First, 
the ‘enlightenment of racial attitudes’ thesis is not supported by any other significant 
indicator of the way in which the American criminal justice system had been transformed 
following the “civil rights revolution”. Contrary to what might have been expected in the 
wake of the remarkable legislative and judicial achievements of the 1960s, the proportion of 
African-Americans in prisons has increased dramatically throughout the last four decades 
(from a black/white ratio of 3:1 in 1968 to 7.6:1 in 2002).51 This dramatic exacerbation was 
produced by the accumulative effect of a range of criminalization policies which selectively 
over-target black offenders,52 and of sentencing policies which disproportionately affect 
black defendants.53 As Michael Tonry has argued, the disparate impacts of many of these 
policies (most notably, War on Drugs and determinate sentencing reform) on African- 
Americans were foreseeable.54 The fact that they were not repealed despite overwhelming 
evidence of their polarizing racial effects seems to be inconsistent with the historical account 
advanced by the ‘enlightenment of racial attitudes’ thesis. Indeed, rather than extending the
50 Lawrence (1999: 20).
51 Gottschalk (2006: 3).
52 Sklansky (1995).
53 Tonry (1995: 56-63).
54 Ibid (104-116).
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egalitarian principles elaborated by liberal Justices and progressive politicians during the 
“civil rights revolution” (as implied by this thesis), the general trajectory of the American 
politics55 and jurisprudence56 of crime has clearly moved in the very opposite direction.
Second, the underlying theory upon which this thesis rests — namely, that the 
enactment of “pro-black” criminal laws reflects the evaporation of racist animus - does not 
possess explanatory power with regard to earlier chapters in the history of American “pro­
black” criminalization. For example, this theory cannot explain how criminal statutes that 
were specifically aimed at protecting slaves could emerge in antebellum Southern society. 
As will be shown in chapter 2, these offences were enacted in an era in which Southern law 
categorically denied the entitlement of African-Americans to civil rights, and in which their 
full belonging to the human race was widely contested. This curious episode in the history 
of American “pro-black” criminalization suggests that, although such reforms are usually 
portrayed as being inspired by noble moral causes, the political and institutional forces 
which underpin their existence might be associated with social interests and political 
dynamics which are consistent with the preservation of the racial status quo.
HI. The “social movements/social problems” thesis’. The third thesis developed by the literature 
on the origins of hate crime legislation focuses on the role of social movements in politicizing 
the issue of bigotry-motivated violence and in shaping the agenda of policy reform. As Valerie 
Jenness has showed in a series of influential studies, since the late 1970s, dozens of watchdog 
organizations specializing in monitoring police practices toward minority victims were founded 
across the US.57 Over the next decades, these movements institutionalized new strategies for 
attracting constant media attention to the problem of minority victimization, and engaged in 
intensive lobbying for the enactment of penalty enhancement hate crime legislation.58
By emphasizing the constructionist underpinnings of present-day understandings of 
“hate crime”, this approach moves beyond the major shortcomings of the two theses 
discussed so far. The social movements/social problems thesis is capable of explaining the 
climbing figures of recorded interracial violence during the 1980s as attendant upon the
55 Murakawa (2008).
56 Bilionis (2005).
57 Broad and Jenness (1997); Jenness (2001); Jenness and Grattet (2002).
58 The social movements/social problem thesis was also advanced by other major studies, including 
Maroney (1998); McVeigh (et al, 2003) and Jacobs and Potter (1998).
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introduction of new mechanisms for measuring race-related violent incidents. It also offers a 
plausible (though, I will submit, incomplete) answer to the puzzle which the ‘enlightenment 
of racial attitudes’ thesis failed to address, namely, why “hate crime” came to be perceived as 
an urgent social problem during the 1980s while various other unfavourable conditions 
disproportionately suffered by African-Americans did not. This explanation focuses on the 
success of the anti-hate crime movement in utilizing favourable political opportunities which 
were opened up by the salience of victims’ rights mobilization. Such opportunities were 
unavailable to advocacy organizations focusing on other symptoms of racial inequality.
I would argue, however, that the narrative provided by Jenness and her colleagues is 
inadequate because it leaves out one crucial (and highly problematic) aspect of what made 
‘success’ possible for the anti-hate crime movement. In contemporary American politics of 
crime, the concept of victims’ rights is predominantly framed through a zero-sum-game 
formula in which the interests and needs of victims are believed to revolve around the 
infliction of harsher penalties on their offenders.59 While professed commitment to victims’ 
rights is frequently used by legislatures and interest groups in order to legitimate “tough-on- 
crime” sentencing and procedural reforms, non-punitive modes of thinking about the problem 
of victimization are being nudged out of the legislative agenda. For example, although 
victimization rates are particularly high among lower socio-economic stratums, the role of 
class in shaping patterns of victimization has never emerged as a central concern within the 
dominant American discourse of victims’ rights. Likewise, in contrast with its European 
counterparts, the American victims’ rights movement has paid little attention to demanding 
non-punitive modes of redress and prevention (e.g. extending social and therapeutic services 
to victims, or expanding public investment in crime-reductive welfare policies).60 Hence, my 
critique of the social movements/social problems thesis focuses on its tendency to overlook 
the ideological and institutional constraints imposed on the development of anti-racist 
criminalization policies because of the cooptation of the anti-hate crime campaign into the 
broader terrain of law and order politics. I would argue that, while the strategic inclination of 
anti-hate crime campaigners to utilize the “opportunities” for penal populist lawmaking had 
enabled them to attain remarkable political support of their proposed reforms, it impeded
59 Simon (2007a: chapter 3).
60 Gottschalk (2006: 98-101).
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their success in ameliorating the institutional and social conditions which play the most 
detrimental role in impeding the equal protection of African-American victims. In particular, 
I will show that these two structural pitfalls of dominant discourses of victims’ right 
(obfuscation of the socio-economic dimensions of patterns of victimization, and excessive 
reliance on penalization) have been installed into dominant modes of framing and acting 
upon the problem of black victimization.
This critique of the social movements/social problems thesis is also useful for 
understanding the double edged effects o f earlier campaigns of “pro-black” criminalization 
in American history. As I will show, the motivations which impelled legislatures and elites 
to introduce new regimes of “pro-black” criminalization were often associated with the 
intended contribution of such reforms to stabilizing particular elements within the racial 
status quo. Thus, to the extent that racial reformers had sought to capitalize on these 
opportunities, they adversely contributed to the entrenchment of these elements.
B2. The Origins o f “Pro-Black** Criminalization in American History
This dissertation develops a distinct explanatory framework for expounding the conditions 
which enabled and constrained the emergence of new regimes of “pro-black” criminalization 
throughout American history. I argue that these conditions had been shaped by the interplay 
between three determinants: a) the extent to which prevailing social and political structures 
made room for the development of new forms of political mobilization around the problem of 
black victimization; b) the strategies used by progressive social movements while framing the 
political meanings of the problem; c) the existence of incentives which impelled 
governments, as well as social and administrative elites, to support the introduction of a new 
regime of “pro-black” criminalization. I will now briefly introduce these three determinants.
First, the materialization of new regimes of “pro-minority” criminalization is 
dependent on the extent to which prevailing political and social structures provide conditions 
in which social movements can attract public attention and policymakers’ concern to patterns 
of minority victimization. Such protest, it should be emphasized, need not necessarily call for 
the reform of criminalization policy as its sought-after form of redress. In two crucial 
moments in American history (the twilight of slavery and Jim Crow), social movements
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integrated the problem of black victimization as a component within campaigns for the 
abolition of the entire system of racial domination. Under these circumstances (as I will argue 
in my discussion of the third determinant), governments might enact a new form of “pro­
black” criminalization in order to contain the protest of progressive movements within 
ideological bounds that do not necessitate the restructuring of the status quo.
In the next four chapters, I will look at how the transformation of social, 
institutional and ideological structures throughout American racial history had enabled and 
constrained the success of social movements in mobilizing around the problem of black 
victimization (either in demand of criminalization reforms or for advancing more radical 
egalitarian changes). For example, in chapter 2 ,1 show how the intensification of regional 
conflicts over the economic sustainability and political legitimacy of the Southern slave 
economy in the antebellum era made room to the proliferation of antislavery protest in the 
North. Within the emerging platform of antislavery campaigning (most notably, as 
mobilized by the Abolitionist movement), the problem of black victimization was attached 
with new significance and meanings. In chapter 3 ,1 demonstrate how, despite the dramatic 
elevation of the legal status of African-Americans during Reconstruction, the structural 
adjustments through which Southern society had re-established a new white supremacist 
order following the dismantling of the slavery system precluded the development of 
effective forms of progressive mobilization around the problem of lynching.
In chapter 4, I show how the sweeping demographic and economic shifts of the 
Great Migration (e.g. the concentration o f the black population in urban black ghettoes, and 
the incorporation of black labour into the industrialized Northern economy) enabled 
African-Americans to establish instruments of collective action through which they could 
campaign for civil rights reforms. Structural economic and political shifts which 
crystallized in the post-W WE era (including, the rise of the Cold War, the economic boom, 
and the entrenchment of the New Deal vision of federal policymaking) had further 
facilitated the proliferation of the Civil Rights Movement, which effectively attracted 
national and international attention to the plight of black victims of Southern racial 
bmtality. In chapter 5, I demonstrate how the structural shifts which took place in 
American politics and society from 1968 onwards (including, the collapse of the New Deal
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model and the rise of neo-liberalism and neo-conservatism) had reconfigured the political, 
cultural and institutional conditions within which proponents of racial justice have to 
operate. I argue that these changes created conditions which, on the one hand, facilitated 
the mobilization of legislative reforms which enhanced the penalization of racist violence 
yet, at the same time, precluded the development of campaigns which could have 
spotlighted the links between the existing patterns of black victimization and other patterns 
of socio-economic deprivation which are disproportionately widespread among the black 
population.
Second, the emergence of new regimes of “pro-minority” criminalization is enabled 
by the strategic manner in which social movements frame the political meanings of particular 
forms of victimizing minorities. The study traces the different ways in which the problem of 
black victimization was constructed in different phases of American racial history, and 
considers the impact of such processes of framing on the outcomes of these campaigns. This 
inquiry contributes to our understanding of the way in which mobilization around the 
problem of victimization plays strategic functions within broader struggles for egalitarian 
social reform. For example, in chapter 2 ,1 show how the Abolitionist movement had made 
strategic use of the problem of slave victimization in order to galvanize the opposition of 
Northern public opinion to the preservation of the Southern slave system. In chapter 4, I 
show how the Civil Rights Movement had strategically framed the problem of Southern 
white supremacist terror as a powerful symbol of the broader failure of the federal 
administration to guarantee Southern blacks’ civil rights. This campaign was highly effective 
in prodding the federal government to introduce a new framework of “pro-black” federal 
legislation. However, it also entailed attendant costs (most notably, failing to mobilize the 
commitment of federal policymakers to eradicating the more “civilized” forms of racial 
domination which prevailed in the North). In chapter 5, I show how the anti-hate crime 
movement had reconstructed the meaning of the problem. I argue that, rather than linking 
contemporary patterns of black victimization with present-day structures of systemic socio­
economic and political marginalization of African-Americans (e.g. the impact of the 
disproportionate concentration of blacks in poor urban areas on their rates of victimization to 
both intra-racial and black-Latino violence), this campaign had adversely reinforced the very 
ideological creeds through which these forms of marginalization are being legitimated.
20
Third, the origination of new regimes of “pro-minority” criminalization is 
dependent on the degree to which such reforms are believed to advance hegemonic political 
and economic interests. The analysis shows that, throughout American history, the 
introduction of new regimes of “pro-black” criminalization was responsive to new 
challenges of legitimation and coordination with which policymakers and social elites were 
confronted.61 The popular belief in the effectiveness of criminal law as an instrument of 
social regulation and as a medium of political communication made criminalization a 
preferable form of policy response to such challenges, although it was clear that the 
tackling of the root causes of black victimization required structural reforms that far 
exceeded the introduction of new criminal statutes. This observation resonates with -  and 
provides further historical evidence which supports — Derrick’s Bell seminal argument in 
his 1980 article on “the interest convergence dilemma”.62 Bell argued that, although 
American legal and political ideologies are structured in a way which reinforces the 
economic and political domination of whites, they do not entirely preclude the possibility 
o f benevolent “pro-black” legal remedies. The possibilities for such reforms are created by 
ad hoc convergences between the interests of blacks in the amelioration of their inferior 
conditions and transient interests of hegemonic political and social elites (which, in some 
cases, only incidentally coincide with the racial egalitarian cause). Bell’s argument 
emphasized that, since economic and political interests which are invested in the 
stabilization o f the racial status quo are built into (and arguably underpin)63 American legal 
thinking and institutional practices, these benevolent racial reforms are prone to reinforce 
the structure of racial inequality (even if by means of ameliorating a particular symptom of 
white domination).
This mode of thinking about the conditions which enable the emergence of 
egalitarian reforms within broader political and legal structures which work to preclude
61 I use the term challenges o f  legitimation to refer to public expectations regarding the suitability o f  public 
policies to satisfty established standards o f efficacy and constitutionality. I use the term challenges o f  
coordination  to refer to practical necessities to reconcile between competing interests (e.g. economic and 
political) and competing values (e.g. the tension between white supremacy and America’s democratic 
creeds) which are affected by prevailing patterns o f  black victimization or by proposed legislative 
responses to such victimization. On the role o f  legitimation and coordination in shaping the attribution o f  
criminal responsibility more generally, see: Lacey (2001: 368-371).
62 Bell (1980).
63 King and Smith (2008).
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emancipatory revolutionary change harks backs to Marx’s classical analysis of the 
emergence of the (“pro-worker”) Factory Acts in post-1830s England.64 For Marx, the 
conditions of existence of such a regime lay in its suitability to stabilize the capitalist 
system even if by means of reining in the interests of individual capitalists. While my 
analysis draws on the basic arguments elaborated by both Bell and Marx (the latter with an 
emphasis on class; the former with a focus on race), it seeks to highlight a theme which is 
more fully developed in critical race theory than in orthodox Marxist thought. Bell’s 
writings aptly stress the extent to which the dependency of racial remedies on their 
intended contribution to reinforcing hegemonic interests is experienced by black activists 
as an uneasy strategic dilemma (rather than, as would be implied by orthodox Marxists, 
reflect a form of false consciousness). The tragic dimensions of this dilemma are obscured 
in orthodox Marxist thinking in light of the vision that a revolutionary change which would 
eliminate the very roots of human exploitation and alienation is achievable (or, in the more 
teleological versions, is inevitable). Distinctively, dominant strands of African-American 
thinking have always been sceptical of such a utopian and revolutionary vision of political 
change, and more attuned to the pragmatic compromises which had to be taken in order to 
ameliorate particular aspects of the black predicament.65 As acknowledged by Kimberle 
Crenshaw:
“Critics are correct in observing that engaging in rights discourse has helped to deradicalise 
and co-opt the challenge. Yet, they fail to acknowledge the limited range of options 
presented to Blacks in a context where they were deemed 'Other* and the unlikelihood that 
specific demands for inclusion and equality would be heard if articulated in other terms” 66
Accordingly, while our historical analysis seeks to pinpoint the incentives which impelled elites 
and legislatures to launch a new regime of “pro-black” criminalization in particular moments of 
American history, it also attempts not to lose sight of the valuable emancipatory dimension which 
these reforms entailed. This dimension lies in their contribution to providing African-Americans
64 Marx (1992: 389-417)[1867].
65 This pragmatist strand is already noticeable in W.E.B. Du Bois writings on the double consciousness o f  
African-Americans as political subjects. See: Du Bois ( 1996)[ 1905].
66 Crenshaw (1988: 1355).
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with a minimal measure of protection and respect to their human dignity (even if, in the larger 
scheme of things, they served to stabilize the structure of race relations).
For example, in chapter 2, I will argue that the emergence and diffusion of ‘‘pro­
slave” criminalization from 1890 onwards was responsive to new economic and political 
challenges with which Southern elites were faced. These challenges were associated with 
the escalation o f regional controversies over the legitimacy and economic sustainability of 
Southern slavery, as well as in internal changes within the Southern economy. In chapter 4, 
I will argue that the introduction of “federally protected activities” legislation in the 1960s 
was responsive to new pressures of legitimation which the federal government faced in the 
post-war epoch. In particular, these challenges were associated with the increasing electoral 
leverage of black voters in the national political arena; the damage caused to the reputation 
of American democracy abroad in light o f the thriving of white supremacist brutality in the 
South; and the need to reinforce rising public expectations regarding the competence of the 
federal administration to solve the nation’s core social problems. In chapter 5 ,1 will argue 
that the introduction of hate crime laws was facilitated by the crystallization of electoral 
incentives which impelled politicians from both major parties to endorse this particular 
form (penalty enhancement) of racial reform.
To summarize, in this section, I introduced the explanatory framework employed in 
this study for analyzing the conditions of existence of “pro-minority” criminalization. I 
delineated the way in which this framework moves beyond the explanatory limitations and 
methodological pitfalls of the theses presented by the major socio-historical studies on the 
origins of hate crime laws. As noted above, the overall argument presented in this 
dissertation is premised on a distinction between two paths of inquiry. The first (discussed 
thus far) examines the conditions of existence of “pro-minority” criminalization policy; the 
second probes the effects which such policies produce. This distinction is attentive to the 
fact that the intended goals of legal reforms can never be actualized in full. Legal reforms 
are always prone to engender unintended consequences. The indeterminacy of legal rules, 
and the intervention o f unforeseeable historical circumstances, might subvert the original 
purposes which led to the enactment of these reforms. In the next section, I move to discuss 
the framework used for analyzing the effects o f “pro-minority” criminalization.
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C. Rethinking the Effects of “Pro-Minority” Criminalization
The introduction of hate crime legislation was widely portrayed as a radical departure from 
a long and gory history of failures to protect African-American victims. As this study 
attempts to show, this portrayal is not sufficiently informed by the historical lessons of 
earlier epochs in which American legislatures adopted new models o f “pro-black” criminal 
legislation. Yet it also demonstrates the prevalence of unrealistic expectations regarding the 
actual achievements that “pro-minority” criminalization reforms are capable of attaining. 
These exorbitant expectations suffuse not only the rhetoric of legislatures and advocacy 
organizations which are fully invested in singing the praises of hate crime legislation.67 
They are also noticeable in much of the academic literature on the topic. This is apparent, 
for example, in much of the normative literature which seeks to furnish a justification for 
penalty enhancement laws.68 Proponents of such legislation have argued that penalty 
enhancement laws are warranted in order to increase the deterrent impact69 or better to 
convey society’s disapproval of such conducts.70 Leaving aside the question of the 
normative persuasiveness of these arguments, it is arguable that they often reflect an 
idealized image of the actual suitability of criminal law to achieve its declared goals, either 
as an instrument of harm prevention (as emphasized by the utilitarian tradition) or as a 
communicative vehicle through which the community’s moral censure is expressed (as 
stressed by retributive or communicative theories). In light of the partition between, on the 
one hand, analytic/normative criminal theory, and, on the other hand, socio-legal and 
criminal justice perspectives on criminalization,71 the normative literature on hate crime has 
not paid sufficient attention to considering whether the institutional preconditions which 
are necessary for the realization of the normative justifying aims of hate crime laws are 
likely to be satisfied given our empirical knowledge of the modus operandi of the 
American criminal justice system. This problem is not unique to the context of hate crime
67 See, e.g. “ADL Hails Long Overdue Enactment O f Federal Hate Crime Laws As A ‘Monumental 
Achievement For America’ (http://www.adl.org/PresRele/HatCr 51/5635 51.htm).
68 For a critical review o f  the normative literature on hate crime, see Hurd and Moore (2003).
69 Levin and McDevit (1993: 217; arguing that “a strong prison sentence sends a signal to would-be 
hatemongers everywhere that should they illegally express their bigotry, they can expect to receive more 
than a mere slap on the wrist’*).
70 Kahan (1996: 599); (1998: 1641).
71 Lacey (2007: 199).
24
policy. It is also raised in other contexts of “pro-minority” criminalization (and indeed in 
various other contexts of criminal justice reforms).72
In this section, I will introduce an explanatory framework for analyzing the suitability 
of “pro-minority” criminalization to meet the expectations of progressive reformers. This 
introduction does not attempt to establish conclusive arguments regarding the way in which 
“pro-minority” legal regimes will fimction whenever and wherever they exist. Rather, I will 
try to develop a set of hypotheses regarding the institutional, cultural and political conditions 
which affect the achievability of the justifying aims of such reforms (as articulated by their 
proponents). These hypotheses draw on sociologically informed perspectives on the 
institutional and political functioning of criminalization in general (mostly drawn from socio- 
legal studies, criminal justice studies, and sociology of law). The explanatory power of these 
hypotheses will be examined throughout the analysis of the consequences brought about by 
the different criminalization regimes through which the problem of black victimization has 
been tackled in different historical phases. Their explanatory power with regard to the 
operation of “pro-minority” criminalization in other contexts of social antagonism or in other 
national settings will have to be examined in follow-up studies. Presumably, such a 
comparative project will reveal both similarities and dissimilarities across space, time, and 
the specific patterns of social harm which each campaign have sought to address.
Common justifications for the introduction of new categories of “pro-minority” 
criminal legislation usually refer to three intended goals. The first goal is to minimize the 
vulnerability o f women and marginalized minority groups to victimization (the preventive 
rationale). The second goal is to use criminalization campaigns as tactical means within 
broader straggles for political empowerment and recognition. The introduction of “pro­
minority” criminalization reforms serves to symbolize the official recognition of the 
principled entitlement of all citizens to equal enjoyment of citizenship rights, regardless of 
their race, gender, or sexual preferences.73 In turn, this official recognition might serve to 
facilitate the mobilization of civil rights reforms in other policy domains as well (the political 
empowerment rationale). The third goal is to use criminalization campaigns in order to
72 Lacey (2008: 13).
73 Harel and Pachomovsky (1999: 509).
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erode the legitimacy of social practices which serve to degrade and to stereotype women and 
minority groups. Exponents of this rationale maintain that, because criminal law serves as a 
medium through which societies construct their collective norms, the outlawing of forms of 
conduct which express white supremacist, patriarchal or homophobic degradation is likely to 
induce stronger public disapproval of these systems of belief (the educative rationale).
In what follows, I will succinctly present the core arguments which ground these 
three distinct rationales, and then consider some of the institutional, cultural and political 
dynamics which affect their achievability in the context of “pro-minority” 
criminalization. Before turning to this task, it is important to note that the distinction 
between the three rationales of “pro-minority” criminalization is employed for analytic 
reasons. In practice, the preventive, political and educative effects of this legislation 
interact with one another. Accordingly, while the theoretical analysis offered in this 
section attempts to pinpoint the relative autonomy of these different justifying aims vis-a- 
vis one another, the historical analysis which will be presented in chapters 2-5 will take a 
close look at the symbiotic or counteracting interactions between them.
Cl. The Recourse to “Pro-Minority” Criminalization as a Vehicle o f Harm Reduction
The first goal of “pro-minority” criminalization campaigns is to minimize the scope of the 
outlawed conduct and thereby to reduce the vulnerability of women and minorities to social 
harm. Criminal law is believed to be capable of reducing victimization in various ways, 
most directly, by deterring and incapacitating would-be offenders.74 By subjecting 
perpetrators of racist violence to enhanced penalties, the anti-hate crime movement had 
sought to augment the deterrent and incapacitative effects of the original criminal offence. 
This rationale appeals to popular convictions about the instrumental efficacy of criminal 
law. However, a careful analysis of the institutional and cultural conditions which affect the 
achievability of the preventive aims of criminal legislation reveals a range o f structural 
deficiencies which “pro-minority” criminalization regimes are likely to suffer from.
First, the revision of statutory rules for ascribing criminal responsibility or for penalizing 
particular forms of conduct will not necessarily be followed by the alteration of enforcement
74 Von Hirsch and Ashworth (2009: chapters 2, 3).
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practices. Nor is it certain that such reforms would be accompanied by the allocation of greater 
administrative and budgetary resources to the policing and prosecution of such conduct. Thus, 
even when legislatures are incentivizedto introduce new “pro-minority” criminal offences (e.g. in 
order to appeal to particular groups of voters), these statutory reforms might be insulated from the 
institutional settings in which these reforms will be implemented. Given the bulk of empirical and 
historical evidence on the disparate outcomes of criminalization policies across racial, gender, and 
class divides, one would expect these institutional factors to be especially constraining in relation 
to “pro-minority” criminalization. The discussion in chapters 2-4 will depict the institutional 
patterns which inhibited the enforceability of “pro-black” criminalization regimes prior to the 
“civil rights revolution”. Still, the urgent question pertains to the extent to which this problem 
continues to constrain the preventive effects of hate crime policies today, in an era in which overt 
forms of racial discrimination are no longer deemed acceptable.75 This question will be 
considered in detail in chapters 5 and 6. By placing hate crime policies within the broader 
landscape of the administration of criminal justice in the contemporary US, I will show that this 
structural impediment has not been eliminated.
Current demographics of crime enforcement attest to the pervasiveness of 
inexorable racial disparities in virtually all aspects of the criminal process. Over the last 
decades, incarceration rates among African-Americans have soared. By 2006, African- 
Americans, who make up less than 13 per cent of the U.S. population, comprised more than 
half of the nation’s imprisoned population.76 The overwhelming incarceration rate of 
African-Americans is produced by the accumulative effect of various patterns of racially- 
skewed enforcement, in the fields of policing,77 sentencing78 and prosecutorial decision­
making.79 It is debatable whether present-day disparities in crime enforcement are rooted in 
relics of racial prejudice, in the enhanced susceptibility of racial and ethnic minorities to 
engage in illegal activities (due largely to the exclusion of large segments of the black 
population from the labour market of post-Keynesian economy), or in a vicious cycle
75 Sklanky (2008: chapter 7); Loftus (2008: 758).
76 Gottschalk (2006: 2).
77 Harcourt (2007).
78 Tonry (1995: chapter 2).
79 Davis (2007: 183-195).
27
between these two sources.80 What is certain is that, as long as these disparities continue to 
prevail, they are likely to affect the way in which the American criminal justice system 
processes cases of violence against African-American victims, notwithstanding the legislative 
declaration of their right to equal (or even special) protection. When we move beyond the 
narrow concept of criminalization as revolving around the formal outlawing of a particular 
form of conduct, and instead focus on the operation of criminalization regimes as a set of 
practices and processes through which social agents identify and respond to crime,81 it is 
questionable whether the institutional settings which prevail in contemporary American 
criminal justice system are suitable to deliver the protective promise of hate crime laws. The 
key for ameliorating the predicament of African-American victims, I would argue, does not 
lie in the further enhancement of penalties (as continued to be asserted by senior 
policymakers, most recently, by the Attorney General of the Obama Administration).82 In 
fact, it requires not only the transformation of a whole range of institutional practices which 
appear to be entrenched within the modus operandi of American crime enforcement 
institutions. It also necessitates tackling demographic and economic conditions which are 
positively correlated with inducing crime and disorder (whether intra-racial or inter-racial).
Within this context, it is arguable that the introduction of “pro-minority” legislation might 
actually perpetuate patterns of unequal enforcement As famously argued by Kimberle Crenshaw, 
in a society in which patterns of gender, class, and racial/ethnic stratification systematically 
intersect with one another, it is probable that legislation that specifically attempts to protect a 
particular minority group will be enforced in a way which correlates with general patterns of 
unequal enforcement and thus end up over-targeting the most marginalized groups of 
perpetrators.83 As Crenshaw demonstrated, in the American case, this dynamic would typically 
lead to the over-targeting of poor black and Latino perpetrators of violence committed against 
women or against one another.84 As I will show in chapter 5, this pitfall has been pronounced in 
the demographics of enforcement of hate crime legislation. Notwithstanding the egalitarian
80 Reiner (1992: 770).
81 See the proposed definition o f  the concept o f criminalization, supra note 15; see also: Lacey (2009: 943- 
947).
82 “AG Holder Urges New Hate Crime Laws”, San Francisco Chronicle 16.06.09 
(http://www.sfgate.eom/cgi-bin/aiticle.cgi7fWn/a/2009/06/16/national/wl34036D70.DTL).
83 Crenshaw (1991).
84 Crenshaw (1991: 1246).
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message of this legislation, African-American and Latino suspects are overrepresented among 
those prosecuted for hate crimes.85 As will be shown in chapter 2, a similar dynamic transpired in 
the antebellum era, when ‘"pro-slave” criminalization was predominantly enforced against poor 
white perpetrators (whose acts of aggression toward slaves damaged the monetary interests and 
paternalistic prerogatives of slave-holders), while leaving the forms of racial oppression practised 
on a large-scale within plantations virtually unregulated
Second, the efficacy of criminal legislation is crucially dependent on the degree to 
which the values it embodies are buttressed by informal social controls and endorsed by the 
bulk of the population. Processes of criminalization involve the participation of multiple social 
actors, including both ordinary citizens (e.g. victims and witnesses) and professional agents 
throughout various stages of the criminal process.86 These agents inevitably employ their 
personal values and subjective judgments while considering whether to classify a particular 
conduct as a “crime” and whether to facilitate the processing of such conduct by policing, 
prosecutorial, and judicial institutions. Thus, “pro-minority” criminalization cannot serve as a 
vanguard force of social change. The egalitarian values which this legislation conveys will be 
effectively enforced only if they resonate with widespread social norms, because these norms 
shape the systems of epistemological and normative assumptions which inform the 
interpretation of the behaviour under scrutiny.87 To be sure, these systems of values are never 
fixed or impervious to transformative forces. Thus, the extent to which specific “pro-minority” 
criminalization regimes are likely to suffer from this pitfall will vary from one context to 
another. However, as my analysis will show, this problem has been repeatedly pronounced 
even in times in which racial norms appeared to undergo significant transformations.
Thirdly, criminalization reforms often serve to displace alternative forms of policy 
intervention which might be more effective in minimizing the vulnerability of minority 
groups to victimization. As Nicola Lacey and her colleagues point out, although “empirical 
evidence suggests that the reductive effects of criminal processes...are meagre, and casts 
doubt on the validity of characterising criminal law primarily in instrumental terms... it may 
be that a widespread belief in the instrumental efficacy and necessity of criminal law is
85 See figures in chapter 5, section E l .
86 Lacey (1995).
87 Lacey (1995: 8).
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something which typically underpins its existence”.88 Because the introduction of new 
criminal laws dramatize politicians’ commitment to eliminate the problem, policymakers are 
incentivized to prioritize the launching of new regimes of “pro-minority” criminalization vis- 
a-vis the sponsoring of “softer” instruments of policy intervention. However, with regard to 
many aspects of minority victimization, it is the latter type of reforms (e.g. greater spending 
on educational schemes for promoting intergroup tolerance) which are likely to produce 
long-term impact on these patterns of offending and victimization.
As I have argued elsewhere, the structural shifts which took place in American 
politics throughout the last three decades have increased the likelihood that populist forms 
of “pro-minority” criminal lawmaking would come to displace the development of non- 
punitive policy measures.89 Over the last decades, electoral incentives to conform to a 
“tough on crime” posture have become more decisive.90 The heavier dependence of the two 
major parties on the support of floating, median voters had increased the leverage o f single­
issue organizations which frame their demands around the problem of victimization.91 In 
response, politicians are increasingly inclined to opt for symbolic (and excessively harsh) 
penal responses to problems of minority victimization, even when criminological research 
warns against the futility or even counter-productiveness of such policies.92 At the same 
time, the development of welfarist responses which might be better equipped to alleviate 
the socio-economic underpinnings of these forms of victimization has been considerably 
constrained by the declining political support of social-democratic welfarism.93
My analysis will show that, although the forms which this structural pitfall has 
taken throughout the unfolding of the hate crime campaign reflected the historical 
contingencies of the day (i.e. the impact of neoliberal thinking on post-1980 public policy), 
the tendency of criminalization reforms to displace the development of more structural 
policy solutions had also been noticeable in earlier stages of American racial history. At 
root, this stemmed from the reluctance o f governments to invest political capital in
88 Lacey, Welles and Quick (2003: 10).
89 Aharonson (2010: 17-19).
90 Lacey (2008: 75); Simon (2007a: chapter 3).
91 Lacey (2008: 68-70).
92 See, in the context o f  feminist campaigns against domestic violence and stalking, Bummiler (2008).
93 Beckett and Western (2001).
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attempting to abolish the structural mechanisms which produced the criminogenic 
conditions within which the victimization of African-American had flourished. Thus, for 
example, antebellum Southern legislatures opted for penalizing individual cases of 
abusing slaves while relentlessly opposing any meaningful attempt to abolish slavery or 
to confer civil rights upon slaves. It was clear, however, that as long as the large-scale 
mechanisms of economic exploitation, dehumanization, and political repression that the 
slavery system amalgamated remained in force, these criminalization reforms could not 
have significantly minimized the suffering of African-American victims.
Fourth, it is important to recall that, even when “pro-minority” criminalization 
reforms succeed in minimizing the vulnerability of minority groups to particular forms of harm 
(e.g. those which are conceptualized as “hate crimes”), their suitability to reduce other harmful 
experiences to which marginalized minorities are disproportionately exposed are meagre. As 
Paddy Hillyard and his colleagues have argued, the concept of crime in intrinsically flawed in 
its suitability to encompass some of the gravest forms of harm to which individuals are 
subjected, not least, the large-scale mechanisms of harm production that are built into the 
modus operandi of the market economy and of the bureaucracies of the modem State.94 This 
“zemiological” approach can be usefully applied for thinking about the limited suitability of the 
concept of “hate crime” to encompass the variety of economic, social and political 
disadvantages to which African-Americans are disproportionally exposed in post-Keynesian 
American economy. A similar observation can be applied for analyzing the shortcomings of the 
legal categories used in earlier historical regimes of “pro-black” criminalization (such as “slave 
abuse” or “federally protected activities”) for capturing the massive mechanisms of harm 
production built into the systems of slavery and Jim Crow. As I will further argue in my 
critique of the political empowerment rationale, because “pro-minority” criminalization serves 
to reinforce public trust in the commitment of American law to minimizing the role of race in 
shaping individuals’ vulnerability to social harm, legislative reforms in this field might obscure 
the persistence of the large-scale mechanisms of racially-skewed harm production which 
cannot be effectively framed in terms of “criminal wrongs” (e.g. because they cannot be 
attributed to the voluntary acts of an individual perpetrator or cannot be policed effectively).
94 Hillyard (et al, 2004).
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C2. The Recourse to “Pro-Minority” Criminalization as a Vehicle of Political Empowerment
The second justifying aim of “pro-minority” criminalization campaigns is to serve as 
vehicles of political empowerment. These campaigns seek to call upon the State to 
recognize its normative commitment to provide members of minority groups with 
adequate protection from violence. The attainment of such official recognition is believed 
to constitute an independent goal of progressive politics. It is argued that, even if  this 
declaration fails to be translated into effective enforcement policies, it nevertheless 
signals an intrinsically valuable message and provides a critical standard against which 
the performances of the criminal justice system can be measured. 95 In addition, and 
again, independently of their success in preventing crime, these campaigns might serve as 
tactical means within broader struggles for political empowerment. By calling attention to 
the suffering of minority victims and showing that their experiences are symptomatic of 
broader patterns of governmental neglect and discrimination, progressive social 
movements seek to galvanize public support for the extension of civil rights not only in 
the penal sphere but also in other domains of public policy.
Over the last decades, the literature on the politics of crime has paid close attention 
to the strategic uses of political mobilization around the problem of victimization within 
grassroots and electoral campaigns. My analysis in chapter 5 draws on this literature by 
showing how these new forms of progressive mobilization transformed the way in which 
the problem of black victimization has been tackled in post-1980 American politics. 
However, the dissertation also gives focus to two issues which are relatively 
underdeveloped in the existing literature. First, it extends the conventional historical 
prism and looks at the way in which problems o f victimization had been framed in earlier 
periods of American history;96 second, whereas much of the literature has focused on the 
role of victims’ rights campaigns in furthering conservative reforms (e.g. curtailing
95 For a justification o f hate crime laws on the ground o f  the intrinsic merit o f its expressive function, see 
Lawrence (1999: 153).
96 In this context, I take my cue from the important works such as Bosworth (2009: chapters 1, 2); 
Gottschalk (2006: chapter 3); Miller (2008: chapter 2). These studies have demonstrated how long-term 
historical transformations which hark back to the early Republican or even the colonial era laid the 
ideological and institutional foundations for contemporary practices in the fields o f  criminalization and 
imprisonment.
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procedural rights; harshening penal policies; and legitimating the expansion of the State’s 
power to incarcerate),97 this study focuses on campaigns which would normally be 
characterized as progressive (in the sense that they mobilize around the grievances of 
marginalized minority groups). Accordingly, the study’s original contribution to this 
literature is twofold. First, I offer a comparative historical prism for examining how 
contemporary forms of mobilizing around the problem of victimization both extends and 
deviates from the forms used in earlier historical periods; second, I explore how the 
convergence between conservative and progressive agendas throughout the framing of 
the hate crime campaign have shaped its character and outcomes.
The tactical incorporation of criminalization campaigns within broader egalitarian 
struggles seeks to utilize the symbolic qualities of victimization as a powerful metaphor of 
human vulnerability. “Pro-minority” criminalization campaigns typically spotlight the most 
overtly violent and obviously appalling behavioural expressions of discriminatory norms 
that are manifested in more “civilized” manner by various other social and institutional 
practices that are deemed legitimate and non-coercive. For example, at the same time that 
the anti-lynching campaign was gaining ground throughout the first half of the twentieth 
century, various forms of symbolizing blacks’ inferior status (embedded both within the 
Southern system of Jim Crow and within the Northern structure of race relations) were still 
regarded as legitimate and non-coercive. This might explain a peculiar historical pattern: 
throughout American history, “pro-black” criminalization campaigns were successful in 
generating policy reforms even in times in which public opinion relentlessly rejected other 
progressive campaigns which sought to ameliorate the social and political conditions of 
African-Americans. For example, as shown in chapter 2, the scope and range of criminal 
laws prohibiting “slave abuse” was significantly expanded between 1830 and 1865, at the 
same time in which Southern governments erected harsher restrictions on manumissions 
and criminalized campaigning for Abolitionism. As will be argued in chapter 5, the anti­
hate crime campaign had gained momentum in the very same decade in which American 
society was willing to tolerate an unprecedented increase in the number of African- 
Americans behind bars and a marked exacerbation o f various other indicators of social
97 E.g. Dubber (2002: chapters 1-3); Weed (1995); Elias (1993); Henderson (1985).
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marginality.98 These examples imply that, even if  proponents of hate crime laws are correct 
in observing that such laws cement social solidarities with the suffering of victims who 
belong to minority groups," it is questionable whether these forms of solidarity are firm 
enough for spurring public support of structural egalitarian reforms (even when such 
reforms are needed for eradicating the root causes of these forms of victimization). “Pro­
minority” criminalization campaigns can gain political support even in times of limited 
receptiveness to structural egalitarian reforms because they tend to circumvent the fiercest 
ideological controversies on the agenda of racial reformism and to spotlight individual 
cases of unjustifiable racial brutality. However, this very feature inhibited the success of 
these reforms in serving as potent vehicles of ‘consciousness raising’ and galvanizing 
public support for wider egalitarian reforms.100
In part, the intrinsic limits of “pro-minority” criminalization campaigns as vehicles of 
egalitarian political reform stem from their susceptibility to being expropriated as a means of 
legitimating the purported adherence of State institutions to principles of racial fairness and 
equal protection. By endorsing criminalization campaigns, governments are provided with a 
favourable instrument for manipulating the political meanings of existing patterns of minority 
victimization. Because criminal law is, in essence, a mechanism which governs the 
attribution of individual blame for the materialization of social harm, the construction of 
social problems as instances of “crime” tends to spotlight the responsibility of the individual 
perpetrator to the injury suffered by the victim,101 and to present his actions as deviant. It is 
important to acknowledge that the focus on holding individuals accountable for the harmful 
consequences of their wrongful actions should not be seen as a mere sham since it addresses 
a warranted moral concern with the role of agency in producing social harm.102 Hence, the 
individualistic tilt of criminal law need not necessarily preclude the suitability of “pro­
minority” criminalization to serve as a catalyst for stimulating public debate on the
98 Wilson (2009: chapters 2 ,3 ).
99 Lawrence (1999: 163).
100 The idea that legal campaigns should serve as vehicles o f  progressive ‘consciousness raising’ was classically 
articulated by Catherine MacKinnon (1991a: 83-105). MacKinnon’s pioneering scholarship continues to inspire 
various “pro-minority” criminalization campaigns at both national and international contexts.
101 As Alan N om e (2001: 223) shows, in orthodox criminal law thinking, this mode o f  construction 
“operates to seal o ff  the question o f  individual culpability from issues concerning the relationship between 
individual agency and social context”.
102 Norrie (2000: 61-62; 85-86).
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complicity of the State in breeding the criminogenic conditions within which these forms of 
minority victimization thrive. However, it will be shown, this potential was not often 
materialized throughout American racial history. More frequently, the focus of such 
campaigns on spotlighting extreme manifestations of white supremacist brutality served to 
divert public attention from the large-scale economic and social forces which shaped these 
patterns of brutality and to obfuscate the harmfulness of “non-criminal” forms of social injury 
to which African-Americans were disproportionately exposed. Paradoxically, then, the very 
success of “pro-minority” criminalization reforms might serve to de-radicalize the struggle 
for social equality.
Along these lines, the dissertation will make a twofold distinctive contribution to the 
sociological literature on the role of piecemeal progressive reforms in legitimating broad 
systems of social inequality. First, in the analysis of the historical driving forces which led to 
the materialization of new regimes of “pro-black” criminalization, I will consider the role 
played by pressures of legitimation in impelling legislatures and elites to establish these new 
legislative frameworks. Second, in studying the effects of “pro-minority” criminalization 
regimes, I will look at the distinct contribution of these regimes to reinforcing public trust in 
the legitimacy of racial relations. Overall, I will show that “pro-black” criminalization policy 
has served as one of the major ideological vehicles through which political authorities have 
reconciled America’s self-image as a beacon of democratic and meritocratic values with its 
actual patterns of racial stratification.
C3. The Recourse to “Pro-Minority ” Criminalization as an Educative Instrument
The third justifying aim of “pro-minority” criminalization policy is to serve as an educative 
instrument that works to de-legitimate degrading and discriminatory social norms. The educative 
rationale draws on a broader jurisprudential view which characterizes law as a communicative 
vehicle which induces individuals not only to obey a shared set of behavioural standards but 
also to recognize their normative force.103 This approach depicts criminal law as a cultural 
medium which not only mirrors society’s fundamental moral values but also (as stressed by 
Durkheim) strengthens the emotional attachment of community members to these values.
103 Burge-Hendrix (2007: 250).
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One of the most subtle formulations of the educative rationale can be found in E.P. 
Thompson’s modification of the Neo-Marxist critique of the rule of law.104 Thompson agrees 
with the Marxist premise that, at the macro-structural level, the mediation of class relations 
through the forms of law serves to de-politicize and thus to naturalize social inequality. 
However, he stresses, from the perspective of its influence on the lived experiences of 
individual agents, the need to interpret social relations in the shadow of the law introduces a 
set of ethical constraints which delimit the behavioural forms through which social 
domination can be legitimately practised. Accordingly, it could be argued that, insofar as 
everyday interracial interactions had indeed been bargained in the shadow of the law, such 
legislation worked to erode the perceived legitimacy of these particular forms of racial 
degradation, and, to some extent, to challenge the arbitrariness of racial domination at large.
The educative rationale is one of the most salient in the literature on the 
philosophical foundations o f hate crime laws.105 However, advocates of hate crime 
legislation often refer to its ability to transform racist attitudes as a probable outcome 
which would follow mechanistically from the formal act of lawmaking. In contrast, this 
study attempts to scrutinize the social and institutional preconditions which are necessary 
for the delivery of the educative function of “pro-minority” criminal laws. I will show 
that the success of “pro-minority” criminal legislation in transforming racist attitudes is 
dependent on a variety o f cultural factors within the social landscape in which these laws 
are applied. These factors include not only racial attitudes, but also broader modes of 
thinking about the role of law within the social order. In particular, I will show that the 
normalization of vigilantism and the contested legitimacy o f constitutional norms in 
Southern political culture had considerably constrained the success o f “pro-black” legal 
reforms in alleviating racist practices and institutions.
My historical analysis will show that “pro-black” criminalization reforms did not 
bring about dramatic changes in American race relations. In fact, the implementation of such 
legislation has more often mirrored prevailing racial norms and sensibilities than it had called 
them into question. This reflects a structural aspect of processes of criminalization: their
104 Thompson (1976).
105 Hurd and Moore (2003: 1111).
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dependence on the exercise o f discretion by both institutional actors and lay citizens while 
engaging in interpretive practices through which they identify and respond to “crime”. In 
deciding whether to classify a particular conduct as a public wrong and as warranting the 
imposition o f penal sanctions on its perpetrator, these interpretive practices are likely to 
reflect dominant cultural assumptions and popular prejudices. This observation has important 
implications not only for the constraints that a racist culture impose on the crime preventive 
merits of such legislation (as noted earlier in our discussion of the preventive rationale). It 
also puts at stake the suitability of such legislation to challenge the fundamental premises of 
deep-seated cultural convictions about race (although, as noted above, it might be able to 
moderate their prevalent forms of permissible expression). Indeed, it may be that when 
political, social and economic forces have already pushed society toward the moderation of 
racial animus, such legislation would become more capable of fulfilling its potential as an 
educative instrument. Yet, this observation only reaffirms the view that social movements 
should focus their efforts on non-legalistic forms of mobilization, and should eschew 
prioritizing criminalization campaigns as major strategic vehicles.
D. Outline of the Dissertation
Let me conclude this introductory chapter by delineating the main questions and 
historical theses presented throughout this study. In the next four chapters, I explore the 
origins and effects of the criminalization regimes through which the problem of black 
victimization was tackled in four distinct eras of American racial history. The sixth 
chapter of this study will summarize the theoretical implications of this historical analysis 
for our analysis of the intrinsic limitations o f “pro-minority” criminalization.
In chapter 2, I explore the historical evolution of legal responses to the victimization of 
African-Americans by white offenders in the colonial (1619-1790) and antebellum (1790-1865) 
periods. The chapter shows that, throughout the antebellum period, Southern legislatures and courts 
developed a body of law which was specifically designed to protect slaves from abuse. The feet that 
antebellum Southern legislatures and elites chose to establish a legal framework for restricting the 
forms and measure of coercion that could be legitimately inflicted upon slaves poses a challenge to 
conventional theories of the conditions under which “pro-minority” criminalization reforms are
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likely to be materialized After all, this legislative reform gained momentum in a period in which 
African-Americans were relentlessly deprived of any form of influence on public policy.
The chapter addresses two main questions. First, what were the driving forces which 
led to the origination of “pro-slave” criminal legislation in the late eighteenth century and to 
its accelerated development throughout the final decades of the antebellum period? Second, 
what were the preventive, political and cultural effects which this legislation brought about?
The discussion probes how the forms of behaviour that were legally recognized as 
constituting “slave abuse” impaired hegemonic economic and political interests which were 
protected by Southern law. It then traces the various functions of coordination and 
legitimation played by the “pro-slave” criminalization regime within the Southern political 
and social order. These functions included: enforcing the monetary interests and 
paternalistic prerogatives of slaveholders; relieving pressures of competition which would 
have thrived in a completely unbridled slave economy; preserving the fitness and hence the 
productivity of the labour force; and legitimating the institution of slavery in the face of 
Abolitionist protest by presenting plantation practices as bounded by principles of legality 
and fairness. However, the analysis emphasizes that, although this legal regime had served 
to stabilize the institution of slavery at the macro-structural level, it nevertheless provided 
slaves with a certain measure of protection. By considering the extent to which this 
criminalization regime was suitable to satisfy the institutional and cultural conditions that 
were necessary for securing its effective enforceability, I explain why this regime failed in 
meeting its stated aims. I conclude by drawing the lessons of this failure for our 
understanding the limits of present-day “pro-black” criminalization policies.
In chapter 3 , 1 explore the way in which the problem of black victimization was 
debated and acted upon throughout the Reconstruction (1865-1877) and post- 
Reconstruction (1877-1909) eras. The chapter shows that the ebb and flow of “pro-black” 
criminalization policy during these decades reflected the broader transformations which 
came to pass in American racial politics. In the early 1870s, the federal government 
established new mechanisms for prosecuting Klan terrorists. However, with the collapse 
of Reconstruction, this short-lived experiment of federal “pro-black” criminalization
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policy had been dismantled. In defiance of the expectations which accompanied the 
tremendous legal empowerment o f African-Americans during Reconstruction, the late 
nineteenth century was characterized by the marked deterioration of American race 
relations. The radicalization of Southern white supremacist consciousness found expression 
both in the thriving of new forms of ritualized racist violence and in the manifested 
abdication of enforcement responsibilities by Southern authorities. At the same time, the 
federal administration refrained from utilizing its new powers to prosecute white 
supremacist perpetrators under the Enforcement Acts of the Reconstruction Amendments.
Accordingly, the chapter focuses on two main questions. First, why was the formal 
equalization of African-Americans’ constitutional rights followed by the retreat of both 
Southern and national authorities from assuming responsibility to preventing white supremacist 
violence? Second, how did the de facto de-criminalization of racist violence throughout this 
era interact with the cultural and political processes through which Southern society has 
moved from one system of racial domination (slavery) to another (Jim Crow)?
My analysis focuses on the way in which a cluster of structural transformations 
which took place at both the national and regional political arenas had removed the incentives 
which prodded federal and Southern authorities to engage in “pro-black” criminalization 
policymaking throughout earlier decades. In light of the increasing electoral leverage of poor 
whites, on the one hand, and the alleviation of the economic interests and paternalistic sentiments 
which impelled Southern elites to support such legislation in earlier periods, on the other hand, 
post-Reconstruction Southern politics became relentlessly unreceptive to any form of benevolent 
“pro-black” mobilization. The discussion emphasizes that, in theory, the introduction of a new 
regime of “pro-black” criminal legislation could have served to legitimate salient aspects of the 
Southern political order. For example, it could have reinforced Southern states’ claims to 
monopoly over the use of legitimate means of coercion, a prerogative which was openly defied 
by the thriving of public torture lynching rituals. In addition, such legislation might have served to 
legitimate Jim Crow by means of portraying it as capable of accommodating fundamental 
principles of racial fairness and respect to human dignity. However, I show that the pervasiveness 
of white supremacist sentiments in post-Reconstruction culture and politics impeded the 
development of virtually any form of grassroots or electoral mobilization around the problem of
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black victimization. In the national political arena, the collapse of the first regime of federal civil 
rights criminalization policy reflected the general reluctance of post-Reconstruction federal 
governments to keep and invest political capital and administrative resources in guaranteeing 
Southern blacks’ civil rights. This retreat echoed a paradigm shift in prevailing constitutional and 
political understandings of the appropriate (minimal) role of the national administration in 
governing Southern race relations. The chapter demonstrates how the de facto de-criminalization 
of white supremacist violence served as a salient vehicle through which the inferior status of 
African-Americans was buttressed even under conditions of formal equal membership in the 
nation’s constitutional order. It concludes by delineating the major lessons which the nadir of 
“pro-black” criminalization in the late nineteenth century presents for our current thinking about 
the role of criminal law in mediating racial conflicts.
In Chapter 4 ,1 look at the transformation of public debate and policymaking on the 
problem of black victimization from 1909 to 1968. This period commenced with the founding 
of the NAACP, which spearheaded the campaign against white supremacist violence for the 
next six decades. It concluded with the establishment, between 1964 and 1968, of a new 
legislative framework for federal prosecutions of violent interferences with blacks’ civil rights. 
After nearly eight decades in which the federal administration insisted that the authority to 
penalize white supremacist terror laid within the exclusive jurisdiction of state governments, a 
significant policy U-tum transpired from the late 1950s. This development unfolded with the 
dispatching of federal troops to Little Rock, Arkansas in 1957, in the wake of a constitutional 
crisis provoked by the refusal of Southern authorities to enforce desegregation orders issued by 
federal courts. The new approach was consolidated between 1964 and 1968, with the 
enactment of a new legal framework for criminalizing interferences with a range of “federally 
protected activities” (e.g. voting, enrolling in public schools, and jury service).
This historical trajectory presents two sets of questions. First, what led the federal 
administration to abandon its previous position and to reclaim its authority to criminalize 
racist violence in this particular historical moment? Second, did the enactment of “federally 
protected activities” legislation contribute to minimizing the patterns of black victimization in 
the South and nationwide (and if so, how)? What were the short term and long term political 
impacts of the revival of federal “pro-black” criminalization policies in the 1960s?
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My analysis shows that the new forms of mobilization around the problem of black 
victimization were embedded within the broader strategies devised by the Civil Rights 
Movement for challenging the legitimacy of Jim Crow. The Movement effectively 
reconstructed the meaning of the problem of black victimization as a powerful symbol of the 
broader failure of the national administration to guarantee the basic citizenship rights of 
African-Americans in the South. The forces which had impelled the federal government to 
establish a new legal framework for addressing these challenges of legitimation were facilitated 
by three seismic historical processes which culminated in the post-war years. First, throughout 
the Great Migration, millions of African-Americans who were hitherto precluded from 
exercising their right to vote (de facto if not de jure) were incorporated into the Northern (and 
thus into the national) electorate. The increasing leverage of the black vote prodded the two 
major national parties to invest greater political capital in sponsoring civil rights reforms and to 
revisit their traditional position on the question of anti-lynching legislation. Second, with the 
intensification of Cold War pressures to polish the image of American democracy abroad, the 
impact of racist incidents on the nation’s international reputation emerged as a salient 
consideration in shaping national civil rights policy. Third, from the launching of New Deal 
policies in the 1930 and increasingly in the post-war years, the federal government had vastly 
expanded its institutional capacities and spheres of operation. The establishment of federal 
jurisdiction over the regulation of Southern racial practices facilitated the efforts of the national 
administration to establish itself as a key policymaker in the criminal justice field (not least, by 
means of demonstrating the shortcomings of states’ rights ideology).
In the latter two contexts, the creation of the new framework of federal “pro-black” 
criminalization was enabled by the contingent convergence of interests between the Civil Rights 
Movement and the federal administration. Through spotlighting the brutal methods used by 
Southern authorities and mobs for suppressing non-violent civil rights protest, the Movement’s 
strategic mobilization around the problem of black victimization had boosted public demand to 
expand the powers of the national administration vis-a-vis state governments. This interpretation of 
the conditions which enabled the emergence of this new regime of “pro-black” criminalization 
provides a useful context for rethinking the effects of this reform both on the patterns of black 
victimization and on American racial consciousness. The Movement’s strategic focus on the forms 
of victimization which were prevalent in the South had boosted its success in bringing Northern
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public opinion to support its immediate reformist goals (i.e. the abolition of Jim Crow, and the 
solidification of federal legislation in the fields of voting and equal opportunity rights). Yet this 
strategy had failed to foster political commitment to eliminating the distinct patterns of 
victimization which were pervasively suffered by African-Americans in the North. These patterns 
(which increasingly included intra-racial violence) were no longer shaped by traditional forms of 
white supremacist animus. Rather, they were nurtured by the demographic concentration of the 
black population in urban ghettoes blighted by devastating rates of poverty and crime. This failure 
is paradigmatic of the limited success of the Civil Rights Movement in galvanizing firm political 
commitment to eliminating the distinct forms of racial inequality which permeated Northern 
society and economy. I will argue that the achievements and the pitfalls which emanated from the 
Movement’s strategic mobilization around the problem of black victimization illustrate the 
unique qualities as well as intrinsic limits of social movements’ recourse to victim-centred 
mobilization while campaigning for egalitarian political reforms.
In Chapter 5 ,1 look at the way in which the problem of black victimization had been 
reframed and acted upon in the post-civil rights era (1968 to date). The defining development of 
this era was the advent of hate crime laws. This framework differs from earlier regimes of “pro­
minority” criminalization in various ways, three of which are of particular importance. First, hate 
crime laws give focus to the idea of penalty enhancement as the primary remedy to the age-old 
problem of the inadequate protection of African-American victims. Second, in contrast with the 
“federally protected activities” legislation of the 1960s and with the civil rights criminalization 
policies of the 1870s, hate crime legislation did not emerge as part of a broader framework; of 
comprehensive civil rights reforms. Accordingly, whereas these two earlier criminalization 
regimes were perceived as instrumental tools for guaranteeing the ability of African-Americans to 
participate in the political process or in civic and economic activities, hate crime laws frame the 
victim’s right to be free of racist harm as a self-contained entitlement. Furthermore, these laws 
frame the meaning of the victim’s rights as revolving around (and vindicated by) the infliction of 
harsher penalty upon the offender. A third distinct feature of hate crime laws is that, in contrast 
with earlier regimes of “pro-black” criminalization, they have gained bipartisan and 
cross-regional political support. The popularity of hate crime legislation is particularly 
noticeable since it emerged in a period in which the development of various other civil 
rights campaigns had been hindered amid the ascending of neo-liberalism as a dominant
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framework o f economic policymaking and the salience of neo-conservatism in fomenting 
the ideological opposition to state-sponsored egalitarian reforms.
The inquiry into the origins and effects of this most recent form of “pro-black” 
criminalization policy focuses on two sets of questions. First, why did the new 
framework of hate crime policy emerge in the 1980s? Second, have these reforms been 
successful in providing the criminal justice system with better tools for minimizing the 
plight of African-American victims? What are the political messages which hate crime 
legislation has conveyed? To what extent have these messages effectively spotlighted the 
interrelations between contemporary patterns of black victimization and broader patterns 
o f racial inequality in contemporary American society?
The analysis sets off by looking at how structural shifts which took place in the 
organizational and ideological forms through which the struggle for racial equality has been 
mobilized since the late 1960s reshaped the dominant forms of strategic mobilization around 
the problem of black victimization. Over the last four decades, the field of black activism has 
been reconfigured following the decline of grassroots mobilization and mass protest as the 
primary vehicles through which African-American activists seek to initiate policy reforms. 
Instead, the struggle for racial equality has come to be dominated by a plethora of single-issue 
advocacy organizations. Unlike the dominant organizational components of the Civil Rights 
Movement, these single-issue organizations do not necessarily espouse a shared or indeed 
coherent vision of egalitarian reform. This constellation seems potentially conducive to the 
development of a more diversified spectrum of racial egalitarian reformist projects (including 
projects which focus on the problem of black victimization). However, it also provides social 
movement organizations with stronger incentives to frame their demands in accordance with 
hegemonic political and media discourses in order to maximize their influence on public 
opinion and to secure policymakers’ support. By placing hate crime policy within this context, 
we can gain a better understanding of the forces which shaped its three distinct features (as 
depicted above). The focus on sentencing enhancement as the professed solution to the problem 
of black victimization sought to capitalize on the fecundity of determinate sentencing reform as 
a dominant model of criminal lawmaking. The insulation from a broader agenda of civil rights 
reform, and the framing of the rights of black victims as revolving around the infliction of
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harsher penalties, mirrored the dominant ideological forms whereby the interests of victims (or, 
more precisely, of the symbolic figure of the Victim as a idealized political subject) have been 
constructed in post-1980 American politics of crime. And the overwhelming bipartisan support 
of such legislation stemmed from its serving as a point of convergence between, on the one 
hand, conservative concerns with law and order, and, on the other hand, liberal attempts to 
reframe egalitarian ideals in accordance with a ‘tough on crime’ posture.
Based on this interpretation of the conditions of existence of hate crime policy, I show 
that its inherent limitations reflect the broader institutional flaws and counter-egalitarian 
ideological creeds of the generic models of criminal lawmaking upon which this policy is 
based. In analyzing the suitability of these reforms to provide the criminal justice system with 
more effective tools for tackling the problem of black victimization, I argue that the focus on 
sentencing enhancement was misplaced and in some respects counterproductive. This critique 
draws on the literature on the generic institutional shortcomings of determinate sentencing 
policies in meeting their two major aims: increasing deterrence and minimizing the 
opportunities for discriminatory exercise of discretion by law enforcers. In examining the 
suitability of hate crime reforms to mobilize pubic awareness to the nexuses between 
contemporary patterns of black victimization and structural patterns of racial inequality, I argue 
that the cooptation of this campaign into the broader framework of populist “tough on crime” 
policymaking have been detrimental in two major ways. First, it obfuscates the extent to which 
contemporary patterns of black victimization are driven by problems of class (i.e. the 
disproportionate concentration of African-Americans and Latino-Americans in poor and 
disintegrated urban ghettoes), rather than traditional forms of white supremacist animus. 
Second, it overstates the extent to which harsher and more determinate penalization indeed 
provides an effective solution to the problem. The development of more effective responses to 
the plight of black victims, I conclude, can only evolve within a new conceptual framework for 
thinking about the symbiotic relationship between race, class and victimization.
In chapter 6, I discuss the major conclusions of the study and indicate its 
contribution to the historical literature on the intersections o f crime, race and politics in 
American history, and to the sociological literature on the conditions which enable and 
constrain the pursuit of egalitarian social change through legal mobilization.
Chapter 2 :
“Law to Him is Only a Compact between his Rulers”: The Development 
of “Pro-Slave” Criminalization in the Colonial and Antebellum Eras
A Freeman would have a right to demand that the law should be pointed to...but a slave 
can invoke neither Magna Chart a nor common law...law to him is only a compact between 
his rulers, and the questions which concern him are matters agitated between them.
South Carolina Court o f Appeals [1847] 1 
A  Introduction
This chapter explores the historical exolution of legpl responses to the victimization of African- 
Americans by white offenders in the colonial (1619-1790) and antebellum (1790-1865) periods. It 
sketches the contours of the body oflaw which was developed by Southern legislatures and judges for 
governing the permissible treatment of slaves both in plantations and in the public sphere. It then 
offers an interpretation of the political and social forces which shaped the character of these legal 
responses, considers the political and social effects which they produced, and discusses some of 
the broad sociological and socio-legal lessons which this case study provides.
As in many other policy debates concerning racial justice, the inprints o f slavery 
continue to play a salient role in shaping present-day views regarding the appropriate legal 
responses to bigotry-motivated violence.2 Yet the dominant mode of drawing the lessons o f 
slavery in both policy and scholarly debates on hate crime is simplistic in both its descriptive 
and prescriptive dimensions. The major descriptive flaw lies in the common tendency to 
neglect the considerable body of legislation and jurisprudence devetoped by antebellum 
Southern legislatures and judges, prohibiting particular forms of abusing slaves. In turn, this 
neglect narrows down the range o f policy and normative implications that are usually drawn 
from this painfol chapter o f America’s racial history. Most importantly, evidence of the
1 Ex parte Boylston, 33 S.C.L. 20, at 43 [1847].
2 Franke (2000: 1679).
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brutality o f  the American slave system is often deployed in hate crime debate in order to 
dramatize the need to adopt harsher penal responses to bigotry-motivated violence, rather 
than (as I will propose in this chapter) as an illustration o f the limited power o f legislative 
reforms to protect marginalized minorities as long as the economic, cultural and institutional 
structures which produce their victimization remain intact.
In this chapter, I advance a more complex understanding o f the enduring significance 
o f slavery to our current thinking about the root causes o f -  and required policy responses to 
-  the problem o f minority victimization. Rather than adducing the legacy o f slavery to 
advocate a particular policy solution, I aim to use it as a comparative prism through which we 
can subject to critical scrutiny the dominant ideas and practices which shape hate crime 
policies. Our analysis will show that the failure to protect African-Americans in the 
antebellum era did not stem from the lack of applicable criminal rules (as usually contended 
by advocates of expanding hate crime legislation). Rather, it derived from the way in which 
the racialized character o f crime enforcement practices inhibited the realization o f  the 
protective principles which the applicable criminal legislation conveyed. This diagnosis is 
highly relevant for informing our critical thinking about the limitations of hate crime policies 
in an era in which racial disparities in the administration o f  criminal justice are still pervasive 
(and arguably have exacerbated in recent decades).3 As my analysis in the fifth chapter will 
demonstrate, the main problem which obstructed the enforceability o f “pro-slave” criminal 
legislation continues to impede the ability o f the American criminal justice system to provide 
African-American victims with equal protection, even after the remarkable expansion of anti­
racist legislation (in the form o f hate crime statutes). At root, the limitations of both “pro­
slave” and hate crime policies stemmed from their being implanted within institutional and 
ideological structures which were fully invested in the stabilization o f  existing patterns o f 
racial inequality. Under these circumstances, “pro-minority” criminalization is not only 
highly constrained in its ability to protect its assumed beneficiaries. It is also prone to 
reinforce the very structures of social inequality which produce these forms o f  victimization, 
and thus to perpetuate the very problem which it purports to eliminate.
3 Western (2006: chapter 1).
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My analysis sets offby introducing the structure o f the legal system within which laws 
governing the victimization of slaves were embedded, and the social and political functions 
which this system had played. In section B, I present the defining features of colonial and 
antebellum slave law and place this legal framework within its social and political context. In 
section C, I depict the remarkable paradigm shift which transpired throughout the transition 
from the colonial period to the antebellum period with regard to the protection o f  slaves in 
Southern criminal law. I will show that, from the late eighteenth century onwards, 
Southern criminal law had increasingly recognized slaves’ right to legal protection.
In section D, I took at the driving forces which impelled this development. I argue 
that the emergence o f “pro-slave” criminal legislation in the antebellum period was 
responsive to new challenges o f coordination and legitimation which Southern elites and 
governments had confronted in the post-Revolutionary decades. These challenges were 
associated with the need to keep in check the crisis tendencies inherent in the polarized 
class structure o f antebellum Southern society and to contain the interregional conflict over 
the constitutional legitimacy and moral defensibility o f slavery. The discussion identifies 
the way in which instances o f slave abuse posed a threat to the political and economic 
stability o f the slavery system, and examines the way in which the introduction o f  new 
“pro-slave” legislation was deemed useful for tackling these challenges o f coordination and 
legitimation.
In section E, I analyze the preventive, political and cultural effects o f “pro-slave” 
criminalization policy. I consider the institutional and cultural determinants which affected 
the suitability o f  these legislative reforms to meet their declared aims and to provide slaves 
with adequate protection from violence. I then draw the major lessons provided by this case 
study with regard to the conditions which enable and constrain the mobilization o f 
egalitarian social change through “pro-minority” criminalization reforms. This analysis 
demonstrates the double-edged functioning o f “pro-minority” criminalization reforms. I 
argue that, contrary to the accepted tore in hate crime debates, antebellum Southern law did 
not entirely neglect the victimization o f slaves. The legal recognition o f  the entitlement o f 
slave victims to equal protection worked to reinforce the social recognition o f slaves’ 
dignity as human beings, and, to some extent, to restrain the forms o f  brutality to which
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they were subjected. At the same time, this legislation served to stabilize the institution o f 
slavery both by reinforcing the monetary interests o f  slaveholders and their patriarchal 
prerogatives and by presenting slave law as receptive to principles of fairness and justice.
B. The Structure of Slave Law in its Social Context: An Introduction
African slaves arrived in what would become the United States in 1619, less than fifteen 
years after the founding o f  the first English colony in Jamestown, Virginia.4 However, the 
process whereby racial categories gained political significance and became legally codified 
was gradual and took its definite shape only by the late seventeenth century.5 Throughout 
the early colonial period, blacks were usually regarded as indentured servants. Their 
bondage typically lasted for several years and was governed by the same social conventions 
which applied to European servants.6 Being primarily driven by efforts to exp to it the 
economic opportunities offered in the New World, the majority o f slave labour came to 
concentrate in the Deep South, where it was mainly used to cultivate tobacco, rice and 
indigo.7 Alongside the increasing dependency o f the Southern economy on black labour, 
racist ideologies which justified the institution o f chattel slavery on pseudo-scientific and 
theological grounds took hold,8 and more restrictive forms o f racial control were erected by 
colonial authorities.9 With the invention o f the cotton gin in 1790, the plantation system 
fingered its way westward, and cotton became the South’s main export staple. As Mark 
Smith observes, “the gin and the industrial revolution in New England and Britain, whose 
burgeoning textile manufactures consumed Southern short staple o f  cotton in a seemingly 
unquenchable rates, had unleashed the cotton boom which was to dominate the South’s 
economy and plantation system up until the outbreak o f the Civil War”. 10 For example, 
between 1790 and 1800, South Carolina’s annual cotton exports increased from less than 
ten thousand pounds to roughly six millions.11
4 Lowndes (et al, 2008: 3).
5 Fredrickson (1971: 47-50).
6 Morgan (1975).
7 Smith (1998: 5).
8 Stampp (1956: 8).
9 Higginbotham(1978).
10 Smith (1998: 6).
11 Klarman (2007: 29).
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The accelerated development o f the Southern agrarian economy enhanced the 
demand for slave labour. From roughly 700,000 African-American slaves in 1790, the 
South became home to nearly 4 million black bondpeople by I860.12 By that year, ninety- 
five percent o f  the black population lived in the South, where it comprised one-third o f the 
overall population, compared with only two percent o f the population in the North.13 The 
rapid growth o f the black population and the increasing dependency o f  Southern economy 
on slave labour created pressing challenges o f  coordination for the newly established 
Southern states. The policy measures used by Southern governments for stabilizing the 
institution o f  slavery had to be devised within an increasingly complex political setting. 
Just as plantation slavery had become the engine o f the region’s economic growth, it was 
dissipating in the North where the climate conditions proved unsuitable to plantation labour 
and a growing recognition that the principles o f the American Revolution were 
incompatible with human bondage was beginning to take hold. As I will argue, the 
proliferation o f “pro-slave” criminal legislation from the early nineteenth century to the 
Civil War was responsive to these new challenges o f coordination and legitimation.
The laws governing violence against African-American victims formed a part 
within the broader framework o f slave law. Because English colonial policy rested on 
tacitly delegating lawmaking authority to local assemblies, this legal framework 
developed independently o f direct English influence14 (though it did borrow from the 
English legal tradition various principles and precedents related to the governance o f 
tower-class people).15 Slave Codes were first enacted in Maryland and Virginia during 
the 1660s,16 and they quickly became the standard statutory source for governing slaves 
and race relations in both Northern and Southern colonies.17 The Codes were 
supplemented by a body o f  jurisprudence that evolved through the application o f 
common law doctrines and principles to the unique context o f  slavery.18
12 F ogel( 1989:65-67).
13 McPherson (1996: 15)
14 Bush (1993: 457-8).
15 Nicolson (1994: 42).
16 Stampp (1956: 22).
17 Klarman (2007: 11-13).
18 On the sources o f  slave law, see: Morris (19%: chapter 2). On the complex relationship between 
codification and judicial policy-making in the development o fslave  law, see Tushnet (1981: 72).
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The policy taken by colonial and antebellum Southern law with respect to the 
institution o f  slavery was premised on devolving the regulatory authority over most aspects of 
slave conduct to masters. Southern law sanctioned the masters’ prerogative to use corporeal 
force in order to compel slaves to perform their tasks.19 The infliction o f corporeal punishment 
was not the only method by which discipline, submissiveness and productivity were 
encouraged in everyday plantation life. As many historical studies illuminate, the paternalistic 
sentiments of slaveholders often made them reluctant to exert their disciplinary prerogative to 
its full20 As conceded by the prominent abolitionist George Stroud in his seminal Sketch o f the 
Laws relating to Slavery, the treatment of individual slaves would typically “take its 
complexion from the peculiar disposition of their respective masters, - a consideration which 
operates as much against as in favor of the slave”.21 Yet the customary use of brutish 
disciplinary practices such as chaining and ironing, placing in stocks, whipping, branding, 
mutilating, shooting, and mauling with dogs, is also widely documented.22 Besides the 
infliction o f corporeal force, Southern law vested masters with nearly unlimited discretion to 
decide on virtually every aspect o f their bondsmen’s life (e.g. whether, and with whom, 
they could maintain a nuclear family or practice their ancestral traditions). Southern law 
would intervene only in instances o f extreme deviations from conventional forms o f 
treating slaves. Colonial legislatures, for example, were primarily concerned with 
dissuading benevolent masters from manumitting their slaves or ameliorating their 
conditions, out o f  fear that such concessions would induce slave rebellion and disorder.23
The primary doctrinal tool which served to rationalize the non-interventionist approach 
taken by Southern law with regard to plantation life was the classification of the slave as an article 
of property, “a chattel personal”.24 As Kenneth Stampp observed, this classification resonated with - 
and in turn reinforced - prevailing cultural norms which degraded the human value o f slaves.
“Men discussed the price o f  slaves with as much interest as the price o f  cotton or 
tobacco; slaves were bartered, deeded, devised, pledged, seized, and auctioned.
19 Genovese (1976: 32); Stampp (1956: 23); Kennedy (1998: 30).
20 See, e.g. Genovese (1976: 33); Klarman (2007: 13); Kennedy (1998: 34).
21 Quoted in Tushnet (1981: 11).
22 Stampp (1956: 171-191).
23 Klarman (2007: 11).
24 Stroud (1827: 11).
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They were awarded as prizes in lotteries and raffles; they were wagered at gaming 
tables and horse races. They were, in short, property in fact as well as in law” 25
However, the idea of “slave as property” had its roots in a long- standing tradition of 
rationalizing the denial o frights from particular categories o f persons by means of repudiating 
their full belonging to the human race. This mode of rationalization harks back to Aristotle’s 
categorization of slavery as a matter of household-govemance (the art of managing 
“instruments o f various sorts; some are living, others lifeless”).26 As Markus Dubber argued, 
this Aristotelian view continued to influence the way in which the Western legal tradition 
rationalized the deregulation of various sorts of patriarchal relationships throughout the Roman 
and Medieval periods (e.g., in matters concerning women and children). This creed was 
conveniently adopted by colonial American law to justify its eschewal from intervening in the 
humanitarian conditions of slaves within plantation.27 The repressive character of this body of 
law was excoriated by abolitionists.28 Harriet Beecher Stowe’s famous observation in The Key 
to Uncle Tom’s Cabin provides a classical example of the abolitionist critique:
“The Slave code...of the Southern state is designed to keep millions o f human 
beings... in a condition in which the master may sell them, dispose o f their time, 
person, and labour, in which they can do nothing, possess nothing, and acquire 
nothing, except for the benefit o f their master; in which they are doomed in 
themselves and in their posterity to live without knowledge, without the power to 
make anything their own, to toil that another may reap”.29
The dominant view which held that a master could not be liable to indictment for 
battering or abusing his slave nested neatly into this legal framework. As late as 1829, the 
Supreme Court in North Carolina opined that, “inherent in the relation o f a master and a 
slave” lay the notion “that the power of the master must be absolute to render the submission 
of the slave perfect”.30 However, by this time, as I will show in section C o f this chapter,
25 Stampp (1956: 201).
26 Aristotle (1905: IV).
27 Dubber (2005: chapter 1).
28 See, e.g. Stroud (1827).
29 Stowe (1968: 132).
30 State v. Mann, 13 N.C. 168 (1829).
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this position was no longer uncontested. Southern legislatures and judges increasingly 
qualified this position and officially outlawed various forms o f mistreating slaves in 
plantations. To a considerable extent, however, the persisting cultural and legal resonance 
of the “slave as property” concept continued to impede the enforcement o f  such laws.
Slave law covered not only relationship between masters and slaves within 
plantations, but also enforced compliance with white supremacist norms in the public 
sphere. Two structural features o f  the legal regulation o f interracial relations outside 
plantations are of particular importance. First, the major goal of this body o f law was to 
reinforce the inferior status o f “the Negro race” (both slaves and freemen) in all aspects of 
social, political and economic life. For example, most Slave Codes (including those in the 
Northern colonies) had disenfranchised not only slaves but also free blacks. In addition, 
restrictions on free blacks’ right to create contracts or accumulate property were common.31 
Slave Codes criminalized “impudence”, an offence that, as testified by Frederick Douglas 
in his memoir o f his experiences in thrall, could manifest itself “in the tone o f  an answer; in 
answering at all; in not answering; in the expression o f  countenance; in the motion o f the 
head; in the gait, manner and bearing o f the slave”.32 A second feature o f the legal 
governance o f racial relations in colonial and antebellum Southern society was its 
amalgamation o f formal and vigilantist mechanisms for enforcing white supremacy. In 
addition to gendarmeries o f slave patrols which enforced the stringent restrictions on 
blacks’ free movement, any white male was entitled to apprehend any black person found 
off the plantation. In South Carolina, for instance, in case o f refusal o f  a black person to 
submit himself to interrogation, the white questioner was legally authorized to summarily 
execute him.33 Even for mere insolence, a member o f the master race had the right to beat a 
slave or a free “Negro”.34 Such laws reflected the peculiar tradition o f  Southern vigilantism 
which (as we shall see in the next chapter) would continue to inflame white supremacist 
violence tong after the formal abolition o f slavery.
31 Klinkner& Smith (1999: 12).
32 Quoted in Stampp (1956: 145).
33 Belknap (1987:2).
34 Ibid, ibid.
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Even this brief introduction o f the structural conceptual and institutional components o f  
antebellum slave law can give a sense o f the oddity o f the emergence o f criminal categories 
which were specifically aimed at protecting slaves within this socio-political setting, 
African-Americans, who were disenfranchised and formally barred from testifying in 
courts or initiating legal proceedings, lacked any meaningful access to the vehicles through 
which criminalization policies are being shaped and enforced. In addition to its relentless 
white supremacist culture, another feature of antebellum Southern society seemed to 
further preclude the emergence o f such categories. Antebellum Southern culture prioritized 
the ideal o f popular justice vis-a-vis the notion o f the rale o f law, and normalized the use o f 
extralegal violence (either in its aristocratic form o f  dueling, or in its popular form o f 
lynching) as a preferable means for settling disputes.35 In particular, antebellum 
Southerners strongly believed that it was both justified and necessary to use physical force 
in order to dissuade slaves from rebelling against their masters.36 What, then, led 
antebellum Southerners to embark upon the establishment o f a criminalization regime 
which was specifically aimed at penalizing the victimization o f slaves?37 Before moving to 
address this puzzle, the next section will survey the evolution and main features o f “pro­
slave” criminal laws.
C. The Protection of Slaves in Antebellum Criminal Law: From 
“Chattel Personal” to Human Beings
The question o f  whether slave law should inpose any limits on the forms and measure o f 
force that can be used against slaves was raised in two main legal contexts: laws governing 
the homicide o f slaves, and laws governing their (nonfatal) “cruel and inhumane” 
treatment. The scope o f criminal liability for the homicide o f  slaves was first addressed in 
colonial Virginia.38 A statute enacted in 1669 provided that the killing o f a slave would not 
be considered as a felony if death resulted from violence administered for the purpose o f
35 Ayers (1984).
36 Davis (2006: 196).
37 This question corresponds with the problem posed by Marx in his analysis o f  the emergence o f  Factoiy 
Act, viz., what led a Parliament which was elected entirely by the upper and middle classes to enact 
legislation which was aimed at ameliorating the conditions o f  labour? Methodologically, much o f  the 
discussion which follows is indebted to Marx’s mode o f  addressing this question. See Marx (1992)[ 1857].
38 Morris (1996: 163).
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subduing resistance or imposing discipline.39 Echoing Aristotle’s view that “there can be no 
injustice., .towards things that are one’s own”,40 prominent commentaries on colonial slave 
law rationalized this legislative approach by expounding that “it cannot be presumed that 
prepensed malice (which abne makes a murder felony) should induce any man to destroy 
his own estate”.41 In 1705, the justification o f  the killing o f a slave “by reason o f  any stroke 
or blow given during his or her correction” had been extended to cover not only masters, 
but also white strangers.42 Even in the absence o f any justificatory, excusing or mitigating 
grounds, the malicious killing o f a slave was subjected to considerably milder penalties. 
For example, in South Carolina, slaying a slave was penalized by a £700 fine compared 
with capital punishment for killing a white person.43
Alongside the removal of common law protections from slave victims, colonial slave law 
established civil remedies for compensating masters for their monetary toss (in cases of the killing 
of slaves by white strangers, hirers or overseers). The prevailing mechanism - established in 
South Carolina (1712), Georgia (1755) and North Carolina (1774) - enabled masters to bring civil 
actions seeking reimbursement for the frill pecuniary tosses suffered for the value of their chattel 
personal44 As I will argue below (section Dl), the transition from tort remedies to criminal 
enforcement throughout the antebellum period was driven by new incentives to deter and to 
condemn such conduct These incentives were associated with the climbing prices of slaves and 
the escalation of the political controversy over the legitimacy of slavery.
The legal and moral arguments which justified the decriminalization o f violence 
against slaves were not entirely dissolved during the antebellum period. They continued 
to impede the equal protection o f slaves long after statutory reforms had ascribed 
criminal liability for such conduct. Nevertheless, from the last quarter o f the eighteenth 
century, a paradigm shift with respect to the legal protection o f slaves in Southern 
criminal law had crystallized. This shift found its paradigmatic expression in 1791, when 
a 1774 statute which subjected the “willful and malicious” homicide o f a slave to only
39 Quoted in Morris (1996: 164).
40 Aristotle (1956: book v, vi).
41 Morris (1996: 164).
42 Ibid, ibid.
43 Hindus (1976: 577).
^ F e d e ^ *  110).
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one year o f imprisonment was repealed by the North Carolina’s legislature. Redefining 
such an act as a murder, the legislature criticized the pre-existing law as “disgraceful to 
humanity and degrading in the highest degree to the laws and principles o f a fiee, 
Christian and enlightened country” because it drew a “distinction o f  criminality between 
the murder o f  a white person and o f one who is equally a human creature, but merely o f a 
different complexion”.45 During this period, four slave states included provisions which 
equalized punishment for the killing o f a slave and the killing o f  a free person in their 
constitutions,46 and many other states amended their law o f homicide to the same effect47 
By 1821, all slave states had passed some sort o f legislation criminalizing the killing o f 
slaves.48 These developments led Justice John B. O’Neal o f the South Carolina Supreme 
Court to observe that the 1821 statute which made the killing o f a slave capital offence 
“elevated slaves from chattels personal to human beings”.49
The development o f  legal responses to nonfatal abuse o f  slaves had also 
accelerated from the late eighteenth century onwards.50 In some states, “pro-slave” 
legislation banned specific “corrective” measures. A South Carolina statute, for example, 
provided for a fine o f up to £100 if a person “cut out the tongue, put out the eye, 
castrated, or cruelly scald, burn, or deprive any slave o f any limb and member”. The 
statute also prohibited “any cruel punishment other than” the following (which thereby 
became legally sanctioned): “whipping or beating with a horsewhip, cowskin, switch or 
small stick, putting on irons, or confining or imprisoning the slave”.51 As the nineteenth 
century progressed, such legislation came to cover many more aspects o f  plantation life. 
For example, a statute enacted by Georgia in 1852 required masters to provide slaves 
with adequate food and clothing, and went on to prohibit “requiring greater labor from 
such slave or slaves, than he, she or they are able to perform”. 52
45 Quoted in Friedman (1993: 90-91).
46 These are: Georgia (1798); Alabama (1819); Missouri (1820), and Texas (1845). See Morris (1996: 172).
47 Including Tennessee (1799) & Virginia (1788). See Morris (1996: 172-173).
48 Genovese (1976:37).
49 State v. Manner, 2 Hill 453 at 455 (1834) (9 S.C. 249).
50 Rose (1982: 23).
51 Quoted in Morris (1996: 183).
5~ Similar legislation was enacted by Alabama (1 852), Kentucky (1852) and Louisiana (1856). See Morris 
(1996: 195-6).
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In most states, however, “pro-slave” legislation did not specify the prohibited 
forms o f  mistreating slaves. Instead, the dominant legislative technique had outlawed 
“cruel and inhumane” treatment o f  slaves and entrusted jurors and judges with the task o f 
defining the meaning o f  this open-ended term on a case-to-case basis.53 The rationale o f 
this legislative strategy was encapsulated by the North Carolina Supreme Court:
“Every individual in the community feels and understand that the homicides o f a 
slave may be extenuated by acts, which would not produce a legal provocation if 
done by a white person. To define and limit these acts would be impossible, but the 
sense and feeling o f Jurors, and the greave discretion o f  courts, can never be at loss in 
estimating their force when they arise and applying them to each particular case”. 54
It has often been observed that, in a cultural setting which dehumanized virtually every 
aspect o f  blacks’ social identity,55 the reliance on popular judgments for measuring the 
degree o f “cruel and inhumane” treatment was doomed to foil as a strategy for protecting 
slaves and bringing their perpetrators to justice. As Kenneth Stampp pointed out, “most 
white men were obsessed with the terrible urgency o f racial solidarity, with the fear that 
the whole complex mechanism o f control would break down if the master’s discretion in 
governing slaves were questioned”.56 Indeed, white supremacist norms were so deep 
seated in Southern culture that the boundary between “deviant” and “normal” forms o f 
degrading slaves could hardly be sustained. However, by focusing on the declared aims 
which such legislation was expected to perform, these interpretations might have failed to 
decipher the full range o f  political functions which “pro-slave” criminal legislation 
actually played. As I will show in the remainder o f  this chapter, although its suitability to 
advance its declared preventive and retributive aims was indeed deficient, “pro-slave” 
criminal legislation fulfilled salient ideological functions which were perceived as 
desirable by Southern economic and political elites. Essentially, I will argue, the 
ambiguity inherent within this legislation was suitable for facilitating ad-hoc 
compromises between the competing hegemonic interests which were at stake.
53 E.g. Alabama’s 1852 Code.
54 State v. Tuckett, 8 N.C. (1 Hawks.) 210, 217 (1820).
55 Paterson (1982).
56 Stampp (1956: 222).
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D. The Driving Forces of the Emergence of “Pro-Slave” Criminalization
We now turn to a discussion o f the historical conditions which enabled the emergence o f 
“pro-slave” criminal legislation in antebellum Southern society. The explanatory 
framework which informs the analysis is twofold. I begin by identifying the major 
challenges o f  coordination and legitimation with which Southern political and economic 
elites were faced from 1790s onwards (the historical moment in which such legislation 
had started to gain political momentum). I then move to consider how the enactment of 
such criminal categories could have contributed to the efforts o f Southern authorities to 
tackle these challenges. This inquiry will focus on two sites o f conflict which generated 
the most acute challenges to the legitimacy and stability o f the slavery system. First: the 
crisis tendencies which emanated from the class structure o f antebellum Southern society; 
second, the conflict between the South and the North over the constitutional and moral 
legitimacy o f the institution o f slavery.
D l. “Pro-Slave” Criminalization and the Mediation of Pass Conflicts
As noted earlier, slave labour served as the engine o f the Southern agrarian economy. By 
the late eighteenth century, the region’s massive production power o f cotton made the 
Southern economy a key contributor to the American export market.57 The political 
economy o f Southern society was profoundly shaped by the need to coordinate and 
legitimate the fierce wealth disparities which evolved around the institution o f  slavery. 
When analyzing Southern slave society, it is important to note that 75% o f the free 
families in the region owned no slaves at all.58 The majority o f  slaves were held by a 
small number o f families who owned the large plantations in which cotton, tobacco, 
sugar and rice were cultivated on a massive, commercial scale. In turn, the economic 
power o f  the planter elite enabled it to accumulate enormous political influence. As 
William Julius Wilson has argued:
57 Smith (1998: 60-71).
58 Stampp (1956: 30). According to the 1860 Census, slaveholders comprised 385,000 out o f  1,516,000 free 
families in slave-holding states. However, almost 50% o f slaveholders possessed no more than five 
bondsmen. It is estimated that the planter elite (i.e. owners o f  more than twenty slaves) was comprised on 
no more than 10,000 families. See: Wilson (1980: 24-25).
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“Tradition, property qualifications for the suffrage, the counting o f  the slave 
population for purposes o f legislative appointments, the gerrymandering o f  
legislative districts to the detriment o f poor whites, or, as in South Carolina, 
qualification which barred office to all but slaveholders...made it easy for the 
master class to control the state and block all unfavorable legislation” 59
At the same time, the centrality o f cotton production to the region’s economy gave rise to 
relentless popular resistance to the abolition o f  slavery. Abolition was portrayed as an 
imminent threat to the region’s prospects o f  economic survival and indeed to its very 
cultural identity. Popular resistance to the restructuring o f Southern economy remained 
firm notwithstanding the starkly unequal distribution o f the fruits o f  slave labour among 
social classes and across the South’s sub-regions.60
It would be simplistic to treat class as the over-determining catalyst o f  the 
formation o f white supremacist culture in colonial and antebellum Southern society. For 
instance, historians who focus on the cultural dimensions o f  the system o f slavery have 
argued that the origins o f white supremacist Southern culture predated the emergence o f 
the plantation system.61 It has also been demonstrated that the evolution o f these cultural 
forms was sometimes at odds with the needs o f  the plantation economy.62 Taking on 
board the importance o f seeking to integrate (as much as possible) the study o f  the 
cultural, economic and political forces which shaped the formation o f  American slavery, 
it is clear that the class structure which evolved around the institution o f slavery played a 
salient role in shaping the specific political and social functions played by white 
supremacist ideologies. The notion o f “whiteness” as a collective identity shared by 
English, Dutch, Scots and German settlers in the New World had developed gradually 
throughout the colonial era via the encounters o f  these settlers with Native Americans 
and with imported black slaves.63 As slavery and blackness became increasingly 
intertwined, the allocation o f political and symbolic privileges to whites qua members o f
59 Wilson (1980: 26).
60 For example, in South Carolina and Mississippi, approximately half o f  the families owned slaves, while 
in Maryland and Missouri, one-eighth, and in Delaware, one-thirteenth. See: Stampp (1956: 30).
6‘ Jordan (1968).
62 On the debate between class and culture in the historiography o f slavery, see: Gross (2001).
63 Allen (1997).
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the ruling caste served to mobilize popular support o f the institution o f slavery. Among 
other things, the construction o f  the idea of “race” (as an essentialist and hierarchical 
binary opposition between “whites” and “Negros”)64 served to forge a sense o f  solidarity 
between the planter elite, yeomanry and poor whites, although the latter two groups 
clearly lacked material interest in the preservation o f slavery. In particular, the economic 
bargaining power o f  the mass o f  white workers was highly constrained as long as 
plantation owners were able to hire slaves and keep them at subsistence levels.65
In a society that normalized the use o f extralegal violence in response to 
perceived violations o f  informal codes o f honour,66 white supremacist sentiments often 
found expression in the infliction o f  violence on members o f the inferior racial caste. As 
Kenneth Stampp notes, such violence had served as an expressive medium through which 
poor whites had asserted their privileged status (in a political setting which de facto 
deprived them o f  access to economic or political power). “Even in poverty”, he points 
out, “they enjoyed the prestige o f membership in the superior caste and proudly shared 
with slaveholders the burden o f keeping black men in their place”.67 Slaveholders faced a 
dilemma while considering how to respond to such violence. On the one hand, they were 
impelled to turn a blind eye to such incidents in order to retain the facade o f solidarity 
with lower class whites. At the same time, such violence compromised two sets o f 
interests. First, it impinged on the monetary interests o f  individual slaveholders (and a 
fortiori o f  slavery as an economic system) in keeping the value o f their chattel personal 
intact. Second, in defying slaveholders’ prerogative to discipline their slaves as they see 
fit, violence by non-slaveholders posed a challenge to the structure o f patriarchal 
authority upon which slave-masters relations rested.68
It is in this context that we can understand why, from the late eighteenth century 
onwards, criminalization came to replace civil remedies as the primary legal instrument 
through which the problem o f slave victimization had been tackled. The transition from 
civil remedies to criminalization seems to be driven by two historical processes which
64 Cf. Anderson (1983).
65 Stampp (1956: 426); W ilson (1980:42-44).
66 Ayers (1984).
67 Stampp (1956: 426).
68 Genovese (1976: 33).
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increased the tendency o f slaveholders to have recourse to criminalization in this 
particular epoch. The first process entailed the climbing monetary value o f slaves from 
1800 onwards.69 The outlawing o f the foreign slave trade by the federal government in 
1808,70 and the boosting o f demand for slave labour in the newly settled territories o f the 
Southwest71 provided two momentous driving forces for the soaring prices o f slaves 
during this period. As one Southerner observed in 1849, “the time has been that the 
former could kill up and wear out one Negro to buy another; but it is not now so. Negros 
are too high in proportion to the price o f cotton, and it behoves those who own them to 
make them last as long as possible” 72 With the climbing economic value o f  slaves both 
to individual masters and to the Southern agrarian economy as a whole, the pre-existing 
civil law mechanisms o f monetary compensation became ineffective in deterring poor 
white perpetrators, who increasingly became incapable o f paying the full value o f a dead 
or seriously injured slave.73
In addition, wanton assaults on slaves by overseers and white strangers posed a 
challenge to the patriarchal prerogative o f  masters to discipline their slaves’ conduct 
Given the pervasive degree to which coercion and racial degradation were built into the 
modus operand i o f the slavery system, the moral censure expressed by slaveholders in the 
fece o f  such incidents can be justifiably criticized as illustrating their double standards. 
But such censure mirrored deep-seated cultural norms which were common among 
slaveholders. Adhering to status-based codes o f  honour which served to distinguish 
Southern gentlemen from lower class whites, support for criminalization also served 
Southern elites to reinforce their hegemonic cultural codes. This legislation drew a 
normative distinction between the forms o f racial domination which could be deemed 
civilized (and, from masters’ point o f view, as having educative purpose) and forms o f 
purely abusive racial degradation.74
69 Phillips (1968: 126).
70 Fede(1985: 107-108).
71 Wilson (1980: 32).
72 Brogan (1999: 282).
73Fede(1985: 113).
74 Ayers (1984: 16).
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The way in which the confluence o f  these economic, political and cultural 
concerns shaped the character o f “pro-slave” criminalization was encapsulated by North 
Carolina’s Supreme Court:
“These offenses are usually committed by men o f dissolute habits, hanging loose 
upon society, who, being repelled from association with well disposed citizens, 
take refuge in the company o f colored persons and slaves, whom they deprave by 
their example, embolden by their familiarity, and then bear, under the expectation 
that a slave dare not resent a blow from a white mam If such offenses may be 
committed with imp unity... the value o f slave property must be impaired, for the 
offenders can seldom make any reparation o f  damages”.75
However, while these economic, political, and cultural forces provided incentives 
to criminalize particular forms o f  slave abuse, the degree to which such legislation could 
have been enforced was constrained by other features o f antebellum Southern society. 
First, given the pervasiveness o f white supremacist norms in Southern culture, public 
opinion was unreceptive to the idea o f equalizing criminal liability for injuring slaves and 
white citizens. As Eugene Genovese puts it, “public opinion...did not readily suffer 
known sadists and killers, but neither did it suffer blacks to testify against whites, and 
therein lay the fatal weakness o f the law”.76 Secondly, slaveholders were all too aware 
that the institutionalization o f effective mechanisms o f enforcement would eventually 
encroach upon their authority to rely on corporeal violence in plantations.
For the planter elite, then, the optimal strategy was to mobilize the enactment o f  such 
legislation (in order to utilize its symbolic and persuasive effects) while impeding the 
development o f  effective enforcement mechanisms which could have interfered with the 
“normalized” use o f violence in plantations.77 The typical form o f “pro-slave” offences 
was suitable for fulfilling this task. Such laws conveyed that “cruel and inhumane” 
treatment o f  slaves might be subjected to penalizatioa Yet, in an era in which the 
composition o f  juries and o f the judiciary reflected the social prerogatives o f upper class
75 State v. Hale, 9 N.C. 325-27 (1823).
76 Genovese (1976: 38).
77 Cf. Fitzpatrick (1987).
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white males,78 it was unsurprising that the legal interpretation o f  the term “cruel and 
inhumane treatment o f slaves” was consistent with masters’ normative worldview. This 
structure o f “pro-slave” offences retained the level o f flexibility which was required in 
order to mediate between the competing hegemonic interests that were affected by these 
violent incidents. Thus, as I will argue in section E o f this chapter, the limitations o f  “pro­
slave” criminalization in meeting its preventive and retributive goals were profoundly 
interwoven with its functional role in stabilizing the antebellum systems o f racial and 
class stratification.
D2. “Pro-Slave” Criminalization and the Mediation o f Regional Conflicts over the 
Legitimacy of Slavery
A second driving force which accelerated the development o f “pro-slave” criminalization 
throughout the antebellum period was the intensification o f  the regional controversy over 
the moral and constitutional legitimacy o f the institution o f slavery. The proliferation o f  
antislavery mobilization during this period created new pressures on Southern authorities 
to reconcile the “peculiar institution” with the system o f ideas which began to define the 
American political ethos. As I will argue, expanding the body o f criminal legislation 
which penalized abusive treatment o f  slaves emerged as was one o f  the strategic 
responses taken by Southern elites and authorities as a means o f tackling these 
challenges. At the same time, the consolidation o f pro-slavery sentiments in Southern 
society in response to the rise of the Abolitionist movement created conditions which 
inhibited both the enforceability o f these new criminal rules and their ability to serve as a 
vehicle o f  structural social reforms.
Regional disparities in race-related legal policies and social practices were already 
noticeable in the colonial era. Although African-Americans (slaves as well as freemen) 
were subjected to various forms o f political and civic disempowerment in Northern 
colonies, Northern Slave Codes were typically much more lenient than Southern 
counterparts.79 They often remained silent on issues which were plainly prohibited by 
Southern legislatures (e.g. literacy) and in some colonies allowed slaves to acquire
78 Hindus (1976: 577).
79 Klarman (2007: 14).
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property and to purchase their freedom.80 Most importantly with respect to our subject 
matter, Northern slave law did not formally discriminate between white and black victims 
of crime, and subjected offenders who killed or maimed slaves to similar penalties to 
those to which victimizers o f white persons were liable.81 The contrast between the two 
regional systems o f slave law reflected broader demographic and economic disparities 
pertaining to the size o f the slave population and its role in each region’s economy. The 
slave population in the North was considerably smaller, and it did not concentrate in 
labour-intensive sectors such as agricultural plantations.
However, it was not until the second half o f the eighteenth century that 
antislavery sentiments started to gain ground in Northern political consciousness. 
Antislavery campaigns began to trigger policy reforms in the Revolutionary era.82 These 
reforms were stimulated by the effort to reconcile the “self-evident truth” that “all men 
were created equal, that they are endowed ... with certain unalienable rights, among these 
are life, liberty and the pursuit o f happiness” (which was championed as the keystone o f 
the nation’s political ethos) with the manner in which slaves and free blacks were treated. 
The Northern endorsement o f abolitionism was hardly unambiguous. In fact, Northern 
elites had often rationalized the compatibility o f this “self-evident truth” with the 
preservation o f  slavery on the ground that since blacks did not fully belong to the human 
race (and allegedly lacked some o f the capacities which were necessary for the exercise 
of rational judgment and free will), they did not possess natural rights.83
Nevertheless, antislavery sentiments eventually triumphed in Northern public 
opinion. In 1780, Pennsylvania adopted the nation’s first gradual emancipation scheme, 
declaring that slavery was “disgraceful to any people, and more especially to those who 
have been contending in the great cause o f  liberty themselves”.84 By 1804, all Northern 
states had abolished slavery within their territories. When the nineteenth century dawned, 
Eric Foner notes, ‘Northerners came to view slavery as the very antithesis o f the good
80 Ibid, 13-15.
81 Ibid, 14.
82 Davis, David B. (1999).
83 Fridrickson (1971: chapter 2).
84 Klarman (2007: 16).
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society, as well as a threat to their own fundamental values and interests".85 The rise o f 
capitalism and o f “free wage labour” ideology led many Northerners to claim that, in 
addition to its immorality, the slavery system was stagnant and inefficient. The reliance 
on slave labour, they stressed, precluded Southern economy from adjusting the size o f  the 
workforce in accordance with fluctuations in demand, and thus retarded the nation’s 
economic growth.86 Following the abolition o f  slavery throughout the North, and the 
coming into effect o f the federal ban on international slave trade in 1808, Northern 
antislavery campaigners had increasingly focused on pressurizing Southern states to 
eliminate “the peculiar institution”. The founding in 1833 o f the American Antislavery 
Society, and, more importantly, the establishment in 1854 o f  the Republican Party, 
created vehicles o f grassroots and political mobilization through which antislavery
R7activists were able to gain much greater influence on policymaking at the national level.
With the proliferation o f  the Abolitionist movement, the coercive techniques 
which had been traditionally used to discipline slaves in Southern plantations became 
susceptible to unprecedented pub he scrutiny and criticism. The publication in 1839 o f 
Theodore Dwight Weld’s influential American Slavery As It Is: Testimony o f a Thousand 
Witnesses,88 which compiled a massive bulk o f evidence from Southern newspapers and 
public records for illustrating the savage character o f disciplinary measures employed in 
plantations, demonstrated the power o f such narratives to galvanize Northern revulsion 
against Southern slavery.89 As Marie Tushnet notes, by the mid 1830s, Southern 
legislators and judges became increasingly cautious o f  the possibility that statutes and 
judicial opinions “would be scrutinized by abolitionists eager to find evidence o f 
slavery’s inhumanity, and a number o f op inions seem aware o f that audience”.90
As the proliferation o f antislavery campaigns created new pressures o f 
legitimation for Southern authorities and elites, they became increasingly inclined to use 
the expressive qualities o f criminal law in order to represent such brutal conducts as rare
85 Foner( 1970: 9).
86 Smith (1998: 9-10).
87 Foner(1970).
88 Weld (2009)[1839].
89 Stampp (1956: 180).
90 Tushnet (1981: 19).
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exceptions to the normal way in which slaves were treated in plantations. The expansion 
of “pro-slave” criminal legislation communicated one o f the central messages 
emphasized in proslavery apologetics. Inordinate cruelty, Southerners argued, was out o f 
line with their codes o f honour, and much less common that contended by Abolitionists.91 
Moreover, proslavery advocates often stressed the contrast between, on the one hand, the 
protective sentiments which the masters’ paternalist mentality encouraged, and, on the 
other hand, the tendency to treat wage workers as pure commodity in the “free” labour 
market o f  nineteenth century capitalism92 They also insisted that the Northern and 
European proletariat iared far worse than Southern bondsm ea93 Whatever the merits o f 
this argument (and it seems that, in terms o f  material conditions alone, it was not entirely 
flawed), it exemplifies the striking resemblance between, on the one hand, the conditions 
which impelled antebellum Southerners to establish a criminalization regime for 
regulating the most grossly inhumane and politically problematic manifestations o f the 
slavery system, and, on the other hand, the conditions which, according to Marx’s 
seminal analysis o f  the Factory Act,94 motivated the simultaneous emergence o f  legal 
regimes for the regulation o f labour conditions in Europe. This resemblance, I would 
argue, touches upon a profound aspect o f such benevolent legislative reforms which 
emerge within entrenched system o f inequality. As theorized by Marx, this aspect 
pertains to the suitability o f such legislation to stabilize wide-ranging systems o f 
inequality by means o f invalidating their most egregious and inhumane symptoms and 
thus reinforcing pub he belief in the basic commitment o f the legal system to principles o f 
laimess, rationality, and justice.
The increasing recourse to criminalization to symbolize Southern commitment to 
protect slaves from cruel and inhumane violence was embedded within a broader strategy 
to which antebellum Southerners resorted in the lace o f  antislavery campaigns. The 
popular belief in blacks’ mental inferiority led most Southerners to regard proposals for 
their naturalization or enfranchisement as preposterous. However, the path o f 
ameliorating the conditions o f servitude was advocated by pragmatic Southerners as the
91 Stanpp (1956: 180-181).
92 Genovese (1976: 661-662); Smith (1998: 10).
93 Klarman (2007: 30).
94 Marx (1992) [1857].
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most advisable strategic path for containing the fundamental political challenge posed by 
antislavery campaigners. From the early 1830s onwards, supporters o f  amelioration 
initiated a range o f  reforms which led slave law to recognize (and to profess to protect) 
the humanity o f slaves in various legislative and doctrinal contexts.95
As Mark Tushnet has argued, had supporters o f  amelioration won the day, the 
development o f Southern law might have assimilated the development o f  modern law in 
bourgeoisie society (which, from a Marxist perspective, evolved through piecemeal 
strategic adaptations aimed at containing the oppositional forces within the system o f 
capitalism).96 Within such a project o f gradual containment, the further expansion o f 
“pro-slave” criminal legislation was highly probable. Such expansion could have 
provided Southern authorities with a suitable instrument for individualizing blame for the 
appalling racial practices spotlighted in Abolitionist campaigns. Indeed, the sociological 
literature is littered with examples o f  how the institutionalization o f  legal mechanisms for 
outlawing particular “excesses” o f fundamentally unjust political regimes might reinforce 
their legitimacy, and indeed entrench the very same inhumane conditions which these 
progressive reforms purport to eliminate.97 However, this movement towards 
rationalizing slave law was cut short by the political circumstances which led to the 
escalation o f  the interregional controversy over slavery. The election o f  Abraham Lincoln 
to the presidency in 1860 convinced many Southerners that secession from the Union was 
the only way to preserve slavery and to inhibit what they perceived as an imminent threat 
to their very way o f life. The Southern decision to wage war in order to break free from 
Northern pressures (rather than to accommodate them through limited concessions and 
piecemeal reforms) halted the development o f this early experiment with using “pro­
minority” criminalization as a means o f legitimating American race relations.
95 Tushnet (1981).
96 Tushnet (1981: 231-232).
97 Shamir (1990); Steikerand Steiker (1995).
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E. The Preventive, Political and Cultural Effects of “Pro-Slave” Criminalization
In the introductory chapter of this study, I proposed that the performances of “pro-minority” 
criminalization policies should be assessed against three yardsticks. First, their success in 
minimizing violence against minority groups (thepreventive rationale)', second, their ability to 
serve as a vehicle of political empowerment and to facilitate the extension of civil rights in other 
policy domains (the political rationale); and third, their accomplishments in delegitimizing 
degrading and discriminatory social norms (the educational rationale). In this section, I will 
assess the accomplishment of “pro-slave” crimnialization in meeting these three aims. I will then 
discuss some o f the broad sociological lessons that can be drawn from this analysis with respect 
to the general limitations of “pro-minority” criminalization reforms in delivering these aims.
El. “Pro-dave” Criminalization and the Preventive Rationale of “Pro-Min ority” Criminalization:
The accomplishments o f  “pro-slave” criminalization in preventing violence cannot be 
empirically proven. The inadequacy o f the mechanisms used in colonial and antebellum 
eras for recording and measuring crime rates as well as patterns of prosecution and 
conviction render such evaluations irretrievably speculative. Written trial records became 
mandatory in Southern appellate courts only in 1833, and no systematic mechanisms 
existed for documenting the performances of lower courts or o f  other agencies o f the 
antebellum Southern criminal justice system.98 The records o f Southern appellate courts 
attest that, between 1833 and 1860, M y  five convictions for killing or abusing slaves 
were appealed. Most o f  these convictions were up he Id.99 This evidence implies that the 
statutes prohibiting the killing or abusing o f slaves were not completely unenforceable. 
Still, given the lack o f  rehab le evidence regarding the bulk o f incidents which were never 
reported, investigated, prosecuted, yielded convictions or appealed, these figures cannot 
establish a rehab le benchmark o f the actual level o f enforcement o f these statutes.
In the absence of a sufficient body o f  empirical evidence on enforcement patterns, we 
can nevertheless use our socio-legal knowledge regarding the conditions upon which efficient
98 Hindus (1967: 577).
99 Nash (1970: 214).
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enforcement o f criminal legislation depend in order to analyze the suitability o f this 
criminalization regime to restrain the measure of violence to which slaves were subjected. As 
we noted in the first chapter, the effective enforcement o f criminal legislation depends on the 
satisfaction o f particular institutional and cultural conditions.100 These conditions affect the 
tendency of legal actors and lay citizens to classify a potentiaUy-criminalized conduct as a 
“crime” and to recourse to crime enforcement measures. To what extent could these 
preconditions have been satisfied in antebellum Southern society?
The exclusion o f blacks from participating in the criminal process created a range 
of institutional impediments to the effective enforcement o f “pro-slave” laws. African- 
Americans (regardless o f their status as slaves or freemen) were barred from giving 
sworn testimony against whites in all Southern states (as well as in federal courts) and 
could not initiate prosecutions.101 As one Southerner observed, there were “thousands o f 
incidents o f  plantation life concealed from public eye, witnessed only by slaves, which 
the law could not reach”.102 Blacks were also categorically barred from jury service 
(which, in the antebellum South, was limited to white male freeholders).103 The effect o f 
these formal exclusionary mechanisms was exacerbated by the pervasiveness o f  informal 
cultural barriers which had dissuaded whites from testifying against a member o f  their 
own race in cases o f violence against a “Negro”.104 Even in those rare cases in which 
such testimony was to be provided, the likelihood o f conviction was sparse. The systems 
of values and beliefs which shaped the manner in which white jurors and judges 
interpreted the facts and applied the law were undoubtedly shaped by the relentless 
ideology o f white supremacy which permeated antebellum Southern culture.105
Importantly, these cultural impediments to the enforceability o f “pro-slave” criminal 
legislation were not alleviated even when the political circumstances which crystallized in the 
post-Revolutionary era impelled political and economic elites to enact such legislation. At the
100 See discussion in chapter 1 o f  this dissertation, Section Cl (PP. 25-30).
101 Kennedy (1998: 39).
102 Quoted in Stampp (1956: 222).
103 Hindus (1976: 577). The status o f  blacks in the Northern criminal justice system was not dramatically 
better. Prior to the Civil War, only one state, Massachusetts, permitted blacks to serve on juries (Kennedy, 
1998: 169).
104 Stampp (1956: 222-223).
105 On the centrality o f  such interpretive practices to processes o f  criminalization see Lacey (1995).
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very same time in which the proliferation of the Abolitionist movement created new 
challenges o f legitimation which were conducive to the development o f such legislation, it 
transformed Southern culture in ways which inhibited the development of adequate 
enforcement mechanisms. Rather than prodding Southern society to reckon with the 
humanitarian breaches o f slavery and to move toward its elimination, the proliferation o f 
Abolitionism cemented Southerners’ support of the “peculiar institution”. 106 Southern public 
opinion scorned calls for abolition as a constitutionally illegitimate intervention in then- 
political and cultural autonomy. The increasing defensiveness o f  Southern public opinion 
was manifested in new criminal statutes which made “advocacy o f abolitionism” a criminal 
offence.107 Within this cultural climate, the debate over the permissible forms of treating 
slaves within plantation became a salient site o f  interregional conflict. Just as, for 
Abolitionists, images o f plantation whippings epitomized the iniquity o f slavery, so, for 
Southerners, these “disciplinary measures” symbolized their ability to maintain the social 
order and to preserve “Southern” (white supremacist) cultural identity. The widespread 
support among white Southerners of the justifiability and necessity o f the forceful control of 
the “Negro race” reflected their anxieties about the loss o f  economic and political privileges 
as well as fears o f physical insecurity. Insofar as the interpretive practices through which 
Southerners had identified and responded to “slave abuse” reflected these public anxieties, 
the enforceability of the new legislative protections of slaves remained highly limited.
E2. “Pro-Slave” Criminalization and the Political Empowerment Rationale
As our analysis has shown, the post-1790s proliferation of “pro-slave” criminal legislation was 
responsive to new pressures of coordination and legitimation which Southern political authorities 
and economic elites confronted. In particular, these new pressures of coordination were driven by 
the soaring monetary value o f slaves both to individual masters and to the Southern economy at 
large since the early nineteenth century. In this context, I argued, criminalization had replaced the 
mechanisms of tort remedies (which were used hitherto to compensate slave-owners for their 
monetary toss) in order to achieve a greater deterrent effect and to reinforce the structure of 
patriarchal authority which privileged the prerogative of slave-owners to discipline and punish
106 Davis (2003: chapter 3).
107 Friedman (1993: 93).
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their slaves. The most salient challenges of legitimation which stimulated the expansion of “pro­
slave” criminal legislation were generated by the proliferation of antislavery campaigning 
(through the organizational platform of the Abolitionist movement). In this context, I argued, 
“pro-slave” criminal legislation was aimed at communicating to the Northern public opinion that 
respect to slaves’ human dignity could be incorporated into slave law and thus reconciling the 
institution of slavery with America’s emerging political ethos.
To the extent that “pro-slave” criminalization policy had succeeded in furthering 
these intended goals, it had worked to stabilize the system o f  racial stratification which 
prevailed in antebellum Southern society. This observation challenges the conventional 
liberal reading which regards the extension o f  “pro-minority” criminal legislation as a 
barometer (as well as a catalyst) o f a progress toward greater social equality.108 In the case of 
“pro-slave” criminalization, it is clear that the expansion o f such legislation throughout the 
final antebellum decades was not only insulated from a broader program of political inclusion 
and empowerment. Rather, this legislation was incorporated within the broader array o f 
policies adopted by Southern authorities in order to contain demands for egalitarian racial 
reform in ways which would have been consistent with the preservation o f slavery. 
Interestingly, concurrently with the wave of “pro-slave” criminal legislation, Southern states 
had adopted harsher measures for reinforcing white supremacy and for buttressing the 
institution o f  slavery. As Philip Klinkner and Rogers Smith point out, “after 1800, most 
Southern states placed new restrictions on private manumission, either banning them outright 
or making former owners liable for the support and good behavior o f  their freed slaves”.109
The simultaneous move toward tightening of legal restrictions both on “slave abuse” 
and on manumissions suggests that the willingness of Southern policymakers to recognize the 
wrongfulness of particular forms o f  mistreating slaves was profoundly interwoven with their 
refusal to recognize the fundamental unfairness of the system o f  slavery within which such 
harms were fully embedded. However, what appears as a prima facie contradiction between 
these two conflicting modes of responding to the Abolitionist challenge might actually reflect 
an important undercurrent which is inherent in “pro-minority” criminalization reforms. The
108 For example, Lawrence (1999).
109 Klinker & Smith (1997: 27).
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curious case of the emergence of “pro-slave” criminalization policy in the antebellum South 
illustrates the way in which such reforms can gain considerable political support even within 
political settings which preclude the development of structural egalitarian racial reforms.
As we will see in later chapters of this dissertation, the unfolding of these policies is driven 
by the interplay between social movements and governments while negotiating the political meanings of 
blade victimization The rise of new egalitarian movements tends to elevate public concerns about the 
laxity with which instances of racist violence are being tackled by the criminal justice system. These 
concerns are triggered by the strategic efforts ofthese movements to use evidence of the victimization of 
African-Americans in order to illustrate the dire consequences of their social marginalization and to 
demonstrate the urgency of structural racial reform. To be sure, we should steer clear of regarding the 
enactment of such reforms as a readily available solution to legitimacy deficits. The enactment of such 
legislation had certainty necessitated to challenge popular conceptions which resisted the idea of 
equalizing blacks’ entitlement to legpl protection and thus entailed political costs. Nevertheless, for 
pragmatic supporters of “the peculiar institution”, such leghlation signaled a reasonable compromise 
between the conflicting political forces upon which the stability of the institution of slavery depended: on 
the one hand, the cortainment ofNorthem pressures to abolish slavery altogether, and, on the other hand, 
the maintenance ofpopular resistance to the possibility of emancipating blacks.
The suitability o f  “pro-minority” criminalization reforms to fulfill this ideological task 
derives from the way in which it reconstructs the political meanings of the overexposure of 
minority groups to victimization.110 By criminalizing particular forms of harming marginalized 
minorities, the State is being represented as responsive to social problems that are generated by 
individual bigots, rather than as complieit in creating the structural conditions within which 
such harms are likely to occur (and in which numerous other forms o f economic exploitation 
and violence continue to be sanctioned by law on a mass scale). While the enactment of such 
legislation provides a form o f symbolic recognition o f the State’s responsibility to protect 
minority groups, it frames this inchisfonary message in a highly narrow manner. The normative 
responsibility of the State is presented as revolving around making offenders liable to harsher 
penalties, rather than as requiring the elimination o f the criminogenic conditions (both
110 On the correlation between vulnerability to victimization and other patterns o f  social deprivation see 
Sampson & Wilson (1995).
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economic and cultural) which make marginalized groups disproportionally vulnerable to such 
violence. The pervasiveness of racial repression in the antebellum South makes it clear that the 
only sustainable solution to the problem of slaves’ vulnerability to abuse was to abolish the 
institution of slavery (and thus the full range of mechanisms o f  economic dependency, political 
and legal disempowerment, and cultural degradation which made African-Americans 
disproportionately vulnerable to viofence). To the extent that the legitimating effect of “pro­
slave” criminalization reform had worked to impede the development o f Abolitionism, it had 
served to perpetuate the very same forms of violence which it officially outlawed.
E3. "Pro-Slave” Criminalization and the Educative Rationale
That said, it is important to acknowledge that the legitimizing aspects o f  “pro-minority” 
criminalization reforms did not entirely preclude their transformative significance. Even if 
such legislation was primarily motivated by the effort to stabilize the institution o f slavery, 
it nevertheless affirmed a valuable moral principle that, by that time, was still vehemently 
denied in most other areas of Southern law. Although the recognition o f  slaves’ principled 
entitlement to equal legal protection remained largely under-enforced, this recognition 
nevertheless might have minimized the vulnerability o f some African-Americans to 
violence by means o f reinforcing the protective element o f  slaveholders’ paternalistic 
culture.111 This observation regarding the coexistence of a stabilizing effect at the macro 
level o f race relations and a transformative effect at the micro level o f the lived experiences 
of individual slaves draws on the argument made by E.P. Thompson in his seminal analysis 
of the impacts o f  the Black Act on eighteenth-century English society.112 Acknowledging 
that “even rulers find a need to legitimize their power; to moralize their functions, to feel 
themselves to be useful and just”, Thompson insisted that “not only were the 
rulers... inhibited by their own force...but they also believed enough in those rules, and in 
their accompanying ideological rhetoric, to allow, in certain limited areas, the law itself to 
be a genuine forum”.113 True, the feet that black victims were legally barred from testifying 
in court or initiating legal proceedings highly constrained the extent to which “pro-slave”
111 Genovese (1976: 119-120).
112 Thompson (1975).
113 Ibid, 265.
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law could have indeed served as a “genuine forum” for reckoning with the moral gravity o f 
such offences. Nevertheless, as Eugene Genovese observed:
“The positive value [of benevolent slave law] lay not in the probability o f 
scrupulous enforcement but in the standards o f decency they laid down in a work! 
inhabited, like most worlds, by men who strove to be considered decent. These 
standards could be violated with impunity and often were, but their educational 
and moral effect remained to offer the slaves the little protection they had”. 1,4
With Thompson and Genovese, it might be argued that, insofar as interracial relations 
in antebellum Southern society had been indeed been interpreted and evaluated through the forms 
o f law, such legislation may have curbed, to some extent, the measure and brutishness of violence 
to which blacks were subjected. The protection of slaves by antebellum criminal law was sparse 
but not entirety insignificant. The positive value o f “pro-slave” legislation becomes more 
apparent when compared with the crisis of “pro-black” criminalization in the post-Reconstruction 
decades. As I will argue in the next chapter, the lailure to protect African-Americans from 
lynching in the post-Reconstruction decades was rooted in the removal o f the two driving forces 
which impelled the development of “pro-slave” criminalization in the final antebellum decades 
(the self interest of slave-owners, and the need to accommodate Northern criticism of Southern 
race relations). The paradox which is revealed by a comparison o f the way in which incidents of 
racist violence were tackled before and after the abolition of slavery is that the formal conferral of 
constitutional rights on African-Americans and their de jure recognition as full citizens was 
followed by the removal of the weak legal protection which they enjoyed as “chattel personal”. 
The relentless political exclusion of blacks after the demise of Reconstruction restored the 
situation in which their legal governance reflected onty “a compact between their rulers” and 
precluded any element of self-govemanee. Yet, despite the elevation of their formal constitutional 
status, the revised terms of the compact between their rulers (most notably, the reconfigured 
relations between upper and lower class whites, and the relations between Southerners and 
Northerners) put African-Americans in an even more vulnerable position.
114 Genovese (1976:48).
Chapter 3:
“Social Prejudices...May not be Overcome by Legislation”: The Rise 
and Fall of Federal “Pro-Black” Criminalization Policy, 1865-1909
It must be considered that there is nothing more difficult to carry out, nor more 
doubtless o f  success, nor more dangerous to handle, than to initiate a new order 
o f things. For the reformer has enemies in all those who profit by the old order, 
and only lukewarm defenders in all those who would profit from the new order; 
this lukewarmness arising partly from  fear o f  their adversaries, who have the 
law in their hands, and partly from the incredulity o f  mankind, who do not truly 
believe in anything new until they have had actual experience o f  it
Niccolo Machiavelli, The Prince
A. Introduction
Throughout the decade which followed the Northern triumph in the Civil War, the legal status 
of African-Americans was dramatically elevated. Slavery became constitutionally prohibited by 
the enactment of the Thirteenth Amendment in 1865. The Civil Rights Act (enacted in 1866) 
empowered African-Americans to own property, make and enforce contracts and sue and give 
testimony in courts. The Fourteenth Amendment (enacted in 1868) endowed them with the 
status of citizenship and enshrined their right to equal protection and to due process. The 
Fifteenth Amendment (enacted in 1870) forbade abridging the right to vote on grounds of race, 
colour, or previous condition of servitude. Additional pieces of federal legislation solidified 
suffrage protection, proscribed race discrimination in jury selection and provided for equal 
access of African-Americans to public transportation and public education. However, the 
elevation of the legal status of African-Americans failed to generate a sustained political 
commitment to equalizing their social and economic conditions. Following the collapse of 
Reconstruction1 in the second half of the 1870s, America’s race relations entered a new era of
1 In American history, the term Reconstruction  refers to the constitutional and political reforms that 
were debated and enacted in the wake o f  the Civil War. In particular, these reforms addressed two main 
issues. First, Congress had to consider how to reincorporate within the Union the Confederate states 
that had declared their secession from the United States between 1861 and 1865. These debates 
concerned, for example, the conditions which should be imposed on ex-Con federates in order to allow  
them to vote in national elections and to hold office in the national political system. The second focus
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prolonged deterioration. Instead of diminishing the persecution and discrimination of African- 
Americans, the tremendous constitutional reforms of Reconstruction were followed by the 
radicalization of white supremacist consciousness. This radicalization found a dire expression in 
the upsurge of new forms of ritualized racist violence, associated with the proliferation of the 
Klan in the late 1860s and the torrent of lynching from early 1880s onwards.
Lynching had its roots in the culture of Southern vigilantism that had already taken 
hold in the colonial period. However, throughout the colonial and antebellum periods, 
lynching did not primarily target black victims. O f more than three hundred victims of 
recorded lynching between 1840 and 1860, less than 10 percent were blacks.3 Throughout 
the colonial and antebellum period, lynching was primarily used against whites who 
deviated from local standards o f proper conduct, either by committing moral transgressions 
such as drunkenness, public indecency, prostitution, spouse-abuse and laziness, or by 
espousing unorthodox moral or political views (not least, support o f abolitionism).4 The 
recorded rates of lynching and the proportion o f African-American victims began to 
climb dramatically from the early 1880s. Each year between 1882 and 1901 (with the 
single exception of 1890), more than 100 deaths by lynching were recorded (the 
numbers peaked in 1884 and 1892, with 211 and 230 victims respectively).5 It was not 
until 1936 that the record of annual victims fell below 10, and not until 1952 that a full 
calendar year passed without a single incident o f deadly lynching.6 Moreover, despite 
the decrease in the total number o f recorded incidents of lynching from 1901 onwards, 
the proportion of African-Americans among lynch victims increased dramatically, 
reaching an average of 90 percent between 1901 and 1909.7 Between 1889 and 1918, 
85 percent of lynching incidents nationwide had been recorded in the South.8 By the 
end of this period, the South’s share o f national lynching rates amounted to 97 percent.9
o f  Reconstruction reforms pertained to the civil status and constitutional rights o f  ffeedmen. The main 
dilemmas were whether freedmen should be recognized as full citizens, and whether they should be 
enfranchised. The conventional periodization refers to the period 1865-1877 as the Reconstruction era 
(see, e.g. Stampp (1967)). The literature on Reconstruction is vast. Some o f  the most authoritative 
studies include: Donald et al (2001); Foner (1988); Williamson (1984).
2 Brown (1975).
3 Genovese (1976: 32).
4 Wyatt-Brown (1984: 425-493).
5 Zangrando (1980: 6-7).
6 Ibid, ibid.
7 Williamson (1984: 185).
8 Belknap (1997: 5). The highest rates o f  lynching were recorded in the states o f  Mississippi (539 Black 
victims), Georgia (492 Black victims), Texas (352 Black victims), Louisiana (335 Black victims), and 
Alabama (299 Black victims). All figures refer to the period 1882-1968 (Kennedy, 1997: 42).
9 Belknap (1997: 5).
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O f course, recorded victimization rates provide only a crude measure of the 
actual scale o f lynching, its savageness, and its terrorizing effect on entire black 
communities. It can fairly be assumed that the frequency of unreported incidents and 
o f those violent incidents which did not result in the victim’s death significantly 
outnumbered the recorded figures. Moreover, the methods used by lynchers became 
increasingly sever and brutal over time.10 Gradually, such relatively humane methods 
o f execution as hanging and shooting were replaced by more torturing ones, e.g. 
having victims “maimed while still alive, their ears or fingers or genitals amputated, 
their bodies stabbed and cut, and their entrails pulled out before their eyes”.11 In 
addition, lynching rituals began to be conducted in front o f “hundreds and sometime 
thousands of spectators” so that “it was not uncommon for railroads to run special 
‘excursion’ trains to the site”.12 The cultish qualities o f lynching in the New South 
were also illustrated by the circulation of photographic “images o f mutilated black 
bodies, some o f them horribly burned and disfigured”, which “were purchased as 
picture postcards, and passed between friends and family like holiday mementoes, 
dutifully delivered by the U.S. mail”.13 Against this backdrop, the outright failure of 
the legal system to deter lynchers or to impair its legitimacy among both ordinary and 
elite Southerners is conspicuous. As late as 1940, it was testified before Congress that 
legal action was taken against those responsible for only 40 o f the approximately 
5,150 incidents of lynching which were recorded since 1882 (amounting to 0.07% of 
recorded incidents).14 By 1933, only four Southern states recorded any convictions.15
In this chapter, I will examine the way in which the problem of white supremacist 
violence was tackled from 1865 to 1909, and consider the political, cultural and institutional 
conditions which shaped the character of legal policies in this field. The discussion so far 
has already hinted at the main puzzle with which this chapter will grapple: what were the 
forces which led to the removal of legal protections from African-American victims in the 
late nineteenth century, a mere two decades after they were provided with constitutional 
rights to equal protection of the laws? This question is particularly puzzling given the fact 
that Southern states had already institutionalized some forms of “pro-black” criminalization
10 Williamson (1984: 187).
11 Garland (2005: 805).
12 Williamson (1984: 187).
13 Garland (2005: 794).
14 Belknap (1997: 9).
15 Ibid, ibid.
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policy in the antebellum period, in an era in which blacks were not yet legally or socially 
recognized as bearers of civil rights. Furthermore, as we will show in this chapter, the nadir 
of “pro-black” criminalization in the late nineteenth century transpired shortly after the 
federal government successfully established its authority to prosecute white supremacist 
perpetrators. What were the forces which led legislatures and crime-enforcement authorities 
at both the regional and national levels to abandon this path and to abdicate their 
responsibility to provide African-Americans with equal protection from racist persecution?
In section B of this chapter, I look at the political conditions which enabled the 
emergence o f federal “pro-black” criminalization policy in the early 1870s (in the form of 
anti-Klan legislation) and at the historical developments which led to the demise of this 
criminalization regime shortly thereafter. The analysis of the emergence o f the federal 
anti-Klan criminalization regime will focus on the role it played in tackling challenges of 
legitimation and coordination with which the federal administration was faced throughout 
Reconstruction. The analysis of the decline of this criminalization regime will focus on 
the interplay between processes which took place in the national and regional political 
arenas. These processes, I will show, eroded the commitment of national legislatures and 
administration to investing political capital in the mobilization of civil rights policies, and, 
simultaneously, removed any electoral incentives which could have impelled Southern 
legislatures to do so. While the discussion in section B gives focus to the political 
dimensions of criminalization policies, the next section focuses on the institutional 
dimensions of the processes through which criminal legislation is being enforced. In 
section C, I look at how the modus operandi of the Southern criminal justice system in 
the Jim Crow16 era shaped the structure of the criminalization process. In particular, I 
consider the determinants which precluded the Southern criminal justice system from 
asserting its authority to monopolize the legitimate means o f violence in the face o f these 
public rituals o f white supremacist terror. This discussion serves as a basis for exploring 
some general questions regarding the interrelations between the development o f “pro­
minority” criminalization regimes and broader processes o f modernization and penal 
evolution. In section D, I recap the conclusions of our analysis, and place it within the 
broader historical trajectory of American “pro-black” criminalization policy.
16 In American history, the Jim Crow era is associated with the body o f  legal and political 
arrangements established in the South between 1877 and 1965 in order to reinforce the second-class 
status o f  African-Americans. The literature on the Jim Crow  (also known as post-Reconstruction) era is 
vast; three authoritative studies are: Woodward (2001); Klarman (2004); Litwack (1998).
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B. The Political Underpinnings and Effects of the Transformation of 
“Pro-Black” Criminalization, 1865-1910
B l. The Rise o f  Federal “Pro-Black” Criminalization Policy. 1865-1873
In 1865, the supply of cheap, plentiful, and easily controlled black labour upon which the 
Southern agrarian economy had relied throughout the colonial and antebellum periods 
was cut short by the political consequences of the Civil War. Following the abolition of 
slavery, Southern legislatures turned to devising new legal instruments in order to 
facilitate the extraction of black labour and to restore white supremacy. These measures 
were incorporated in the Black Codes. Under the Codes, the ffeedmen would have more 
rights than did free black before the War, but still be confined to a second-class civil 
status. The Codes explicitly excluded freedmen from the franchise. They also instituted a 
range of harsh criminalization policies aimed at regulating the movement and activities of 
freedmen.17 In some ex-Confedemcy states, the Codes subjected all freedmen who had “no 
lawful employment or business” to amercement or imprisonment.18 They also attached 
draconian penal sanctions to minor offences such as petty larceny. In some states, stealing any 
property valued at 10$ or more was subjected to five years imprisonment.19 These harsh 
criminalization policies were aimed at facilitating the exploitation of black labour through the 
institutionalization of the convict leasing system.
The enactment of the Codes was strongly resisted by Northern public opinion. 
The Codes were criticized as indicative of Southern inexorable refusal to accept the 
political outcomes of the War, and as demonstrating the urgent need to adopt stronger 
measures of federal enforcement for protecting freedmen’s civil liberties. Contrary to the 
expectations of Southern governments, the passing of the Black Codes strengthened the 
political position of Radical Republicans, who supported both the imposition of stringent 
restrictions on the vote of former Confederates and a more intensive involvement of the 
federal government in governing Southern social and political institutions. After the 1866 
elections, Radical Republicans gained considerably greater representation in Congress 
and were able to effectively shape the contours o f civil rights policies. In 1867, Congress 
passed the Reconstruction Act which placed ex-Confederate states under military control.
17 Wilson (1980: 53).
18 Friedman (1993: 93).
19 Litwack (1998: 271).
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Federal troops were assigned with enforcing the constitutional rights conferred to 
freedmen by the Thirteenth, Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments. It was within this 
political context (involving an intense interregional conflict, and heightened post-War 
expectations regarding the competency of the national administration to serve as the 
ultimate protector of civil rights) that the first experiment with establishing a federal “pro­
black” criminalization regime in American history had took shape.
The emergence of the Ku-Klux-Klan in 1865 gave vent to the widespread anxieties 
of poor whites in the face of increasing economic competition with blacks and the loss of
9 ftthe symbolic prerogatives of belonging to a master race. As C. Vann Woodward pointed 
out, the radical transformative effects of the incorporation of millions of ex-slaves to the 
region's wage-labour market was immediately felt, as “the Negroes invaded the new 
mining and industrial towns.. .and the two races were brought into rivalry for subsistence 
wages in the cotton fields, mines, and wharves”.21 The Klan was not a centralized and 
hierarchic organization. Rather, it brought together a “chaotic multitude of antiblack 
vigilante groups, disgruntled poor white fanners, wartime guerrilla bands, displaced 
Democratic politicians, illegal whiskey distillers, coercive moral reformers, bored young 
men, sadists, rapists, white workmen fearful of black competition, employers trying to
99enforce labor discipline, common thieves, [and] neighbors with decades-old grudges”. 
Some of its attacks were directed at white proponents of racial egalitarianism and operatives 
o f the Federal Freedmen’s Bureau. However, the primary focus o f its actions targeted 
African-Americans who attempted to exercise the constitutional rights which had recently 
been conferred on them. Among other things, Klan terror targeted black voters in the 
ballots, intimidated black holders of public office, drove out black farm tenants, warded off 
interracial political associations, and menaced African-Americans who failed to “know
23their place” and comply with degrading white supremacist etiquette.
The surge of white supremacist violence which swept the South in the late 1860s 
posed an evident challenge to the new model of federalism which emerged under 
Reconstruction 24 And it was indeed met with firm legislative and enforcement responses 
by the federal government. The enactment of the 1870 Enforcement Act and the 1871 Civil
20 Williams (1996: 28).
21 Woodward (1971: 211).
22 Parsons (2005: 816).
23 Tolnay & Beck (1995: chapter 2).
24 Foner (1988:245).
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Rights Act (also known as the Ku-Klux-Klan Act) authorized federal agencies to police, 
prosecute, and adjudicate “the use of force or intimidation to keep citizens from exercising 
any right or privilege granted or secured to him by the Constitution or laws o f the United 
States”. The Act was enforced by federal military troops (in some counties, through 
Presidential suspension of the right of habeas corpus). Prosecutions were taken in federal 
courts, in which biracial jury composition was significantly more common (and less 
vulnerable to Klan intimidation) than in Southern state courts.27 The Klan Act yielded a 
considerable volume of prosecutions in federal courts between 1870 and 1873, with high 
conviction rates (amounting to 74 percent in 1870). The establishment of a federal 
framework of “pro-black” criminalization policy provided a path which was abandoned in 
later years because of a combination of political and institutional impediments which will 
be discussed in detail below. This path would be retaken only nine decades later, when the 
constitutional crisis in Litde Rock, Arkansas (1957) would compel the federal 
administration to reassert its authority to penalize white supremacist brutality.
The emergence o f the anti-Klan criminalization regime in the late 1860s can be 
attributed to the materialization of two major historical conditions. First, the growth of the 
Klan posed a challenge to the legitimacy o f the federal government, which was heavily 
invested in the project of Reconstruction. Anti-Klan criminalization was embedded within 
the broader array of post-war political and constitutional reforms which sought to expand 
the powers of the national administration vis-a-vis state governments. The failure of 
Southern states to guarantee the fundamental liberties o f African-Americans (as was clearly 
demonstrated by the Black Codes) was seen by Northerners as a quintessential example of 
the necessity of establishing a powerful national administration. Consequently, the success 
of the federal government in demonstrating its competence to protect freedmen in the South 
became a yardstick for measuring its ability to deliver these expectations. The rise o f a new 
framework o f federal legislation, and the high profile Ku Klux Klan trials which followed, 
communicated this message to both Northern and Southern audiences 29
Second, in considerable respects, the emergence o f the anti-Klan criminalization 
regime was consistent with the interests o f Southern elites in that particular historical
25 Ch. 114, 16 Stat. 140(1870).
26 W illiams (1996: 46).
27 Trelease (1971).
28 Belknap (1987:12).
29 Blight (2002: 114-117).
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moment. True, the abolition of slavery impaired the direct economic and political interest 
o f Southern elites in protecting their black labour force. However, fretting that the 
unchecked rampage of Klan terror would prolong the presence of federal troops in the 
region and thus leave the South in a political limbo, Southern elites had an interest in 
curbing the flames of white supremacist brutality. This is consistent with William J. 
Wilson’s general observation that, during the first two post-bellum decades, Southern 
elites preferred to tighten their paternalistic economic bondage with blacks than to align 
themselves with white supremacist rabbles.30 Although distressed by having to ameliorate 
the arduous working conditions which prevailed before the War and to increase the costs 
of black labour, the planter elite recognized that a transition to a predominantly white 
labour force would inescapably require greater concessions. Their strategic solution was 
in many respects similar to the ‘divide and rule’ strategy which had served them well 
throughout most of the antebellum period (albeit under more propitious political 
circumstances): relying on black labour while impeding the political empowerment of 
both African-Americans and poor whites.31 Indeed, in contrast with the antebellum 
period, Southern elites did not take an active role in mobilizing for the enactment of this 
regime of “pro-black” criminalization, as the extension of federal authority in the region 
had clearly constrained their political leverage. However, in comparison with other 
federal policies enacted throughout the Reconstruction era, anti-Klan legislation served 
some purposes which were consistent with the interests of Southern elites.
B2. The Nadir of “Pro-Black” Criminalization and the Growth of Lynching. 1873-1909
The crisis o f federal “pro-black” criminalization policies derived from the collapse of 
the political order which prevailed during Reconstruction. By the late 1870s, the two 
major conditions which facilitated the emergence of anti-Klan criminalization policies 
in the late 1860s (namely, the commitment of national and Southern governments to 
guarantee African-Americans’ civil rights, and the compatibility of these policies with 
the interests of Southern elites) were no longer in operation. In this subsection, I will 
show how the structural changes which took place in both the regional and national 
political arenas following the demise of Reconstruction inhibited the development of 
adequate legal responses to the problem of lynching.
30 Wilson (1980: 54-55).
31 Mandle (1979); Williamson (1984).
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B2.1. The Nadir o f  “Pro-Black" Criminalization and the Ascendancy o f White 
Supremacy in Southern Politics
In the decades which followed the collapse of the antebellum political order, Southern 
politics became a site of fierce straggle between revolutionary and reactionary forces. 
These forces had vied with another in an effort to extend or to contain the unprecedented 
opportunities for the redistribution of political and economic power created by the swift 
incorporation of millions of formerly disenfranchised and enslaved blacks into the 
Southern electoral and economic systems. As we saw earlier, the abolition of slavery 
significantly compromised the bargaining power of poor whites. Their economic 
predicament created incentives for Southern politicians to invest in the mobilization o f 
popular demands to erect tighter restrictions on black economic competitiveness. The 
effective mobilization of this revanchist agenda enabled racial conservatives to win the 
lion’s share of state and local offices during the first half of the 1870s.33 However, given 
the reluctance of Southern elites to grant their full support to such initiatives (in an 
attempt, as noted above, to facilitate their reliance on black labour), Southern legislatures 
did not develop systematic ideological and institutional frameworks for the economic and 
political exclusion of African-Americans until the 1880s.
The major catalyst for the intensified pursuit of racial exclusion from the 1880s 
was the effort to stunt the rise of the Populist Party, which sought to capitalize the full 
transformative potential o f this unstable economic and political constellation. In an effort 
to build a cross-racial political coalition, Populists spotlighted the converging interests of 
black and white farmers and urban workers in challenging the hegemony of the planter 
elite. Among other things, Populists called for abolishing vagrancy laws and the 
institution of convict leasing (which, besides its humanitarian breaches, was criticized as a 
means for breaking the unionization and collective bargaining power of white miners and 
farmers).34 They also demanded die removal of legal barriers to African-Americans’ 
ability to own land or to seek employment opportunities outside plantations.35
The rise o f the Populist Party posed a radical challenge to Southern elites. In an 
effort to remove this challenge, Southern elites had abandoned their previous strategic 
preference to divide and rale the working class through using racial animus to impede the
32 Woodward (1971: 211-12).
33 Perman (1984).
34 Gottschalk (2006:49).
35 Bloom (1983: 39).
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development of class-consciousness and collective bargaining power. In order to rein in 
the rise of the Populist Party, Southern elites had to bind themselves in political alliance 
with the white masses.36 This political alliance was stabilized by the radicalization of 
white supremacist consciousness in Southern culture. The new white supremacist 
ideologies which gained ground during this period served to legitimate 
disenfranchisement crusades by portraying African-Americans as unfit to vote and 
incapable o f holding political offices. Expressing this view, a prominent Southern 
publicist had asserted in 1905 that it was essential to suppress the black vote “as it would 
have been to suppress the votes of all the Southern mules and oxen, had a Republican 
Congress, in the spirit o f Caligula.. .seen proper to confer the suffrage on them”.
The radicalization o f Southern white supremacist consciousness fomented the 
growth of lynching and, at the same time, impeded the mobilization of effective legal 
responses to such terror. From the mid 1880s onwards, the sanguinary efforts of lynchers 
to preclude black participation in the democratic process were entirely consistent with the 
plethora o f legislative measures erected by Southern policymakers in order to nullify the 
black vote. Disenfranchisement policies ranged from ostensibly colour-blind measures 
(such as literacy tests and tax polls) to more blatantly racist schemes such as the 
enactment of the Grandfather Clause (requiring voters to prove that their ancestors had 
the right to vote).38 By 1903, every Southern state had passed legislation which de facto 
disenfranchised African-Americans.39 The combination o f extralegal violence, fraud, and 
disenfranchisement laws radically transformed the composition of the electorate 
throughout the South. In Louisiana, for instance, the number of African-Americans 
registered to vote plummeted from 130,344 in 1896 to 5,320 in 1900 and reached an 
ultimate low of 1,772 in 1916, almost a 99 percent reduction.40 Because of the prevalence 
o f white supremacist terror, these registration figures overstate turnouts. In Mississippi, 
black voter turnout was estimated at 29 percent in 1888, 2 percent in 1892, and 0 percent 
in 1895 41 The representation o f African-Americans among legislatures and holders of 
public office vanished accordingly. No African-Americans sat in the Mississippi 
legislature after 1895, down from a high of 64 in 1873. In South Carolina’s lower house,
36 Williamson (1984).
37 Quoted in Litwack (1998: 246).
38 McAdam (1999: 68).
39 Klarman (2004: 12).
40 McAdam (1999: 69).
41 Klarman (2007: 77).
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which had a black majority during Reconstruction, only a single African-American 
representative remained in 1896.42
In turn, the entrenchment of all-white legislatures mobilizing around white 
supremacist policy platforms led to unprecedented recourse to legislative measures in order to 
symbolize and enforce white supremacist social conventions. Thus, whereas up until the mid 
1880s, “localities could strike their own compromises in race relations, try their own 
experiments, and tolerate their own ambiguities”,43 from this historical moment onwards, 
conformity with white supremacist codes became increasingly enforceable by legal 
mechanisms. Southern legislatures, as noted by Leon Litwack, began to “segregate the races 
by law in practically every conceivable situation in which whites and blacks might come into 
social contact” 44 For example, in South Carolina, the law prohibited textile factories from 
permitting black and white labourers to “work together in the same room, to use the same 
entrances, doorways, or stairways at the same time, or the same lavatories, drinking water 
buckets, pails, cups, dippers or glasses at any time” 45 In Atlanta, a municipal ordinance 
segregated black and white prostitutes by allocating them to separate blocks.46
With the dismantling of the political significance of the black vote, any electoral 
incentives which could have motivated Southern politicians to address the escalating tide of 
lynching were removed. African-Americans were, once again, relentlessly deprived of 
access to the vehicles through which criminal justice policy was shaped. Although some 
moderate Southern legislatures and social movements openly criticized lynching, such 
dissenting voices were politically marginal and inconsequential. Interestingly, such 
criticism was usually framed as a plea for the restoration of law and order rather than as a 
call to transform the structure of racial domination within which lynching was embedded 47 
The majority of Southern politicians appealed to the white masses by vindicating or even 
celebrating lynching. Governor Vaidaman o f Mississippi bragged that “every Negro in the
A O
state will be lynched” if necessary to maintain white supremacy. Governor Blease of 
South Carolina announced that he would rather resign his post and “lead the mob” than use
42 Klarman (2004: 32).
43 Ayers (1992: 137).
44 Litwack (1998: 233).
45 Litwack (1998: 233).
46 Ibid, 236.
47 Gottschalk (2006: 64). This example o f  the recourse to the rhetoric o f  Maw and order’ to promote a 
liberal agenda highlights the historical contingency o f  contemporary uses o f  this term.
48 Klarman (2007: 79).
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his office to protect a “nigger brute” from lynching.49 To symbolize his point, he planted a 
finger o f a lynched African-American in the gubernatorial garden.50
B2.2. The Nadir o f  “Pro-Black” Criminalization and Northern Retreat from Reconstruction
The imperviousness of Southern political system to the grievances of African-Americans 
put to the test once again the commitment o f national political and legal institutions to the 
constitutional ideal of equal protection. Lynching posed an evident challenge to the 
authority of the federal government. By sabotaging the ability o f the legal system to provide 
African-Americans with due process, lynching had blatantly defied the competence of the 
national administration to defend the most elementary rights pledged by the Constitution, 
including the right to life. Yet, this time, the challenge was not met by a firm reassertion of 
federal commitment to guarantee civil rights in the South. The inactions of national 
administrations throughout more than two decades in which white supremacist terror spread 
across the South reflected the wider demise of the political forces which impelled the 
emergence of anti-Klan criminalization policies less than two decades earlier.
The fall of the anti-Klan criminalization regime, and, more generally, of the set of 
political ideals and commitments which this regime embodied, was brought about by two 
major shifts in the national political arena: declining Northern support of racial egalitarian 
reformism, and the tighter constitutional constraints imposed by the Supreme Court on the 
further development of federal civil rights policy. From the mid 1870s, Northern public 
opinion increasingly supported the pursuit o f interregional reconciliation and was willing to 
acquiesce to Southern oppressive racial practices to facilitate that aim.51 Northern elites 
expressed their concerns of the antidemocratic implications of sustained military mle in the 
South. The severe economic recession which began in 1873 put heavier fiscal constraints 
on the national administration and intensified the Northern unease about the heavy 
budgetary costs which the institutionalization o f federal authority in the South had 
necessitated. The economic crisis had also diverted public attention from issues of racial 
equality and impelled the federal government to invest in new policy domains in which it 
could more easily legitimate its authority vis-a-vis state governments.53
49 Ibid, ibid.
50 Williamson (1984: 188).
51 Blight (2002: 123-125); Klarman (2004: 13).
52 Klarman (2007: 62).
53 Ibid, ibid.
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Besides the principled objections to the excessive expansion o f federal powers, 
Northern opposition to Reconstruction also reflected a profound sense of ambivalence 
regarding the required pace and direction of the move toward equalizing African- 
Americans’ civil rights.54 The constitutional reforms of Reconstruction exceeded what 
was originally envisioned by the majority of Northerners as the preferable outcome of 
the Civil War. Even Abraham Lincoln, in his 1858 debate with Democrat Stephen 
Douglas, denied having been “in favour of bringing about in any way, the social and 
political equality of the white and black races” and insisted that “blacks must remain 
inferior”.55 As we saw in the previous chapter,56 Northern support for the abolition of 
slavery was not entirely motivated by egalitarian sentiments, and, at any rate, it hardly 
put to the test the commitment o f Northern society to eradicate its own white 
supremacist social and political institutions. In contrast, the further institutionalization 
o f the egalitarian principles of Radical Reconstruction could have generated acute 
challenges of legitimation for the established structure of political and economic power 
in the North. From the early 1870s, these concerns found expression (and, in turn, were 
intensified by) allegations of corruption and incompetence o f African-American office 
holders in Southern governments.57 With the defeat o f the Republican Party in the 
Congressional elections of 1874 (in which a 110-seat Republican majority in the House 
turned into a 110-seat deficit), elite groups within the Party began to support the 
granting of amnesty to former Confederates and the termination o f military rule in the 
South.58 It also became clear that control over the House would enable Democrats to 
block funding for the enforcement o f existing civil rights legislation and to prevent the 
passage of additional reforms.59 In 1876, the Republican presidential candidate, 
Rutherford B. Hayes, won on a platform of sectional reconciliation and decided to 
withdraw federal troops from the South. Consequently, the institutional machinery 
which enabled the federal government to combat the first wave o f Klan violence was 
dismantled. The number of federal court cases prosecuted under the Enforcement Act 
dropped from a high of 1,271 in 1873, to 954 in 1874, 221 in 1875, and only 25 
prosecutions in 1879.60
54 Klinker & Smith (1999: chapter 3).
55 Quoted in Marx (1998: 121).
56 See chapter 2, Section D2 o f  this dissertation.
57 Foner (1988: 388-389).
58 Klarman (2007: 62).
59 Klarman (2007: 63-64).
60 Marx (1998: 72).
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The Supreme Court’s civil rights jurisprudence in the post-Reconstruction era posed 
additional constraints on the development of “pro-black” federal criminalization 
policy.61 As Michael Klarman points out, “even Republican justices rejected social 
equality among the races and disfavoured large expansions of federal power to protect 
the rights of blacks”.62 In its landmark decision in the Civil Rights Cases (1883), the 
Supreme Court held that Congress lacked constitutional authority to outlaw 
discrimination by private individuals and organizations, and that its powers under the 
Fourteenth Amendment extended only to actions taken by state and local 
governments.63 In United State v. Harris (1883), the Court applied this logic to the 
question of Congress’ criminalization power under the Reconstruction Amendments.64 
The Court declared Section 2 o f the Civil Rights Act of 1871 (under which Klan 
perpetrators had been prosecuted during the 1870s) unconstitutional on the theory that 
the power of the federal government to enforce the Equal Protection Clause applied 
only to state action, not to state inaction. In the specific case, four African-American 
men were removed from a county jail in Crockett County, Tennessee by a group of 20 
white supremacist vigilantes led by Sheriff R. G. Harris. The four men were beaten and 
one was killed. The defendants, who were charged with conspiring to deprive the victim 
of the equal protection of the laws, demurred to the indictment and questioned the 
authority of the federal administration to indict them. In accepting their appeal, the 
Supreme Court reasoned that the Fourteenth Amendment "is a guaranty against the 
exertion o f arbitrary and tyrannical power on the part o f the government and legislature 
of the state, not a guaranty against the commission o f individual offenses”.65 The fact 
that Southern states inexorably eschewed bringing lynching perpetrators to justice was 
not recognized by the Court as a valid ground for warranting federal action. This 
constitutional reasoning reflected the prevailing view among Northerners, who, by the 
late nineteenth century, were ready to assent that the “Afro-American problem.. .had to 
be worked out in the South without external intervention”.66
61 Scaturro (2000).
62 Klarman (2007: 68).
63 C ivil Rights Cases, 109 U .S. 3 (1883).
64 U nited States v. H arris, 106 U.S. 629 (1883).
65 Ibid, at 638.
66 Klinker & Smith (1999: 73).
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C. The Institutional Dimensions of the Nadir of “Pro-Black” 
Criminalization in the Post-Reconstruction Era
So far, I discussed the way in which the transformation o f the politics of race in both the 
national and regional political arenas had shaped the character of anti-racist 
criminalization policies in the Reconstruction and post-Reconstruction eras. I 
demonstrated how a cluster o f structural shifts which led to the collapse of 
Reconstruction and to the entrenchment o f Jim Crow impeded Southern and national 
legislatures from developing adequate legal responses to the problem o f white 
supremacist violence. This inquiry has contributed to our understanding of one of the 
central questions of this study: under what conditions is “pro-minority” criminal 
legislation likely to emerge? Still, despite the failure to establish a new criminalization 
regime for tackling lynching and other rampaging forms o f white supremacist terror, it 
is clear that these incidents violated multiple offences in the criminal codes o f Southern
67states. This provokes the question: what were the historical dynamics which led the 
Southern criminal justice to abdicate its responsibility to prevent lynching and to 
penalize its perpetrators? To be sure, the poor performance o f criminal justice systems 
in protecting members of marginalized minority groups is all too familiar. Yet, the 
manifest way in which the Southern criminal justice system had institutionalized this 
common failure in the heyday o f lynching was nevertheless peculiar (particularly when 
understood as a retreat from the formal acknowledgment o f its enforcement 
responsibility in the antebellum and Reconstruction periods). Thus, a corresponding 
question arises: what are the general lessons that this manifest abdication of 
enforcement responsibilities tells us about the conditions under which adequate 
protection of members of marginalized minority groups is likely to be provided? In this 
section, I will address this twofold question. The analysis will take a close look at how 
the modus operandi of the Southern criminal justice system and the wider cultural 
landscape o f the New South affected the structure o f the criminalization processes 
through which the protection of African-Americans had to be pursued.
67 Garland (2005: 809).
68 The analysis will be informed by the general discussion offered in the first chapter (pp. 25-30) for 
characterizing the cultural and institutional preconditions which enabled and constrain the 
enforceability o f  “pro-minority” criminal categories.
Cl. The Transformation o f the Southern Criminal Justice System as a Catalyst to
the Removal o f Criminal Law’s Protection from Black Victims
Throughout the Reconstruction era, racial reformers repealed various provisions of the 
Black Codes and launched ambitious plans to restructure the modus operandi of the 
Southern criminal justice system. For example, a significant body of state and federal 
legislation forbade racial exclusions from jury service.69 In South Carolina, such 
legislation went as far as to require that the racial composition o f juries would mirror
70the racial composition of the electorate. However, the impact of these reforms was 
bounded by the wider difficulties in sustaining the political vitality of Reconstruction. 
The checks they imposed on the conduct o f Southern crime control institutions 
collapsed together with the demise o f the Reconstruction project.
From the late 1870s onwards, as part of the broader proliferation o f white 
supremacist lawmaking, Southern legislatures and courts had devised new measures for 
excluding African-Americans from the criminal process. New segregation laws forbade 
black lawyers’ “presence in some courtrooms and made them liabilities to clients in 
others”.71 Courts regularly excluded blacks from juries and disregarded black 
testimony.72 Throughout the post-Reconstruction decades, the Supreme Court reiterated 
that the Fourteenth Amendment forbade statutory exclusion o f blacks from jury service. 
However, at the same time, it tacitly allowed Southern states to nullify this constitutional 
principle through establishing mechanisms of de facto racial exclusion in jury selection74 
and set evidentiary requirements which made it virtually impossible to prove the 
discriminatory aspect of such practices.75 For example, in jurisdictions where jurors were 
selected from voter lists, the mass disenfranchisement o f African-American voters served 
to justify their absence from juries.76 In practice, Michael Klarman points out, “between 
1904 and 1935, the Court did not reverse the conviction of even one black defendant on 
the ground o f race discrimination in jury selection, even though blacks were universally
69 Klarman (2004: 39).
70 Litwack (1998: 247).
71 Klarman (2004: 65).
72 Litwack (1998: 247).
73 Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303 (1880); Neal v. D elware, 103 U.S. 370(1880).
74 Kennedy (1998: 172-178); Nieman (1989: 400-401).
75 Schmidt (1983).
76 Klarman (2004: 42).
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excluded from Southern juries”.77 The pervasiveness of institutional racism was apparent 
in virtually all aspects of the administration o f criminal justice in the South. A study of 
sentencing practices in Georgia in 1882 revealed that blacks served twice as long as 
whites for burglary and almost five times as long for larceny. For more severe offences, 
blacks were disproportionately subjected to capital punishment. Between 1882 and 1930,
7081 percent of the legal executions in Southern states were inflicted on black offenders.
Perhaps the most egregious symptom of the role played by the Southern criminal 
justice system in enforcing racial domination was the entrenchment of the convict leasing 
system from the early 1870s onwards.80 Although the practice of leasing prisoners to 
private individuals was instituted well before the onset of the Civil War (and was also 
customary in the North), it reached an unprecedented scale in the New South.81 The 
institutionalization of the convict leasing system served the converging interests of 
Southern states and economic elites. For the states, it enabled to reduce expenses on the 
erection of penitentiaries in a political setting in which “spending money on black 
criminals was at the bottom of every white taxpayer’s list o f priorities”.82 At the same 
time, it enabled economic elites to regain an almost unqualified control over the black 
labour force notwithstanding the formal abolition of slavery. Paradoxically, contrary to 
the intended aims of its initiators, the wording of the Thirteenth Amendment (prohibiting 
“involuntary servitude, except as a punishment for crime whereof the party shall have 
been duly convicted”) might have channeled the efforts o f Southern economic elites 
to establish new mechanisms for exploiting black labour to the penal sphere. The use 
o f black convicts served as a major engine o f the transition o f Southern economy from
* f t ”}agrarian to industrial modes o f production in the post-War decades. Unlike slave­
owners, contractors ran no risk of losing a valuable investment if a convict was worked to 
death. The appalling mortality rates o f convict labourers bear witness to their atrocious 
working conditions, which were often severer than those imposed under slavery.84 In
RC
Alabama, for example, 41 percent of convict labourers died in 1870.
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By the late nineteenth century, then, the Southern criminal justice system became 
fully invested in stabilizing white supremacy. The pervasiveness of institutional racism 
precluded Southern policing and judicial institutions from attempting to protect African- 
American victims notwithstanding their formal conferral with constitutional rights to due 
process and equal protection. In considerable respects, African-Americans became more 
vulnerable to wanton white supremacist victimization after their formal political 
emancipation. With the collapse of the network of informal social controls used to 
reinforce the inferior status o f blacks during the antebellum period, white Southerners 
became increasingly tolerant o f barbarous forms of racial degradation that were hitherto 
deemed censurable (and indeed destructive to the monetary interests of slave-owners). 
The Freedmen’s Bureau documented some o f the more heinous instances in which 
extralegal violence was used for compelling compliance with degrading racial etiquette, 
e.g. the killings of a black person for “refusal to move his hat” or “to give up a whisky
Q/T
flask”. The pervasiveness of such violence in Southern everyday life brought one 
observer to note in 1866 that, “whatever the Negro legal right, he knows how far he may
o n
go, and where he must stop” and that “habits are not changed by paper laws”.
C2. Southern Excevtionalism and the Path Not Taken
The simultaneous intensification of both legal and extralegal executions of black offenders
oo
in the New South is widely documented in the historical literature. As Anthony Marx 
pointed out, “Jim Crow was enforced as much by hoodlums as by local authority” and 
“often the two were indistinguishable, as elected judges and other officials turned a blind
OQ
eye to the mobs who had voted them into office”. The simultaneous escalation of both 
legal and extralegal violence provides an appalling illustration of the interplay between two 
different forms in which criminal justice systems operate to reinforce social 
marginalization: their tendency both to over-penalize and to under-protect members of 
marginalized communities.90 Yet the way in which this familiar tendency was pronounced 
in the practices of Southern crime control institutions also has some broader implications 
for our understanding of the interrelationship between the trajectories of modem penal 
evolution and of “pro-minority” criminalization. As noted above, Southern crime control
86 Kennedy (1998: 39).
87 Quoted in Litwack (1998: 230).
88 Tolnay & Beck (1992: chapter 4).
89 Marx (1998: 141).
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institutions had expanded enormously during the post-War decades. This expansion was 
facilitated by the removal of one of the major impediments to the institutional development 
of crime control apparatuses before the Civil War: the resistance of slave-holders. This 
resistance was couched in terms of a principled objection to excessive state and federal 
interventions in local affairs, but it also reflected the partisan interests of the planter elite in 
preserving the hybrid structure o f authority over the governance of slaves’ conduct.91 In 
light of the decisive influence of the planter elite on public policymaking in the antebellum 
South, by the mid 1860s, penal and policing apparatuses in the South were remarkably 
underdeveloped vis-a-vis Northern counterparts. For example, in 1850, while Georgia and 
Massachusetts held a comparable population (900,000), Massachusetts’s incarcerated 
population was almost thirty times higher (1236 vs. 43).92 In the post-Reconstmction era, 
however, the Southern criminal justice system expanded dramatically (not least due to its 
heavy involvement in buttressing racial repression). For example, between 1874 and 1877, 
the imprisonment rate of African-Americans in Mississippi and Georgia grew threefold.93
In this context, the post-1880 proliferation of public torture lynching appears to 
have posed an evident challenge to the ability of Southern states to monopolize the means 
of legitimate violence within a cmcial moment for establishing their political legitimacy and 
professional authority. Conducted in front of large crowds, these rituals imitated ancient 
forms of ritualistic public execution which had been formally abolished by the legal system 
decades earlier.94 As David Garland noted,95 the mushrooming of public torture lynching in 
late nineteenth century Southern society sets it apart from what is widely regarded as the 
“normal” trajectory of modem penal culture: the monopolization and bureaucratization of 
penal authority by state institutions and the disappearance o f rituals of popular vengeance 
from the agora 96 In order to understand why Southern states eschewed confronting this 
manifest challenge to their authority to monopolize the means of legitimate violence, we 
should consider two peculiar features of Southern culture: the inexorability of its white 
supremacist norms and its deep-seated vigilante tradition.
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In the late nineteenth century, new dehumanizing racist discourses had gained 
currency in Southern culture. These discourses gave emphasis to the issue of black 
criminality as the ultimate symbol of the disruptive social consequences which, according
Q7to Southerners, were caused by the forced abolition of slavery. With the increasing 
influence of Social Darwinism on American sociological, political and ethical thought in 
the late nineteenth century, American scientists had increasingly resorted to 
methodologies and insights drawn from evolutionary theory for rationalizing the need to
QO
maintain white supremacy. Two main theses drawn from natural selection theory were 
particularly salient in fulfilling this ideological task. The first thesis contended that 
African-Americans had been undergoing a process of retrogression following their 
unleashing from the civilizing influence o f their masters." Expounding this theory in an 
1890 scientific article, Nathaniel S. Shaler, then Dean of the Lawrence School of Science 
at Harvard University, advised the white population to be alert “lest the old savage weeds 
overcame the tender shoots of the new and unnatural culture”.100 Such scholarly myths 
resonated with widespread anxieties among white Southerners about the coming o f age of 
a new generation o f blacks who were more questioning o f their “place” and less inclined 
to render absolute deference to members of the ruling caste. These anxieties were 
paradigmatically expressed by an 1895 editorial in a Louisiana newspaper, lamenting that 
“the younger generation of Negro... have lost that wholesome respect for the white man, 
without which two races, the one inferior, cannot leave in peace and harmony 
together”.101 These common views inflamed the moral panic regarding blacks’ propensity 
to engage in sexual crime, which soon became the most salient justification o f lynching.
The second thesis which emerged in the scientific literature, extending the 
Darwinian “survival of the fittest” theme to the analysis o f racial conflicts, depicted white 
supremacy as an outcome of a struggle for existence in which the more fitted race shall 
forcefully triumph while the inferior one will be extinct. In his 1896 book Race Traits and 
Tendencies o f the American Negro, renowned Southern statistician Fredrick Hoffinan 
analyzed the data on the upsurge of lynching as “representing fairly the increasing tendency
97 Arguably, the political uses o f  black criminality in the N ew  South laid the foundations for the 
broader configurations o f  crime-talk and governance which would spread throughout the nation in the 
1960s. See: Wacquant (2001: 117).
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99 Williamson (1984: 120).
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of colored men to commit this most frightful of all crimes” (i.e. rape). He further insisted 
that no relief could be found in educative programs but only in the “gradual extinction” of 
the Negro race.102
The moral panic regarding the vulnerability o f white women to the ferocious 
sexual impulses of predatory black males served as a socially acceptable outlet to 
deeper anxieties which suffused the collective psyche o f Southern society. The rise o f 
Social Darwinism both granted scientific credibility to these anxieties and radicalized 
their tone. For example, a contemporary Southern historian asserted that: “rape, 
indescribably beastly and loathsome always, is marked, in the instance of its 
perpetuation by a negro, by a diabolical persistence and malignant atrocity o f detail that 
have no reflection in the whole extent of the natural history o f the most bestial and 
ferocious animals”.103 As feminist readings o f the ritualistic forms and conventional 
apologetics of lynching illuminate, the intensity of this moral panic was fomented by 
the confluence between the racist and patriarchal creeds of Southern culture. The 
“drama o f lynching”, as Jacquelyn Hall persuasively argued, had served to reaffirm 
patriarchal stereotypes o f women’s defencelessness, to reinforce traditional imagery o f 
Southern women’s “sexual pureness”, and to interdict intimate relationship between 
members o f the two races.104 It is also worth mentioning that although the protection of 
women from sexual victimization by black offenders overshadowed any competing 
‘justifying aim’ of lynching, in practice less than 26 percent of those lynched were 
charged with, let alone tried or convicted of rape or attempted rape.105
The measures taken by white Southerners against black suspects reflected their 
profound distrust of the suitability of ordinary legal mechanisms to eliminate what they 
perceived as an extraordinary threat to their physical security and cultural identity. This 
sense of distrust had its origins in the deep-seated tradition of Southern vigilantism.106 The 
introduction of the Reconstruction Amendments failed to eradicate these popular 
sentiments. Furthermore, as Michael Klarman notes, “most Southern whites found black 
jury service, which they conceived as a form of political officeholding, even more
102 Quoted in Williamson (1984: 122).
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objectionable than black suffrage”.*07 As demonstrated above, these constitutional reforms 
had hardly alleviated the discriminatory practices of Southern courts, policing and carceral 
institutions. Yet the principle which these reforms conveyed -  namely, the idea that black 
offenders and victims were entitled to the same procedural safeguards and measure of 
protection to which whites were entitled -  was fiercely resented by white Southerners. 
Rituals of popular vengeance thus became salient sites for rejecting Northern 
interventionism and reasserting Southern values. Paradoxically, however, it was the very 
retreat of Northern politicians and federal authorities from keeping their commitment to 
enforce this principle that enabled lynching to thrive across the region from the early 1880s 
onwards. And in a corresponding paradox: Southerners’ claims that lynching reflected “the 
outcry of a conservative and lawloving people against the abuses of a system of criminal 
procedure which has become intolerably inefficient”108 gained political momentum in the 
very moment in which the Southern criminal justice system abdicated any meaningful 
commitment to the constitutional procedural safeguards which allegedly inhibited its 
competence to tackle the “unconventional threat” of black criminality.
The fallacy of the common vindication of lynching was most evidently demonstrated 
by the many cases in which mobs had seized hold on their victims after they had already been 
sentenced to death. The mushrooming of lynching was not rooted in the preventive 
shortcomings of law enforcement agencies (which, as we saw above, only became more 
focused on targeting black suspects and more capable — institutionally — of tackling black 
criminality). Rather, it grew out of the interplay between, on the one hand, the functional role 
which these rituals played in Southern culture (symbolizing Southern defiance of the de-jure 
inclusion of blacks into the framework of American citizenship),109 and, on the other hand, 
the refusal of both Southern and federal law enforcement agencies to reclaim their authority in 
tight of combination of institutional racism and political convenience. Lynching was accepted 
as the continuation by other means of the policies which were institutionalized at the very 
same moment in order to symbolize and to enforce the second-class status of African- 
Americans (not least, segregation, disenfranchisement and disproportionate penalization of 
black offenders). The coexistence of legal and extralegal mechanisms of retribution embodied 
Southerners’ conceptions of how retributive justice should be delivered in a white 
supremacist polity. The Southern system of penal retribution was restructured in order to
107 Klarman (2004: 39).
108 Taylor (1907).
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institutionalize two sets of standards: the first was applicable to members of the ruling caste 
and subjected to constitutional principles of due process; the second was applicable to 
members of the inferior race and administered through the infliction of spectacularly cmel 
and unusual punishment. The acquiescence of the federal administration in the establishment 
of this racially-skewed system of penal retribution reflected its general approach amid the 
entrenchment of Jim Crow. The reasoning of the Supreme Court while upholding the 
constitutionality of state-sanctioned segregation in the South in the landmark case of Plessy v. 
Ferguson 10 encapsulated the dominant way in which this position was articulated in late 
nineteenth century American law:
We consider the underlying fallacy of the plaintiffs argument to consist in the 
assumption.. .that social prejudices may be overcome by legislation...We cannot accept 
this assumption.. .Legislation is powerless to eradicate racial instincts or to abolish 
distinctions based upon physical differences... If one race be inferior to the other 
socially, the Constitution of the United States cannot put them upon the same plane111
D. Conclusion
In this chapter, I examined the way in which the problem of white supremacist violence 
had been tackled between 1865 and 1909. My analysis has showed that the measure of 
protection provided to victims who belong to marginalized minorities does not hinge on 
whether they are legally recognized as entitled to equal citizenship rights. The conditions 
of existence o f “pro-minority” criminalization are more closely associated, as this study 
suggests, with the attempted contribution of such reforms to tackling challenges of 
legitimation and coordination with which political authorities and elite groups are faced.
Throughout the Reconstruction era, the performance of the national administration in 
protecting the safety and liberty of freedmen emerged as a salient yardstick of its competence 
to enforce the new model of national citizenship. The devising of federal mechanisms for 
bringing white supremacist terrorists to justice was embedded within a broader array of 
federal policies. As George Fredrickson has shown, these policies had been precipitated by 
the crystallization of new public expectations (particularly among Northern elites) for the
110 P lessy  v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
111 Ibid, at 550.
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117benevolent exercise of power by the national administration in the wake of the Civil War.
As I argued in section B, because of political changes which crystallized from the mid 1870s 
in both regional and national politics, the conditions which enabled the enactment and 
facilitated the enforceability of anti-Klan legislation were no longer operative. Northern 
public opinion lost its enthusiasm for robust federal civil rights policy, and was now willing to 
permit white Southerners a free hand in ordering Southern race relations. The institutional 
machinery which enforced anti-Klan legislation in the 1870s was dismantled following the 
removal of federal troops from the region and the stringent constitutional limits imposed by 
the Supreme Court on the development of federal civil rights policy. At the same time, the 
increasing electoral leverage of poor whites and the dissolution of the economic and political 
incentives which had motivated Southern elites to support the criminalization o f racist 
violence in the antebellum period removed the political conditions which could have impelled 
Southern legislatures to develop adequate enforcement mechanisms at the state and local 
levels. These unfavourable political and institutional transformations crystallized at the very 
same moment in which the radicalization of racist sentiments in Southern culture expressed 
itself (among other things) in the rise of new ritualized forms of white supremacist terror. The 
nadir of “pro-black” criminalization in the post-Reconstruction era reflected the wider crisis 
of racial egalitarianism in the late nineteenth century. As we will see in the next chapter, the 
conditions which would impel American society to reinstitute a new form of federal “pro­
black” criminalization regime crystallized only in the second quarter of the twentieth century.
My analysis has emphasized that, from the late 1870s onwards, the development 
of “pro-black” criminalization policies became highly constrained by the structural 
transformations which took place in the regional and national political arenas. However, it 
is important to emphasize that these structural transformations did not entirely preclude 
the potential for developing legal responses to white supremacist violence. Even after the 
collapse of Reconstruction, the emergence of legal responses to lynching and Klan terror 
remained plausible. After all, as we already saw in the second chapter, “pro-slave” 
criminalization reforms can gain ground even within political settings which are 
inexorably committed to the preservation of white supremacy. Accordingly, it is arguable 
that the Jim Crow legal order could have accommodated limited efforts to criminalize 
extralegal forms of excluding blacks from the ballot, jury box or from the public sphere in 
general. Such measures could have legitimized the institutionalized forms of pursuing
112 Fredrickson (1965).
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such exclusion (e.g. disenfranchisement and segregation) by portraying the legal system 
as committed in principle to guaranteeing blacks’ constitutional rights.
In this context, my analysis in this chapter has challenged not only the 
conventional liberal position which predicts that the extension o f equal constitutional 
rights would be followed by the amelioration o f social and political conditions of 
marginalized minorities. It also urges us to specify in more detail the conditions under 
which the Marxist thesis regarding the conditions of existence o f “pro-minority” 
reforms is likely to be substantiated. At the descriptive level, my analysis drew 
attention to the role played by contingent cultural factors (such as the deep-seated 
resentment to the rule o f law and the championship o f vigilantism in Southern culture) 
in affecting the likelihood that “pro-minority” reforms will be introduced in order to 
legitimize social inequalities. At the normative level, this discussion had 
reemphasized the double- edged character of “pro-minority” criminalization. Even if, 
as stressed by crude instrumentalist strands o f Marxist thinking, such reforms serve to 
legitimize and thus to stabilize the status quo, they nevertheless entail persuasive and 
symbolic elements which are not insignificant. Given the pervasiveness o f white 
supremacist norms in all aspects of Southern culture, it would be simplistic to assume 
that the mere introduction of additional legislative reforms could have provided 
African-Americans with meaningful protections. Yet the refusal o f both Southern and 
national lawmakers to endorse even this limited form o f recognition o f the moral 
gravity o f lynching provides an appalling indicator as any of the extent to which late 
nineteenth century American society was permeated by white supremacist norms.
Chapter 4:
The Emergence of National Civil-Rights Criminalization Policy, 
1930-1968
"My brethren say that when a man has emerged from slavery, and by the aid o f 
beneficient legislation has shaken o ff the inseparable concomitants o f  that state, there 
must be some stage in the progress o f his elevation when he takes the rank o f a mere 
citizen...and when his rights as a citizen, or a man, are to be protected in the ordinary 
modes by which other men’s rights are protected... What the nation, through Congress, 
has sought to accomplish in reference to that race is, what had already been done in 
every state in the Union for the white race, to secure and protect rigfits belonging to them 
as freemen and citizens; nothing more. The one underlying purpose o f congressional 
legislation has been to enable the black race to take the rank o f mere citizens. The 
difficulty has been to compel recognition o f  their legal right to take that rank, and to 
secure the enjoyment o f privileges belonging, under the law, to them as a component 
part o f the people fo r  whose welfare and happiness government is ordained."}
A. Introduction
With this bold statement, Justice John M. Arlen concluded his dissenting opinion in the 
Civil Rights Cases (1883). By holding that Congress lacked constitutional authority to 
outlaw racial discrimination by private individuals, this decision hindered the 
development o f federal anti-lynching legislation through the following decades. Justice 
Arlen’s dissenting voice represents the ‘path not taken’ by the American legal system 
throughout the post-Reconstruction era.2 In rejecting this view, the Supreme Court gave 
expression to the dominant mode o f thinking about the appropriate (minimal) role which 
the national government ought to play in governing race relations.3
1 C ivil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 62 (1883)
2 Tushnet (2008: 45-68).
3 Klarman (2004: 9).
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In this chapter, I examine the social and political processes which transformed the 
dominant constitutional and political understandings o f the role of the federal government in 
tackling racist violence. With the culmination of this paradigm shift, Congress established a 
new legal framework; for criminalizing racially-motivated interferences with a range of 
“federally protected activities” (including jury service, enrollment in public schools, and the 
use of interstate common carriers).4 The major goal of this new legal framework was to 
provide the federal administration with suitable enforcement tools for remedying the failure 
of Southern authorities to provide African-Americans with adequate protection. Tellingly, 
this objective echoed the very same vision which was articulated by Justice Arlen and 
rejected by the majority in the Civil Rights Cases eight decades earlier.
The rise of new constitutional theories which expanded the scope o f Congress’s 
legislative power had certainly played a role in removing the major constitutional obstacles 
which inhibited the development of federal anti-racist criminalization policy in earlier 
decades. Yet, these shifts in constitutional thinking reflected a much broader transformation 
in American political values and institutional structures. In this chapter, we will look at how 
these dramatic transformations provided the driving forces for the emergence o f  a new 
framework of federal “pro-black” criminalization in the mid 1960s. We are primarily 
concerned with the following two questions. First, what led the federal administration to 
abandon its previous position (to which it adhered for nearly eight decades) and to reclaim its 
authority to penalize white supremacist violence in the South? Second, what were the major 
effects which this campaign and legislative reform produced?
In addressing the first question, I will argue that the policy U-tum taken by the federal 
government was shaped by the interaction between four major forces: a) the proliferation of 
the Civil Rights Movement (particularly, between 1954 and 1965); b) the incorporation of 
black voters into the national electorate; c) the impact of Cold War dictates on domestic civil 
rights activism and policymaking d) the massive expansion o f the institutional capacities and 
political legitimacy o f the federal government during the New Deal era. Operating in tandem, 
these forces created new pressures of legitimation and coordination with which the federal 
administration was compelled to grapple. The introduction o f the new legal framework of
4 18 U.S.C § 245.
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“federally protected activities” became politically and institutionally feasible because it 
provided the federal government with suitable tools for containing these challenges. It is 
within this context, I will argue, that we can illuminate both the achievements and the failures 
o f the “federally protected activities” regime.
A succinct introduction o f  the structure and main arguments presented in this 
chapter follows. In section B , I will delineate the social transformations which enabled 
African-Americans, for the first time in their history, to take an active role in shaping 
criminalization policies. In particular, I will survey the demographic and economic shifts 
which facilitated the formation o f the Civil Rights Movement and the incorporation o f 
African-American voters into the national electorate.
In section C, I examine the trajectory o f the campaign to enact a federal finmework 
of “pro-black” criminalization, beginning with the founding o f the NAACP in 1909 and 
concluding with the passing o f “federally protected activities” legislation in 1968. In 
particular, I look at how the interactions between grassroots mobilization and electoral 
mobilization around the problem o f  black victimization enabled African-Americans to 
reconstruct the political meanings o f this problem. The analysis shows how the 
Movement’s strategic use o f ‘the victimization frame’ for spotlighting structural aspects of 
the Southern caste system effectively galvanized Northern revulsion against the system o f 
Jim Crow. In turn, this shift in Northern public opinion had dramatically transformed the 
dynamics o f electoral competition between the two major national parties. Most notably, it 
impelled the Democratic Party to invest greater political capital in sponsoring civil rights 
reforms. The passing o f the “federally protected activities” legislation had served as a 
product and fee ilitator o f these structural shifts in the national political arena.
In section D, I show that the new challenges of legitimation feced by the federal 
government throughout the Cold War era added a distinctive dimension to the struggle for 
federalizing anti-racist criminalization policy. As Mary Dudziak has shown, throughout the 
Cold War era, the inpact of racist incidents on the nation’s international reputation emerged as 
one of the most momentous forces in shaping domestic civil rights policy.5 The need to
5 Dudziak (2000).
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‘disown’ Southern racist brutality created strong incentives to utilize the expressive qualities of 
criminal law by means of passing a new framework of “pro-black” federal legislation.6 At the 
same time, the Cold War setting (particularly throughout the heyday of McCarthy ism) also 
inhibited the development of civil rights protest insolar as such campaigns had spotlighted the 
antidemocratic and illiberal aspects of the American political system. In this section, I will 
examine how the interplay between the contradictory inpacts of Cold War politics enabled and 
constrained the mobilization of “pro-black” criminalization policy during this period.
Another important trend which characterized the post-War period was the 
entrenchment of a novel (and unprecedented ly expansive) vision o f the role o f the national 
administration in tackling the nation’s core social problems. From the launching o f  the 
New Deal programs in the mid 1930s, the traditional division o f  labor between federal, 
state, and local governments was eroded, and the federal government consistently 
expanded its institutional capacities and political authority. In section E, I examine how 
the efforts o f the federal government to reinforce the New Deal vision o f federal 
policymaking created new incentives and opportunities for enacting a new framework o f 
“pro-black” federal criminalization. I will also pinpoint the role played by the 
introduction o f “federally protected activities” legislation in facilitating the efforts o f the 
federal administration to establish itself as a key policymaker in the criminal justice field.
In section F, I analyze the major effects brought about by the introduction of “federally 
protected activities” legislation. In assessing the preventive performance of this framework, I 
notice the curious feet that, contrary to the expectations that accompanied the six decade 
campaign to federalize civil rights criminalization policy, this legislation generated only a 
negligible volume of prosecutions following its high-profile enactment. However, I suggest that 
this feet does not necessarily imply the futility o f  this reform Although, as I will argue in 
sections C-E of this chapter, this legislation was essentially driven by efforts to utilize the 
expressive qualities o f “pro-minority” criminalization in order to tackle challenges of 
legitimation, it was also embedded within a broader network of policy measures which worked 
to dismantle the Southern caste system and thus to alleviate the criminogenic conditions which
6 On criminalization as a form o f  expressing the community ‘disowning’ o f  the outlawed conduct, see: 
Fein berg (1994: 77-80).
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produced this particular form of black victimization. However, because this wider political 
framework did not tackle the distinct mechanisms of racial stratification which prevailed in 
Northern economy and society, this new regime o f “pro-black” criminalization neglected the 
patterns of black victimization which thrived in the North. I argue that, while the prioritization 
o f Southern patterns of white supremacist victimization was almost inevitable given the 
political opportunity structure within which the Movement had to operate in the 1950s and 60s, 
it created a pattern of path dependence which continues to inhibit the development of adequate 
responses to the problem ofblack victimization even today.
In evaluating the political effects generated by the introduction o f “federally 
protected activities” legislation, I consider the assets and liabilities which emanated from 
the Movement’s strategic use o f the problem o f  black victimization as a vehicle for 
mobilizing wider egalitarian reforms. I argue that the political legacy o f this campaign 
reflects the interplay between two contradictory effects which “pro-minority” 
criminalization campaigns are prone to engender. On the one hand, this legislation 
reaffirmed the principled entitlement o f African-Americans to equal protection and served 
as a symbolic form o f political inclusion. On the other hand, because this campaign focused 
on spotlighting Southern forms of overt racial brutality, it obscured the harmfiilness 
embedded within numerous ‘softer’ forms o f  racial domination, which, by that time, had 
already permeated Northern economy and society. This failure illustrates the tendency of 
“pro-minority” criminalization to overemphasize sensational forms of social harm and to 
divert pub he attention from various other forms o f  harm to which minority groups are 
disproportionately vulnerable in light o f their socio-economic and cultural marginalization. 
The introduction o f a new form o f “pro-minority” criminal legislation reassures public 
opinion that the problem o f minority victimization is being tackled effectively and 
reinforces the myth o f equal protectioa Paradoxically, the success o f  these campaigns in 
triggering a policy reform works to de-radicalize the struggle for egalitarian change (and to 
hinder the structural reforms necessary for tackling the symbiotic root causes both o f these 
specific forms o f  victimization and o f numerous other forms o f  social harm).
103
B. The Social Underpinnings of the Emergence of Political Mobilization 
around the Problem of Black Victimization
Bl. The Social and Political Impacts o f the Great Migration
As we saw in the previous chapter, following the collapse o f Reconstruction, Southern 
society instituted various formal and informal mechanisms which prevented African- 
Americans from realizing their constitutional rights. The stability of the Jim Crow political 
order rested on a symbiosis between a set of demographic, economic and political conditions. 
Among other things, these conditions precluded African-Americans from developing 
mechanisms of collective action through which they could influence public policy. When the 
twentieth century dawned, over ninety percent o f  the black population still resided in the 
eleven ex-Confederacy states and over eighty percent of that population engaged in cotton 
forming (mainly as sharecroppers or tenant formers).7 African-Americans were deprived o f 
any meaningful influence on the electoral system at both the regional and national levels. In 
the South, where blacks constituted more than one third o f the overall population, 
disenfranchisement effectively neutralized their numerical strength.8 As late as 1940, 
black voter registration was extremely low, ranging between a regional-tow o f  0.3% o f 
the black voting-age population in Mississippi and a high o f  8.1% in Arkansas.9 Across 
the rest o f the nation, blacks constituted too small a proportion o f the electorate to impel 
the national Republican Party to address their political repression. Unsurprisingly, in the 
late nineteenth century, the Republican Party came to recognize its traditional association 
with the black vote as an electoral liability, rather than as a political asset.10
The social conditions which buttressed the political disempowerment o f  African- 
Americans began to be eroded from the 1910s onwards, with the advent o f the Great 
Migration. The Great Migration entailed the mass movement o f African-Americans out o f
7 Wilson (1980: 65).
8 M cAdam(1999: 70).
9 Ibid, 79.
10 Ibid, 69.
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the South as well as from rural-to-urban areas within that region." To be sure, the forces 
pushing blacks away from the South (including, political repression, economic deprivation, 
and physical insecurity) had long been present. However, it was only at this historical 
moment that African-Americans were provided, for the first time, with alternative 
employment opportunities outside the Southern agrarian economy. These opportunities 
were created by the acute shortage o f labour experienced in the Northern economy.12 The 
booming demand for unskilled and semiskilled labour in the steel mills, packinghouses, 
factories and the railroads ofthe North was triggered by the combination o f  heavy wartime 
production demands,13 and the marked decline in the flow o f European immigrants.14 hi 
addition, the availability o f a huge stockpile o f cheap black labour enabled Northern 
industrialists to constrict the bargaining power of white workers after the Clayton Act of 
1914 facilitated unionization and collective bargaining.15 Although the Great Depression 
temporarily reduced job opportunities in the North during the 1930s, the next two decades 
had witnessed unprecedented levels o f black northward migration. Demand for black 
labour skyrocketed amid expanding war production throughout WWII and the Korean War 
and the economic boom o f the post-War years. Overall, between 1910 and 1960, nearly 
five million Southern blacks relocated to the North, where they enjoyed relatively 
unimpeded access to the ballot. Most fundamentally, it became clear that the ‘Negro 
question” could no longer be treated as an exclusively “Southern affair”, as the South’s 
portion ofthe nation’s black population declined from roughly 90% in 1900 to 70% in 
1940 and to less than 50% in 1960.16
At the same time that shortage of labour in Northern economy provided blacks with 
new employment opportunities, the Southern agrarian economy had experienced a crisis which 
curtailed the demand to form labour. Severe hardships were experienced by black formers in 
light of a combination of various factors, including technological developments which
11 The literature on the Great Migration is vast. For two comprehensive accounts, see: Fligstein (1981); 
Marks (1989).
12 Klarman (2004: 100).
13 Piven & G o ward (1979: 190).
14 The number o f  European immigrants had tumbled from 1.2 million in 1914 to only 111,000 in 1918. 
Klarman (2004: 100).
15 Piven & G o ward (1979: 191).
16 Klarman (1994:67).
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increased the mechanization of Southern agriculture, the reduced demand for cotton (the price 
of which plummeted from a high of 35 cents per pound in 1919 to 6 cents in 1931),17 the 
damage caused to the cotton and sugar crops by a boll weevil infestation and by a series of 
storms and floods between 1914 and 1917,18 and the form policies of the New-Deal which 
significantly reduced cotton acreage in an effort to stimulate demand.19 In addition to 
precipitating the black odyssey northwards, the crisis o f Southern agriculture boosted a massive 
rural-to-urban population movement within the South and fostered processes of urbanization 
and industrialization throughout the region.20
Nationwide, between 1890 and 1960, the proportion of urban blacks increased from 20 
percent to 62 percent (and, by 1970, it swelled to 81 percent).21 Urbanization went hand in hand 
with the integration of black labourers into the nation’s industrialized economy, although the 
concrete terms of such integration (namely, disproportionate concentration in semi-skilled, 
manual and servant work) made them particularly vulnerable to future business downturns and 
structural shifts ofthe capitalist modes of production (as the post-1968 crisis ofthe Keynesian- 
Fordist capitalist economy will prove all too clearly).22 These structural economic and 
demographic shifts destabilized the political structure which precluded the mobilization of 
“pro-black” criminalization policy during the previous decades. They also facilitated the 
emergence of new vehicles of grassroots and electoral mobilization for civil rights reforms.
B2. The Great Misration as a Catalyst to the Incorporation of Blacks into the American 
Political System
Prior to the Great Migration, a vast majority of the black population was geographically 
dispersed in rural areas and subjected to the pervasive web of legal, vigilante, and economic 
controls which reinforced the semi-feudal system of Southern agrarian economy. By contrast, 
the new demographic patterns which crystallized following the relocation o f  millions o f 
African-Americans in urban ghettoes were characterized by the spatial concentration and
17 McAdam(1999: 75).
18 Wilson (1980:66).
19 Piven & Clo ward (1979: 190).
20 Klarman (1994:55)
21 Wilson (1980: 71).
22 Ibid, 71-76.
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separation o f the black community. Since, in the words of Loiib Wacquant, “the ghetto... is, 
by its very makeup, a doubled-edged sociospatial formation: it operates as an instrument o f 
exclusion from the standpoint ofthe dominant group; yet it also offers the subordinate group 
partial protection and a platform for succour and solidarity in the very movement whereby it 
sequesters it”,23 these emerging demographic patterns created conditions which were 
conducive to the development o f new instruments of collective actio a
The combination o f  spatial concentration and racial separation precipitated the 
development o f cohesive communal institutions - cultural, civic, religious, educational, and 
political. For example, between 1941 and 1945, enrolment rates in black colleges more 
than doubled.24 Between 1934 and 1946, association membership in the NAACP grew 
fivefold.25 Together with the black churches which mushroomed in the black ghettoes, 
these institutions served as the main mediums for forging a sense o f collective identity, and 
for establishing an organizational framework for mass protest In addition, the 
incorporation o f blacks into the industrialized economy across the nation provided them 
with a measure o f available resources and economic independence, both o f  which are 
positively correlated with participation in social movements.26 To be sure, the bulk o f the 
urban black population continued to be disproportionately concentrated in tow-skill 
occupations. However, their unfettering from the relentless apparatuses of social control to 
which they were subjected in the South provided them with a relatively unimpeded degree 
of freedom o f association, as well as with greater economic independence.
Concurrently with the formation o f vehicles of grassroots mobilization, the electoral 
bargaining power of African-Americans had increased steadily. Between 1910 and 1960, the 
number of black voters in the presidential elections grew eightfold (while the black population 
increased 92 percent).27 Moreover, the Great Migration involved a mass departure of African- 
Americans from states in which they were most repressively disenfranchised to states which 
exerted immense influence on the outcomes of presidential contests 28 O f the five million black
23 Wacquant (2001: 103).
24 McAdam (1999: 102).
25 Ibid, 103.
26 Jenkins (1983).
27 McAdam (1999: 79).
28 Ibid, 79.
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migrants who moved northwards between 1910 and 1960, 87% settled in industrial centres in 
seven highly populous swing states (New York, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Ohio, Michigan, 
Illinois, and California). Given the structure of the American presidential voting system - 
namely, population-based pro rata representation to each individual state and first past the 
post (winner-takes-all) provision - these seven states provided nearly eighty percent o f 
the votes necessary to elect a President by the mid century.29
Another salient trend which carried enormous inpact on the electoral leverage of 
African-American voters was the transition o f the black vote from the Republican Party to the 
Democratic Party. The political stability o f the Southern post-Reconstructfon racial caste 
system was stabilized by the fixed cross-racial patterns of party affiliation. Since the demise of 
Reconstruction, with the instalment o f  the ‘white primaries’ to the Democratic Party and the 
erection o f sweeping disenfranchisement policies in the general elections, the South was 
characterized as a one-party region. At the same time, the dominance of the Southern branch of 
the national Democratic Party enabled it to effectively veto proposed civil rights reforms. 
During this period, black voters consistently aligned themselves with the Republican Party.
These voting patterns started to erode from the early 1930s, as the increasing 
representation of African-Americans in the national electorate impelled candidates of both parties 
to compete for the black vote.30 The presidential elections of 1936 demonstrated the 
revolutionary effects of this development. For the first time since the formal franchise of African- 
Americans (ie. after seventeen consecutive presidential elections), a majority of black voters 
supported the Democratic Party’s presidential candidate, a factor which proved significant for 
securing Roosevelt’s landslide victory. The new trends which became evident in the 1936 
presidential contest gained further momentum throughout the following decades. As my 
analysis will show, although the increasing leverage o f the black vote would foil to 
outweigh the influence o f anti-civil rights constituencies throughout the next decades, it 
will have a considerable transformative effect on the contours o f civil rights policymaking.
To summarize, in this section, I have delineated the structural demographic and 
economic changes which enabled African-Americans to develop new instruments o f
29 Ibid, 80.
30 Ibid, 83.
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collective action through which they could, for the first time, prod policymakers to respond 
to their grievances. As we will see in the next sections, the process whereby the Movement’s 
organizations (particularly, the NAACP) became capable of mobilizing policymakers to 
address the predicament o f black victims in the South progressed piecemeal, and entailed a 
fierce struggle between the Movement and its adversaries. The analysis introduced so for will 
help us to gain a better understanding o f  the structural conditions which enabled and 
constrained the mobilization of “pro-black” policy reforms during this era.
C. The Struggle for Federalizing Civil Rights Criminalization Policy 
Cl. Front the Founding o f  the NAACP to Brown v. Board o f  Education
The NAACP was founded in 1909 in the aftermath o f a race riot in Springfield, Illinois, 
in which at least seven African-Americans were killed. The riot illustrated the urgency o f 
establishing an effective civil rights organization to struggle against governmental 
discrimination and Klan persecution. In particular, this sense o f  urgency grew out o f the 
exacerbation o f racist violence and segregation laws in the North throughout the early 
decades o f the twentieth century, as the influx o f black migrants fed the racial prejudice 
of Northern whites.31 This escalation found expression in an enormous increase in Ku 
Klux Klan membership across the North. By the 1920s, there were an estimated 35,000 
Klansmen in Detroit and 50,000 in Chicago.32 From the moment o f its founding, the 
organization treated the enactment o f an anti-lynching bill as one o f  its primary 
objectives.33 Inportantly, this campaign was interlinked with other campaigns aimed at 
removing legal obstacles to blacks’ political and economic participation, most notably, 
the campaigns against segregation in public schools, racial discrimination in the criminal 
process (particularly in Southern states) and disenfranchisement.
From the mid-1910s, the NAACP established systematic mechanisms for compiling 
and publishing data on national lynching trends. While the ability of black leaders to participate 
in public debate on required anti-lynching policies was still highly constrained, they gained a
31 Klarman (2007: 115).
32 Ibid, ibid.
33 Zangrando (1981: 18).
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greater success in inducing national politicians to support federal legislation. In 1918, the first 
proposal for a federal anti-lynching bill (the Dyer Bill) was put before Congress. The proposed 
bill defined lynching a federal felony, and sought to establish the authority o f  federal 
institutions to prosecute and try participants in lynch mobs. Although the Bill passed the House 
of Representatives in 1922, it was defeated in the Senate due to a filibuster by the white 
Southern Democratic block. The campaign for federal anti-lynching legislation regained 
momentum in the 1930s, but persistently foiled to win a majority support in Congress.
The public resonance o f  the NAACP campaign against lynching demonstrates the 
political progress made by African-Americans throughout the interwar period. However, the 
foct that this campaign repeatedly foiled to generate legislative reforms suggest that, by that 
period, the necessary preconditions for the materializatfon o f a policy change were not ripe 
yet. This observation is valid with respect to the four major processes which eventually 
facilitated the enactment o f “federally protected activities” legislation in the 1960s (namely, 
the development o f effective strategies o f grassroots mobilization; the materialization o f 
electoral incentives for sponsoring “pro-black” legislative reforms; the urgency of defending 
the reputation of American democracy abroad; and the need to reinforce public expectations 
o f federal leadership). As this section focuses on the interactions between the first two of 
these processes, let us now move to reflect on the way in which the structuration o f  the 
national politics o f civil rights and the characteristics o f black activism from 1909 to 1954 
had enabled and constrained the development of this “pro-black” criminalization campaign.
The limited success o f the early campaign fo r  federal “pro-black” criminalization 
and the contours o f the politics o f race in the national electoral arena: Although black voters 
were gradually regaining access to the ballot throughout the intensification o f the Great 
Migration, up until the 1940s, their electoral leverage was not significant enough to outweigh 
the influence o f Southern voters. This was particularly evident during the 1930s, when the 
Southern wing of the Democratic Party effectively vetoed civil rights proposals. In order to 
secure Southern support o f the major undertaking o f his presidency, the New Deal programs, 
President Roosevelt chose to avoid head-on conflicts with the South over the racial issue.34 In 
his appeals to Northern black voters, Roosevelt emphasized that the most constructive path
34 Piven and Go ward (1979: 197).
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for ameliorating the economic and social conditions o f African-Americans lay in integrating 
them as beneficiaries o f  the New Deal programs o f relief recovery and reform, rather than to 
sponsor civil rights laws. Accordingly, he refused to endorse anti-lynching legislation.35
Throughout the 1940s, African-Americans voters continued to gain further electoral 
influence. Their political empowerment was facilitated by a cluster o f land marie 
constitutional decisions which fortified their voting rights. In 1944, the Supreme Court held 
that the exclusion o f blacks from participation in the primaries to the Democratic Party was 
unconstitutional36 The Court overturned its previous holding (decided only eight years 
earlier by a unanimous vote) which rejected a constitutional challenge to such exclusion on 
the ground that it did not constitute state action under the Fourteenth Amendment.37 The 
decision in Smith foe Oita ted the integration o f blacks into the ranks o f  the Democratic 
Party, and further weakened the veto power o f white Southerners.38 These changes led to 
the expansion o f the Democratic Party’s civil rights agenda, as was powerfully illustrated 
by President Truman’s dramatic decision in 1948 to issue an executive order desegregating 
the army.
Truman’s position on the problem o f black victimization reflected the increasing 
commitment o f the Democratic Party to the racial egalitarian cause. In a Special Message 
to Congress on Civil Rights delivered on February 2, 1948, Truman declared his support 
for a federal anti-lynching bill. The fact that this presidential pledge was not translated 
into legislative reforms during Truman’s second term in office (1949-1953) was partly 
caused by contingent historical circumstances, such as the diverting effect o f the Korean 
War and the chilling effect of McCarthyism on the nation’s receptiveness to the 
Movement’s grievances (which will be discussed in detail below). However, it also 
reflected a more structural impasse which constrained civil rights reformism in the 1940s 
and 1950s. Indeed, the incorporation o f African-Americans into the New Deal coalition 
intensified the competition over the black vote, and impelled both parties to vie with one 
another in terms o f  civil rights policy platforms. However, as long as both parties foiled
35 Ibid, ibid.
36 Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649 (1944).
37 Grovey v. Townsend, 295 U.S. 45 (1935).
38 Lawson (1976: 37-42).
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to establish a stronghold among black voters, they continued to be dependent on the votes 
of white Southerners and thus had to avoid antagonizing opponents o f civil rights 
reforms.39 This constellation remained in force throughout the 1950s. In the presidential 
elections of 1956, for example, Eisenhower’s victory was secured by his ability to win 
nearly 40% ofthe black vote and 48.9% o f the votes o f white Southerners.40 Consequently, 
the politics o f  race throughout that period was marked by a constant tension between brave 
egalitarian rhetoric and moderate implementation o f policy reforms.
The limited success o f the early campaign fo r  federal “pro-black” criminalization 
and the contours o f black activism: The limited success of the NAACP’s anti-lynching 
campaign also reflected the ineffectiveness of the strategies o f  grassroots mobilization used by 
black activists up until the 1950s. To be sure, the NAACP’s legal battles were not without their 
successes. Alongside the anti-lynching campaign, the organization conducted intensive 
litigation campaigns which challenged the constitutionality o f  various practices o f crime 
enforcement in the South,41 racial segregation in public education,42 and disenfranchisemert43 
These campaigns generated a cluster of landmark victories in federal courts and succeeded in 
elevating the salience of the struggle for racial justice. However, by the late 1940s, black 
leaders increasingly came to recognize that the struggle for racial equality could not be won in 
federal courts atone.44 This recognition reflected the emerging black experience with the 
limited power of judicial achievements to bring about social change, as many ofthe practices 
that were outlawed by courts foiled to be eradicated in light of the persistence of white 
supremacist norms across the nation. This recognition led them to intensify the recourse to 
more popular forms of collective action and mass protest.45
The genius o f the strategy used by the Civil Rights Movement between 1954 and 
1965 lay in the way in which it brought into synergetic interaction two tactical vehicles: 
legalistic campaigns and non-violent ‘direct action’ protest. The litigation campaigns ofthe
39 Klarman (1994: 136).
40 Ibid, 132.
41 Klarman (2004: 117-134).
42 Tushnet (2005).
43 Klarman (2004:135-142).
44 Piven & Cloward (1979: 203-211).
45 Ibid, 208.
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NAACP induced federal courts to declare that a range o f governmental practices in the 
South had been inconsistent with American constitutional values. The mobilization of 
masses of non-vb lent African-Americans who demanded to realize the rights conferred to 
them by federal courts signalled to Northern whites that the black struggle was, in its 
essence, a plea to American society to live up to its own manifested ideals. In particular, 
the combination o f  litigation in federal courts and non-violent direct action protest was 
effective in spotlighting the stark contradict b n  between America’s declared politbal values 
and the governmental and social practbes whbh continued to prevail in the South.46
Within this strategb framework, the long-standing removal o f protectbns from 
black victims in the South emerged as an effective symbol o f  the Movement’s broader 
claims. Given the history o f Southern resentment o f  “forced racial integratbn from above” 
(ie. by means o f  federal legal intervention), it was nothing but predbtable that the twofold 
strategy o f the Movement would incite a new surge o f white supremacist vigilantism. The 
intensive recourse by the NAACP to federal courts for challenging Southern racial 
practbes enhanced the sense o f sectbnal defensiveness o f  white Southerners. The 
mobilizatbn o f hundreds o f thousands o f black protestors to Southern streets (demanding 
the realization o f  constitutbnal rights from whbh they were de facto deprived for decades) 
created multiple opportunities for Southern mobs to use terrorist measures in order to vent 
their resentment. However, as Mbhael Klarman has argued, in the late 1940s, Southern 
black leaders had come to recognize that such escalatbn was necessary to compel the 
federal government to take more aggressive steps toward the abolitfon o f  Jim Crow.47
In particular, the Movement’s leadership devised a strategy known as “creative 
tensbn”, “pursuant to whbh peaceful civil rights demonstrators would provoke, and then 
passively endure, vblent assaults from Southern law enforcement officers and unofficial 
mobs, with the hope o f reaping a public opinion windfall from a horrified vfewing 
audience”.48 Within this strategb framework, the appalling experiences o f black victims 
emerged as a salient issue o f  political mobilizatbn As put by Robert Zangrando:
46 Crenshaw (1988: 1368).
47 Klarman (1994:143).
48 Ibid, ibid.
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“While the campaign against lynching was essential and sincere on its own terms, 
the NAACP also realized that it could be used to draw attention to other racial 
inequities... [a]t a time when the public refused to honor voting rights, integrated 
education, equal employment opportunities, access to public accommodation...the 
NAACP could gain a hearing by showing how violence threatened generally held 
Judeo-Christian and democratic values”.49
C2. From Brown to Little Rock
In the mid-1950s, the Movement’s strategic use of litigation in federal courts and non-vb lent 
direct actbn became folly devetoped. In May 1954, the NAACP reached the most momentous 
achievement in its entire history. In the landmark decision in Brown v. Board o f Education, the 
Supreme Court finally declared on the unconstituttonality o f  racial segregation in public 
schools.50 In the following years, recorded rates of white supremacist violence rampaged 
dramatically.51 The spectacle o f white supremacist mobs precluding the enrolment of blacks in 
public campuses and schools became one of the idiosyncratic symbols o f  the escalation of 
Southern defiance of the challenge of racial integration. Once again, ritualized forms of racial 
intimidation served to symbolize popular resentment o f  racial egalitarian reform52 This time, 
however, the political conditions provided African-American activists with greater 
opportunities to influence public opinion and national policymakers.
For observers today, Brown is usually perceived as an initiator o f a transformative 
process whereby an anachronistic caste system came under increasing pressures and 
eventually collapsed. However, what appears in retrospect as an almost inevitable structural 
transition was experienced at the time as a moment of radical uncertainty. In part, this 
uncertainty was rooted in the profound ambiguity o f the meanings and implicattons o f 
Brown. The decision clearly established the unconstituttonality o f  de jure segregation in 
public schools on the ground that such segregation was inconsistent with the Equal 
Protection Clause o f the Fourteenth Amendment. However, the Court remained silent on
49 Zangrando (1980: 18).
50 Brown v. B oard o f  Education o f  Topeka, Kansas, 347 U.S. 483 (1954)
51 Kennedy (1998: 63).
52 Garland (2005).
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many other mechanisms o f  degrading racial division (e.g., segregation in private schools; 
de facto segregation in public schools as a consequence o f  residential and economic 
disparities; or state-mandated segregation in other public institutions and facilities). Even 
on the question o f desegregation in public schools, the Court ordered no immediate 
remedies and refused to endorse the NAACP plea to declare a deadline for the completion 
of desegregation53 This ambiguity was exacerbated after the decision in Brown II (1955), 
in which the Court stated that desegregation should proceed "with all deliberate speed".54 
This statement was criticized by the NAACP lor tacitly providing Southern authorities with 
a justification for delaying or avoiding significant integration reforms for years. And 
indeed, the landmark court victory in Brown did not facilitate significant desegregation 
until the enactment o f federal legislation in the next decade. In 1960, the proportion o f 
black schoolchildren attending desegregated schools across the region amounted to only 
0.15%, and in some Southern states (South Carolina, Alabama, and Mississippi not a 
single black child attended a desegregated schooL55
Notwithstanding its limited direct inpact on desegregation, it would be wrong to 
conclude that Brown did not have a profound impact on American race relations in the 
long ru n 56 Yet, in order to pinpoint the exact contribution o f  Brown, we should steer 
clear o f uncritically accepting the conventional liberal celebration o f the decision as an 
epitome of “judicial heroism”,57 not least due to the tendency o f such interpretations to 
obfuscate our understanding o f  the enduring pervasiveness o f racial segregation in public 
education58 and housing.59 Instead, I would suggest that it was the radical uncertainty 
which Brown provoked that impelled social movements and politicians to boost their 
efforts to eradicate or to preserve the foundations o f Jim Crow.
Indeed, in Brown, the Court invalidated the constitutional framework through which 
Southern racial practices were legitimized and institutionalized throughout the preceding six
53 Klarman (2004:313).
54 349 US. 294  (1955).
55 Klarman (1994:9).
56Feeley (1992).
57 For a critique o f  this common liberal interpretation, see: Balkin (2002: 5).
58 Clotfelter (2002).
59 Massey and Denton (1998).
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decades (namely, the ‘separate but equal’ doctrine).60 The decision was followed by a decade 
of radicalizatfon, in which, on the one hand, the Movement intensified its resort to its two 
main tactical vehicles (litigation and direct action), and, on the other hand, Southern white 
supremacist mobs enhanced their involvement in terrorizing African-Americans who 
attempted to exercise their civil rights. For its part, the Movement intensified its recourse to 
litigation in order to impel federal courts to reaffirm the precedent set out in Brown. Yet, the 
string o f  constitutional challenges posed by the NAACP during these years foiled to push the 
Supreme Court to take any further step further in denouncing racial segregation per se 
throughout the subsequent eight terms.61 Nevertheless, appeals to district federal courts to 
issue desegregation orders in the fece o f local obstructionism were, on occasions, more 
successful.62 The combination o f such remedies with the Movement’s second tactical 
endeavour, namely, the marshalling o f  non-violent protestors who demanded local authorities 
to enforce court segregation orders, proved consequential (not so much in actually facilitating 
desegregation in Southern schools (as indicated by the figures presented above) but in 
attracting national attention to the ferociousness of Southern obstructionism).
From the Southerners’ point o f  view, Brown was perceived as a paternalistic and 
unconstitutional encroachment on prerogatives that lay at the very core o f the concept o f 
states’ rights. In March 1956, Southern Senators and Congressmen issued a “Southern 
manifesto”, decrying Brown as a “clear abuse o f judicial power” because it “substituted 
the Justices’ personal political and social ideas for the established law o f the land”.63 In 
the post -Brown era, the perceived urgency o f thwarting racial integration impelled 
Southern politicians to vie with one another over being the most “blatantly and 
uncompromisingly prepared to cling to segregation at all costs”.64 ‘Moderation”, Michael 
Klarman observes, “became a term o f  derision, as the political centre collapsed, leaving 
only ‘those who maintain the Southern way o f  life or those who want to mix the 
races’”.65 Given the profound embedding o f  white supremacist vigilantism in Southern
60 Homer A. Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
61 Klarman (2004: 321).
62 On the complex role played by federal courts in this setting, see: Peltason (1961).
63 Quoted in Balkin (2001: 5).
64 Klarman (2004: 390)
65 Ibid, 390-391.
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culture,66 it was nothing but predictable that this widespread rejection ofthe legitimacy o f 
judicially-mandated desegregation would also find expression in violent defiance o f  court 
orders. And indeed, episodes o f cross burning, bombings and vandalism o f  black 
churches and NAACP branches became more common in the wake o f Brown.61 Mobs 
served at the forefront o f Southern resistance to school desegregation. Their actions were 
not only tolerated by Southern authorities, but also endorsed by the most senior 
politicians at the regional political arena.68
The ramping up o f white supremacist violence in the post-Brown epoch had an 
excruciating effect on individual victims and a terrorizing effect on their communities. 
However, such incidents effectively served to amplify the general messages asserted by the 
Movement. Whereas federal courts and administrations could more easily turn a blind eye to 
the plethora of ordinances issued by Southern legislators and municipalities in order to de 
facto preclude racial desegregation, widely-circulated media images o f focal mobs inhibiting 
black schoolchildren from enrolling in public schools in defiance o f  court segregation orders 
exposed the federal government to vehement criticism at home and abroad. Indeed, these 
images were highly consequential in advancing the Movement’s strategic use o f “television 
to make the protests of blacks irresistibly appealing to the large majority o f the American 
people who were mostly indifferent to segregation when it remained distant but disliked it 
when forced to face the unpleasant measures needed to maintain it”.69 Nevertheless, between 
1954 and September 1957, the Eisenhower administration persistently refused to intervene in 
racial desegregation hostilities. Eisenhower denied a role for the federal government in the 
prevention of focal rioting and advocated gradualism (which gained currency as a euphemism 
for sustaining the segregationist status-quo) as the most judicious path forward.70
C3. From Little Rock to the Passim of “Federally Protected A ctivities” Legislation
The long-standing posture of federal non-involvement in Southern race riots faced is  most 
testing moment in the constitutional crisis in Little Rock, Arkansas, in September 1957. The
66 See, in particular, my discussion in chapter 3 (section C2) o f  this dissertation.
67 Belknap (1987: 30)
68 Klarman (2004: 326).
69 Barone (1990: 354).
70 Klarman (2004: 324).
117
crisis was provoked when nine African-American schoolchildren tried to enrol in a local public 
high school after their admission had been ordered by a federal district court. Declaring that the 
students’ enrollment entailed an “imminent danger of tumult, riot and breach of the peace and 
the doing of violence to persons and property”, Arkansas Governor Orval Faubus proclaimed a 
state of emergency and ordered the Arkansas National Guard to surround the school and to 
prevent the entrance of the black students.71 This blatant rewarding o f focal lawbreakers with 
state-enforced inhibition of a federal court’s order escalated the conflict between Southern 
states and the federal administration. After weeks of intensive media coverage accompanied by 
vehement criticism of his failure to defend the constitution, President Eisenhower finally 
dispatched federal troops to the region. Military forces guarded the attendance of the ‘Little 
RockNine’ during the 1957-1958 school year, feeing a fierce focal resistance.
The Little Rock crisis triggered a remarkable departure from the position o f the federal 
government during the previous eights decades. Nonetheless, Eisenhower insisted on the ad- 
hoc nature o f his decisioa He adhered to his principled objection to sponsoring federal civil 
rights criminal legislation on the ground that the ordinary regulation o f criminal conduct had to 
remain within the exclusive jurisdiction o f state governments. Accordingly, the Justice 
Department avoided seeking prosecutions of those involved in the Little Rock hostilities.72
However, while the crisis did not generate immediate legislative reforms, its more 
subtle political ramifications were remarkable. Most importantly, the Little Rock crisis 
enabled the Movement to reconstruct the meaning o f the desegregation issue. The 
desegregation issue came to be seen as a litmus test o f the authority o f  federal courts and 
of the determination o f the Eisenhower administration in defending the Constitutioa The 
strategic currency o f  such re-contextualisatkm was noticeable in the justifications 
provided by Eisenhower while advocating his decision to the American public. 
Eisenhower opened his special “Radio and Television Address to the American People on 
the Situation in Little Rock” by stressing that “our personal opinions about the [Brown]
71 Klarman (1994:328).
72 Klarman (2004: 334).
118
decision have no bearing on the matter o f enforcement”.73 He further clarified that the 
federal troops dispatched to Little Rock were there “to support our federal court system -  
not to enforce desegregation”.74 This distinction echoed widespread public attitudes o f 
the time. In 1956, a Gallup poll revealed that more than 70 percent o f whites outside the 
South believed that Brown was rightly decided, but only a small percentage (less than 6 
percent) considered civil rights the nation’s most important issue.75
The Supreme Court, which was generally reluctant to re-enter the desegregation fray, 
also emphasized this distinction between the political and the constitutional aspects of the 
Little Rock crisis in its important decision in Cooper v. Aaron.76 Cooper involved a review o f 
a decision issued by a district judge in favour o f reprieving school desegregation in Little 
Rock for two and half years on the grounds that the right o f African-American students to 
non-discriminatory admission to public schools should be balanced against the public interest 
in a smoothly functioning educational system (an interest which was infringed by the 
persistence of mob resistance to desegregation). The constitutional question at stake was 
whether a district judge was authorized to delay desegregation, once it had commenced, 
because of community resistance. In its unanimous decision, the Court declared that “law and 
order are not here to be preserved by depriving the Negro children o f their constitutional 
rights”.77 It further stressed that “the principles announced in [Brown] and the obedience o f 
the state to them, according to the command o f the Constitution, are indispensable for the 
protection o f the freedoms guaranteed by our fundamental charter for all of us”.78
The need to reinforce federal authority compelled both the Eisenhower administration 
and the Supreme Court to tackle Southern inpediments to racial desegregation. In turn, federal 
intervention served to bestow legitimacy on the Movement’s cause. In this respect, the Little 
Rock crisis marks one of the earliest examples of an effective strategic utilization of the 
‘victimization frame’ for boosting wider political reforms. By mobilizing around the problem of
73 “Radio and Television Address to the American People on the Situation in Little Rock”, September 24, 
1957, Public Papers o f  the President o f  the United States: Dwight D. Eisenhower, 1957, 690. Quoted in 
Klarman (2004:421)
74 Ibid, ibid.
75 Klarman (2004: 365).
76 C ooper v. Aaron, 385 US. 1 (1958).
71 Cooper, 358 U.S., 19.
78 Cooper, 358 U.S., at 19-20.
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Southern blacks’ vulnerability to mob violence, the Movement sought not only to trigger a 
change in federal civil rights criminalization policies, but also to spotlight broader patterns of 
governmental discrimination and thus to galvanize public support o f a structural political 
reform (ie. the abolition o f  Jim Crow). This campaign effectively reconstructed the problem 
of civil rights obstructionism as a challenge to national interests and urged the federal 
administration to demonstrate its commitment to protecting these interests. By the early 
1960s, the optimal instrument available to government for symbolizing and institutionalizing 
this commitment, the enactment o f a new federal bill, lay just around the comer.
With the continuation of the posi-Brvwn turmoil, the Kennedy administration (1961- 
1963) was confronted with a series of riots ignited by focal defiance of court-ordered 
desegregation. These crises compelled the administration to involve federal troops on several 
occasions in attempt to restore basic standards of law and order. The most notable of these 
incidents took place in October 1962 at the University of Mississippi campus in Oxford The 
upheavals were inflamed by focal attempts to hamper the enrolment o f the first African-American 
student. The student, James Meredith, was escorted by national guards to his first class - a 
seminar on American colonial history - through a crowd of several hundred jeering students and 
enraged mobs. The riots resulted in the killing of two African-Americans and foe injuring of an 
additional seventy-five. However, although such events clearly demonstrated the relentless 
unwillingness o f Southern authorities to enforce desegregation court orders, the President and 
the Justice Department regarded such federal interventions as “isolated and temporary 
departures from a general policy of leaving the problem of racist terrorism to the states”.79
This position had been put under increasing pressures following the sea change in 
Northern public opinion. From the late 1950s, the Movement intensified its efforts to 
optimize the strategy o f ‘creative tension’ by means o f  nonviolent civil disobedience. As 
explained above, this strategy brought masses of non-violent black protestors into high 
profile encounters with Southern police and white supremacist mobs, in a deliberate effort to 
attract Northern attention to the brutality invested in the maintenance of the Southern caste
79 Belknap (1987: xi).
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system80 This strategy was effectively pursued in the Montgomery Bus Boycott o f 1955- 
1956, and it gained further momentum throughout the next decade. From 1960 onwards, 
groups o f African-American activists engaged in “sit-in” protest. Non-violent protestors 
would sit together in segregated public areas and businesses (such as lunch counters, public 
libraries and theatres), and would eventually be forcefully evicted by Southern authorities 
enforcing the region’s harsh segregationist codes. In another prolific campaign, known as the 
Freedom Rides campaign, civil rights activists tested the enforceability o f  a recent Supreme 
Court decision that recognized the right o f passengers engaged in interstate travel not to be 
subjected to racial segregation.81 Travelling from Washington D.C. into the Deep South, 
groups o f  African-Americans passengers sought to challenge local laws enforcing 
segregation, and to attract media attention to the nonbcomplianee o f  Southern authorities with 
Supreme Court civil rights jurisprudence. The Freedom Rides were met by savage responses 
from Klan mobs, ofien with the complicity o f  focal law enforcement authorities.82
By 1963, the strategy of “creative tension” had proven increasingly effective in inducing 
Northern public opinion to support the introduction of firmer federal measures for bringing Jim 
Crow to an end. Intensive media coverage of the brutal methods used by police forces against 
peaceful wting rights’ marchers in Birmingham, Alabama in 1963 (including such measures as 
tear gas, truncheons, high-pressure hoses and dogs) was particularly influential in stimulating 
Northern revulsion against Jim Crow.83 The shift in Northern attitudes toward civil rights was 
clearly reflected in public opinion polls. Whereas m September 1957, only 9 percent of 
respondents to the annual Gallop poll on “the most important problem feeing this country today” 
put civil rights as the most urgent issue, in October 1963, these figures climbed to more than 50 
percent.84 Following this notable shift in public opinion, politicians naturally became more 
inclined to champ ion the introduction of a new framework for criminalizing anti-civil rights 
violence. As a result, the established practice of federal administrations since the Little Rock crisis 
- namely, ad-hoc dispatching of federal troops for taming the eruption of local resistance to court- 
ordered school desegregation - would give way to a more systematic legal framework.
80 Martin Luther King had defended the strategy o f  creative tension in his famous Letter from Birmingham 
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The foundations for this new regime o f federal “pro-black” criminalization would 
be laid by the passage o f the Civil Rights Act in July 1964. Among other things, the Act 
made it illegal to compel segregation o f the races in public schools, public housing or 
employment. However, its contribution to expanding the enforcement powers of the federal 
criminal justice institutions was still limited. A series of racial atrocities which took place 
subsequent to the passage of the Act provided painful demonstration o f the necessity of 
fortifying federal enforcement authority. On August 4 1964, four civil rights volunteers who 
participated in a voter-registration campaign in Mississippi (the Mississippi Summer Project 
campaign) were found dead.85 Out o f  the four victims, only one was African-American. The 
unprecedented coverage ofthe event by the national news media might have been associated 
with the identity ofrest ofthe victims, who, like most ofthe 1,000 participants in this project, 
belonged to middle and upper-class white families from the North. Mob violence against 
civil rights protestors persisted throughout 1964 and 1965. The brutal repression of 
demonstrations to secure blacks’ voting rights in Selma, Alabama, in March 1965 was 
particularly influential in prodding President Lyndon Johnson to push for the enactment of a 
federal voting rights bilL Speaking before a joint session o f Congress and to an estimated 70 
million viewers, Johnson declared that protestors’ “courage to risk safety and even to risk 
their lives” in pursuit of equality “awakened the conscience of this nation”.86 In August 6, 
1965, President Johnson signed the National Voting Rights Act into law. While the Act 
outlawed various discriminatory practices which had long served to disenfranchise 
African-Americans, it did not establish effective mechanisms o f crime enforcement for 
prosecuting interferences with blacks’ voting rights by individual parties.
The enactment o f § 245 o f the Civil Rights Act (1968) extended the enforcement 
provisions o f  the two earlier Acts and completed the creation o f a new framework o f 
“federally protected activities” legislation. § 245 criminalized interferences with the 
political and civil rights enshrined in these earlier pieces o f federal legislation. In 
particular, the statute enumerates a range o f activities which had been subjected to racist 
terror throughout the campaigns o f the Civil Rights Movement (e.g. “enrolling in or 
attending a public school or university; participating in any benefit, program, service, or
85 McAdam (1990).
86 Quoted in Garrow (1978: 107).
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facility provided by a state or focal government... serving as a juror, travelling in or using 
any facility o f  interstate commerce”.87 It defines interferences with such activities a 
federal crime, and stipulates a range o f penalties (depending, inter aha, on whether 
firearms or explosive had been used, and the degree o f injury to the victim).
C4. The Enactment of “Federally Protected Activities” mid the Reconfiguration ofRadal Politics
The passing o f  the “federally protected activities” legislation was enabled by the creation 
of electoral demands for the enactment o f more robust forms o f  federal intervention in 
Southern race relations. As we saw earlier, the NAACP’s campaign against lynching was 
constrained by the counterbalancing forces which were operative in the national political 
arena from the early 1930s onwards. While the two major parties were compelled to 
appeal to Northern black voters, they also had incentives to appease Southern whites and 
other racial conservatives. This constellation was changed by about 1963, as Northern 
white voters became increasingly repelled by Southern racial repressiveness. As the 
nation became increasingly polarized over the issue o f  civil rights, it became more 
difficult to have a foot in both camps. The Kennedy and Johnson administrations faced 
stronger electoral incentives to invest political capital in promoting civil rights reforms. 
In doing so, the Democratic Party finally abandoned its post-1930s inclination to oscillate 
between its liberal and conservative constituencies (Le. blacks and white liberals, on the 
one hand, and Southern whites, farmers, and blue collar voters on the other hand). With 
the passing o f the Civil Rights Act (1964), the Voting Rights Act (1965), and the Civil 
Rights Act (1968), the Democratic Party had finally positioned itself unambiguously 
aside civil rights reformers. This step had brought to completion this three-decade 
transitional phase in the evolution o f American politics o f  race and fully established the 
transition o f the black vote from the “party o f Lincoln” to the Democratic camp.88
In turn, as the Democratic Party became fully invested in supporting civil rights 
reforms, the Republican Party was impelled to realign its own voting base by means of 
establishing a stronghold among socially conservative voters. The mobilization of popular 
opposition to desegregation (and, in later decades, to affirmative action) served as a salient
87 18 U.S.C § 245.
88 W eiss (1983).
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instrument while pursuing this realignment. This shift was firstly pronounced in the 1964 
presidential elections, in which Republican candidate Barry Goklwater heralded the twofold 
neoconservative crusade to roll back welfarist and civil rights reforms and to extend ‘law and 
order’ policies. As we will see in the next chapter, this “Southern strategy” was to become the 
lynchpin ofthe effective realignment of the voting base of the national Republican Party in future 
decades, and arguably a decisive catalyst of its post-1980 hegemony in national politics. The 
passing of the “federally protected activities” legislation not only served as a product of this 
restructuring o f American politics o f race. It also accelerated and entrenched this process. Thus, it 
could be argued that, while the short-term implications of the introduction of this framework 
contributed to the firrthering of the racial justice projects, its effects in the long term were double- 
edged. We will discuss these effects in more detail in section G of this chapter as well as in the 
next chapter (in which I will consider the post-1968 development of “pro-black” criminalization).
D* The Role of Cold War Politics in Enabling and Constraining the 
Mobilization of Federal “Pro-Black” Criminalization Policy
D l. Cold War and Civil Rights
Apart from electoral considerations and pressure from civil-rights activists, post-War federal 
administrations had operated in the shadow o f another set o f incentives for criminalizing 
racist violence. From the mid 1940s onwards, national policymakers were increasingly 
obliged to consider the impact of Southern racist brutality on the international image of 
American democracy. WWII effectively terminated the dominance of the non-interventionist 
doctrine which had shaped America’s foreign policy hitherto. Consequently, the implications 
of the nation’s race relations on its foreign policy became an important dimension o f  civil 
rights policymaking. In some measure, Jim Crow already became problematic from a foreign 
policy perspective already during WWII itself a war justified as a crusade against the moral 
indefensibility o f  European Fascism yet carried out by racially segregated military forces. In 
an effort to legitimate American involvement in the War, the federal government sought to 
emphasize the ideological disparities between American democratic values and Nazi illiberal 
credos. These efforts were responsive to internal pressures, exemplified by a 1942 New York
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Times editorial which urged the government to ameliorate racial practices in order to avoid 
“the sinister hypocrisy of fighting abroad for what it is not willing to accept at home”.89
These challenges o f legitimation became more pressing following the advent o f the 
Cold War. From now on, international perceptions of American democracy would be 
recognized as pivotal for winning the ideological battle with communism and thus for 
fortifying both national security and the stability o f the international order. Although the 
military and political configurations o f the Cold War took different forms in the following 
decades, the ideological framing of the conflict continued to reflect its early portrayal by 
President Truman as a struggle between “free peoples” and tyrannical regimes. This mode of 
framing had diverted the open controversy between the two superpowers from issues 
concerning the material and geopolitical stakes of their competition over “zones of influence” 
toward moral questions which emphasized the contrasts between their political ethoses. Within 
this context of ideological rivalry, the political conditions of African-Americans emerged as the 
feature of American democracy which was most vulnerable to Communist recriminations.
American racial practices became particularly problematic from a foreign policy 
perspective because o f  the critical importance attached to mobilizing the political 
consciousness o f non-white peoples in the newly independent nations which mushroomed 
in Africa, Asia, and Latin America (where anti-Western sentiments thrived after 
emancipation from decades o f colonial rule).90 In the early 1950s, the State Department 
estimated that nearly half o f Soviet propaganda highlighted American racist practices.91 
Incidents o f  white supremacist violence provided critics o f  American democracy with 
ample evidence o f  the double standards o f American political ideology. They also lent 
credence to charges o f  American Occidental imperialism by means o f linking the nation’s 
imposition o f Western values abroad with its repression o f  African descendants at home.
In this section, I will explore the impact of these new pressures of legitimation on the 
contours of activism and policymaking related to the protection of African-Americans from 
white supremacist violence.
89 Quoted in Dudziak (2000: 24)
90 Skrentny (1998: 245).
91 Ibid, ibid.
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D2. The Impact o f Cold War Imperatives on Black Mobilization in Demand to 
Criminalize White Supremacist Violence
The impact o f  the Cold War on domestic American politics both enhanced and constrained 
the leverage o f black activists while prodding the federal government to assume 
responsibility for the criminalization o f Southern racist brutality. On the one hand, public 
opinion increasingly came to recognize that race discrimination harmed the nation’s 
reputation abroad by providing Communists with an invaluable propaganda weapon 
According to a Harris Poll, in 1963, this view was shared by no less than seventy-eight 
percent o f white Americans.92 Public concerns regarding the damage done by Jim Crow to 
the nation’s international standing served to lend more weight to the Movement’s demands 
to criminalize racist brutality even when numerous other symptoms of Jim Crow were still 
deemed tolerable. On the other hand, as the apocalyptic undercurrents o f Truman’s framing 
of “the struggle between freedom and tyranny” were fomenting the rise o f McCarthyism, 
mainstream political discourses became less inclined to accommodate campaigns which 
spotlighted the illiberal aspects o f American political culture.93 Although the practice o f 
criticizing liberal welfarist reforms as “Red Plots” or “Communist” had been widely used 
by conservative politicians from the dawn o f the New Deal era, these accusations became 
increasingly salient (and gave rise to unprecedentedly aggressive forms of political 
repression) from the late 1940s.94 McCarthyism both expressed and incited widespread 
fears o f communist influence on American institutions. The Second Red Scare (during 
which thousands o f Americans were accused o f being Communists or communist 
sympathizers) had exposed black activists to both formal and informal persecution insofar 
as they framed their grievances in terms which challenged the self-image of American 
democracy.
Within this setting, African-American activists had to consider whether to capitalize 
on the new political opportunities presented by the governmental need to reconcile 
American professed political ideals with its actual racial practices. Their dilemma reflected
92 Dudziak: (2000: 187).
93 Fried (1997).
94 Ibid, 41.
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concerns that the utilization ofthe expressive qualities o f  criminal law to censure individual 
manifestations o f  white supremacy would not necessarily precipitate governmental moves 
toward addressing the broader economic and political structures which stabilized racial 
inequality. At the same time, it was clear that the political opportunity structure for 
mobilizing a radical structural reform o f American race policies was impeded as long as 
McCarthyism repressed the development o f  progressive campaigns which represented the 
symbiosis o f  race and class as the constitutive force o f social injustice in America. The 
conflicting responses taken by black activists in the face o f  this double bind reflected the 
profound strategic and ideological disagreements within the black community.95 On the one 
hand, integrationist black voices sought to make hay o f the opportunities offered by these 
new pressures o f legitimation with which post-War federal administrations had to grapple. 
For example, in an article published in The Crisis, the official magazine o f the NAACP in 
1951, the Association’s executive drector Roy Wilkins had stressed that “the Negro wants 
change in order that he may be brought in line with the American standard.. .which must be 
done not only to preserve and strengthen that standard here at home, but to guarantee its 
potency in the world struggle against dictatorship”.96
On the other hand, radical black movements sought to utilize the increasing 
international interest in Southern racist brutality in order to debunk the credibility of 
American professed leadership of the “struggle between freedom and tyranny”. In December 
1951, the Civil Rights Congress (CRC), a black organization associated with the Communist 
Party USA, submitted to the UN Committee on Human Rights a petition accusing the US 
federal government o f “complicity in genocide”, on the ground o f its persistent lailure to act 
against lynching. The petition included nearly 150 pages o f  evidence to 153 killings and 344 
nonfatal incidents o f violence against African-Americans committed in the US between 1945 
and 1951. It then argued that the failure of the federal government to bring racist offenders to 
justice violated its obligations under the UN Convention ofthe Prevention and Punishment of 
the Crime o f Genocide. Under the Convention, ratifying states pledged to punish any o f  their 
citizens involved in the “killing, causing serious bodily or mental harm...with intent to 
destroy, in whole or in part, a...racial...group”. The petition was signed by family members
95 Haines (1998).
96 Quoted in Dodziak (2000: 29).
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of victims o f lynching and by prominent black activists. It explicitly established a linkage 
between the de facto decriminalization of lynching and broader, ostensibly non-violent, 
dimensions of American institutional and cultural racism. In one o f  their opening statements, 
petitioners declared: “Out o f inhuman black ghettoes of American cities, out o f the cotton 
plantation o f the South, comes this record of mass slaying on the basis of race, of lives 
deliberately warped and distorted by the wilful creation o f conditions making for premature 
death, poverty and diseases”.97 The petition concluded with the following statement: ‘The 
oppressed Negro citizens of the United States, segregated, discriminated against, and long the 
target o f violence, suffer from genocide as the result o f the consistent, conscious, unified 
policies of every branch of government”.98
This rhetoric reflected the view of black nationalists that the recourse to supranational 
forums and institutions was not only strategically effective in intensifying the political pressures 
on national policymakers. It was also required in order to mobilize cross-national racial 
solidarities and pan-African political consciousness. In their view, governmental toleration of 
racist brutality at home was part and parcel of a broader legacy of racial exploitation which had 
taken a global scale and meaning from its very inception in the Atlantic slave trade.
The establishment in 1945 o f the United Nations fell short o f  providing African- 
Americans with enforceable legal remedies against their national government. However, it 
had equipped black activists with access to new communicative vehicles for attracting the 
interest o f  the world press and thus appealing to international audiences. This development 
added a new dimension to the long-standing struggle for bringing American government to 
tackle the victimization of African-Americans. As in other areas of black activism, although 
the campaigns mobilized by moderate and radical flanks appear to be in tension, it is arguable 
that the efforts of black radicals to tarnish the international image of American democracy 
made policymakers more receptive to the demands made by black integrationists to introduce 
a new framework of “pro-black” federal criminal legislation.99 Let us now turn to discussing 
in more detail the dynamics which impelled federal institutions and policymakers to become 
more receptive to these campaigns.
97 Dudziak (1997: 63).
98 Civil Rights Congress (1951).
99 On the interplay between radical and moderate flanks o f  the Civil Rights Movement, see Haines (1988).
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D3. The Impact of Cold War Imperatives on Federal A nti-Radst Criminalization Policies
The increasing international scrutiny of American racial practices impelled the federal 
administration both to become more supportive of civil rights reforms and to devise new 
mechanisms for communicating its messages abroad. The pursuit o f the latter objective fed to 
the establishment of the United States Information Agency (USIA) in 1953. The USIA was 
assigned with the task of planning and implementing strategies for responding to international 
criticisms o f  US policies. It was also responsible to monitoring and informing policymakers of 
the impact of domestic political events on the nation’s international reputation.100
It is important to reiterate that the need to appease international audiences did not fully 
determine the character of governmental policies, as international pressures of legitimation had 
to be counterbalanced against other interests that were at stake (in particular, the electoral 
considerations analyzed earlier). Still, as Maiy Dudziak has shown, Cold War imperatives were 
taken into account throughout the defining moments of the Movement’s struggle.101 In 
particular, the damage caused to the nation’s international standing by international media 
coverage of Southern brutality was explicitly acknowledged by Presklent Eisenhower in 
justifying his decision to involve federal troops for resolving the crisis in Little Rock.102 In his 
televised speech following the dispatching of federal troops (a speech that was translated to 
forty-three languages and extensively covered by the international press),103 Eisenhower stated:
“At a time when we face grave situations abroad because o f the hatred that 
Communists bear toward a system o f government based on human rights, it would 
be difficult to exaggerate the harm that is being done to the prestige and influence, 
and indeed to the safety, o f  our nation and the world. Our enemies are gloating 
over this incident and using it everywhere to misrepresent our whole nation”. 104
While Eisenhower’s speech was primarily aimed at convincing the American public 
ofthe justifiability o f his decision, his attempt to dissociate American values from Southern
100 Dudziak (2000: 142-145).
101 Dudziak (2000).
102 Ibid, chapter 4.
103 Skrentny (1998: 263).
104 Quoted in Dudziak (2000: 133).
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racial brutality were mainly directed to international audiences. In stressing this distinction, 
Eisenhower adhered to the broader strategy devised by the USIA for tackling international 
criticism in the aftermath o f high-profile incidents o f white supremacist terror. This 
strategy sought to emphasize the extent to which Southern practices deviated from national 
norms and to justify the toleration o f such practices by the federal government as reflecting 
its reluctance to use force to repress internal conflicts. The film Nine from Little Rock that 
was produced by the USIA, translated into seventeen languages and distributed to ninety- 
seven countries (before being awarded an Oscar in 1965 for best documentary film), 
epitomized the propagandist methods used for amplifying this message. The film ascribed 
the turbulence in Little Rock to the actions of a racist “few who tried to impose their will 
on the many”, and concluded by assuring that “if Little Rock taught us nothing more, it 
taught us that problems can make us better, much better”. 105
Inasmuch as cinematic portrayals of the events were suitable for recasting the problem as 
an issue o f  individual non-compliance with American collective norms, the criminalization of 
such conduct remained the ideal institutional tool for communicating this message. From the 
perspective o f its functional contribution to accommodating challenges to the legitimacy o f a 
given political order, criminalization provides governments with a framework for 
reconstructing social problems in a politically convenient way by means of “individualizing” 
blame for the materialization o f social harm.106 In the context of “pro-minority” 
criminalization, this re-contextualization serves to eclipse the extent to which state policies 
themselves are complicit in creating the criminogenic conditions within which such forms o f 
victimization are likely to occur.107 Accordingly, the “hands ofF’ approach taken by federal 
authorities throughout the entrenchment of Jim Crow facilitated the crystallization o f the 
cultural and political conditions within which such vigilante resistance to racial desegregation 
thrived. At the same time that the federal government censured the inhibition of 
desegregation by white supremacist mobs, it was still ready to tolerate various mechanisms 
that were erected by Southern authorities for inhibiting desegregation o f public schools and 
other public institutions. The increasing political support for enacting federal “pro-black”
105 Quoted in Dudziak (2000: 218).
106 Lacey (1995: 14).
107 Cf. Norrie (2001: 223).
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criminal legislation was a step forward. However, to the extent that this willingness was 
motivated by the effort to contain the challenges of legitimation provoked by international 
critics o f American government, it relied upon shaky foundations. Like other policy reforms 
attempted to improve the nation’s reputation abroad rather than to actually remove the 
conditions which structurally exposed African-Americans to social harm, the actual 
transformative effect o f such symbolic steps was intrinsically constrained.
E. The Federalization of Anti-Racist Criminalization Policy as a Vehicle 
for the Construction of Federal Crime-Control Authority
El. The Rise o f the New Deal Model o f Federal Governance
Another structural shift which facilitated the accelerated development of federal anti-racist 
criminalization policy in the post-War years was associated with the rise o f a new (and considerably 
more ambitious) vision of the role ofthe national administration in addressing the nation’s core social 
problems. This shift created new pressures of legitimation on the federal government, which was 
compelled to reconcile the new vision through which it justified the expansion of its powers 
throughout the New Deal era (1930-1968) with its modes of handling the sectional defiance of federal 
authority in the South. Because the establishment of the New Deal vision of federal authority was 
interwoven with the transformation of the jurisprudence of the Supreme Court on the question of the 
constitutional limits of national legislative and executive powers, one of the major catalysts for the 
emergence of “federally protected activities” policy was provided by the decline of the constitutional 
doctrines which had inhibited the development of federal civil rights policy hitherto.
As we saw in the previous chapter, the dominant view which took hold after the 
collapse of Reconstruction maintained that Congress did not possess constitutional power to 
regulate racial discrimination by private individuals,108 and thus that it could not criminalize 
such conducts.109 This view remained in force despite the clear failure o f  Southern states to 
fulfil their part in the federalist package and to bring racist perpetrators to justice. The 
constitutional theory which underlay this dominant legal and political view was based on the
108 Civil Rights Cases, 109 US. 3 (1883).
109 United States v. Harris, 106 U.S. 629  (1883).
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model of dual federalism. According to this model, the American governmental system is 
comprised o f two separate and co-sovereign subsystems (federal and state-level), each o f 
which is supreme within its sphere o f operation. Throughout the entrenchment o f the New 
Deal model of government in various domains o f  public policy, the influence of dual 
federalism was significantly eroded. As a result, it became increasingly difficult to reconcile 
the de facto decriminalization o f  white supremacist terror in the South with dominant 
constitutional theories regarding the responsibilities and powers of the federal administration.
The decline of dual federalism was triggered by the proliferation of a new vision of federal 
governance from 1930s onwaids. The New Deal programs introduced a new array of ideas regarding 
the role of the national administration in regulating the operation of the market economy and in 
stimulating economic growth and stability.110 These ideas originally emerged in order to remedy 
specific deficiencies o f the nation’s economic system. However, during the following decades (and 
particularly after WWII), they had gradually begun to be applied to tackle a much broader range of 
social and economic problems. Eventually, the implementation of New Deal rationalities in new 
policy domains had eroded the traditional demarcations between the spheres of operation o f federal 
and state governments. In some policy domains, in which the national administration was impelled to 
cooperate with state and local governments in order to implement New Deal policies, a new model of 
‘cooperative federalism’ was established. Under this model, the national administration had set the 
parameters of ptiblie policy and steered and monitored their execution by state and local governments, 
mainly through the utilization of fiscal tools.111 In other policy domains, in which sectionalism 
appeared to impede the harmonious pursuit of national interests, the relationship between different 
layers of government resulted in open contests over the legitimacy of federal regulative policies. By 
and large, these contests were resolved -  constitutionally and politically - in favour of a consistent 
expansion of the legitimate sphere of operation of the national administration.112 Although 
Roosevelt’s ‘coirt packing’ initiative (following the constitutional overtiming of the 1935 National 
Recovery Act) had foiled, he was nevertheless successful in utilizing more conventional measures for 
ensuring greater judicial deference to the principles of New Deal Liberalism (most significantly, the
110 Brinkley (1989).
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appointment of eight liberal justices between 1937 and 1941)-113 From the late 1930s onwaids, the 
Supreme Courf s constitutional juisprudence became much more receptive to claims made by the 
federal government in favour of the expansion of its regulatory reach.114 This paradigm shift was 
legitimated through a generous interpretation of Congressional legislative powers under the 
Commerce Clause and the gradual constriction of the scope of states’ rights doctrine (a trend which 
was reversed only by the Rehnquist Court).115
E2. The Emergence of Federal Anti-Racist Criminalization Policy as a Product and 
Facilitator o f the Expansion o f Federal Criminal Justice Policymaking Authority
The entrenchment o f the New Deal model of national policymaking had altered the character 
of anti-racist activism and policymaking in two main ways. First, as the national 
administration accumulated greater institutional capacities and political legitimacy, African- 
American activists were increasingly inclined to channel their efforts toward demanding 
federal intervention (rather than to prodding Southern elites to call for the relaxation o f racial 
oppression). Second, in an effort to legitimate the expansion of its involvement in criminal 
justice policymaking, the national administration was increasingly inclined to use the 
problem o f the abdication o f enforcement responsibilities by Southern governments as an 
illustrative example o f the pitfalls o f states’ rights ideology. Our discussion in section C of 
this chapter already demonstrated the extent to which the Movement prioritized the recourse 
to federal institutions as the primary path for abolishing Jim Crow. In the remainder of this 
section, we will therefore focus on the second aspect of this structural shift, namely, the way 
in which the new pressures o f  legitimation with which the federal government was faced 
throughout the expansion of its crime-policymaking authority had created new incentives to 
establish a new regime o f federal “pro-black” criminalization.
1 ] 3 Leuchtenburg (1996).
114 Placed within the context o f  the intellectual history o f  American legal thought, the judicial endorsement 
o f  the principles o f  New Deal liberalism was facilitated by the rise o f  legal realism in the 1930s. Realists’ 
descriptive analysis o f  adjudication as a form o f policymaking, and their critique o f  Lochner-style judicial 
rationalizations o f  ‘laissez faire’ ideology, facilitated the emergence o f  new conceptions o f  the judiciary’s 
political role. Their theories also inspired a greater commitment to developing progressive-oriented 
jurisprudence.
115 United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S.549 (1995).
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The expansion o f the regulatory authority o f the national administration was inevitably 
interwoven with the extension o f Congress’s criminalizing power. By and large, the cardinal 
principle of the administration of criminal justice in the American federal system - namely, that 
primary responsibility for criminalizing criminal conduct lies with state and bcal institutions - 
has remained in force. Yet, the power of this principle to exclude the legitimate interest of the 
federal government in criminal justice policymaking was clearly diminished.116 Throughout 
this process, the national government has predominantly resorted to two major modes of 
justification for legitimating its greater involvement both in directly regulating criminal conduct 
and in regulating the performances of states governments while executing their enforcement 
responsibilities. The first mode of justification was based on the identification o f national 
problems which were argued to necessitate regulatory interventions that crossed state borders. 
The second mode of justification stressed the role ofthe national administration in establishing 
national norms which would set minimum standards for the operation of state and focal 
governments. In what follows, we will look at how the establishment of federal jurisdiction 
over white supremacist violence derived from these two modes of justification and, at the same 
time, helped the national administration to legitimate the further extension of its powers.
“Pro-Black ” Criminalization and the Role o f the Federal Government in Tackling 
Social Problems That Crossed State Borders: The first conventional path for expanding 
federal crime control authority emphasizes the role o f the national government in 
regulating problems which cross state borders. This rationale resonates with a deep- 
seated view o f the legitimate scope o f  operation o f the federal government, namely, its 
authority to regulate interstate commerce. However, the institutional conditions which 
facilitated the heavy reliance on this rationale for legitimating the massive expansion o f 
federal crime control authority were created only throughout the first half ofthe twentieth 
century, following the founding in 1908 o f the Bureau o f Investigation (which in 1932 
was renamed the FBI). As Marie Gottschalk has argued, throughout this period, the 
Bureau’s leadership was able to branch out to new areas o f governance through fostering 
media concern o f a cluster o f  social problems which were reconstructed as national
116 Friedman (1993: 273-276); Merola (1982).
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threats that could only be eliminated through large-scale federal crusades.117 The most 
prominent o f these crusades had reconstructed the political meanings o f social problems 
such as alcohol consumption, ransom kidnapping, and bank robberies throughout the 
1920s-30s; juvenile delinquency and sex crimes during the 1940s; and organized crime 
and Communism throughout the 1950s.118 Through the mobilizatbn o f  popular demand 
for their intervention, federal agencies were able both to establish the legitimacy o f their 
operation in the ‘law and order’ policy domain and to acquire much greater institutional 
and budgetary resources.
Understood within this context o f its contribution to the construction o f  the 
authority o f the national government as a crime-control policymaker, the establishment o f 
federal jurisdiction over Southern white supremacist violence signalled a momentous triumph 
over one of the most salient symbols o f the ideology of states’ rights. In the early 1960s, 
when Northern public opinion became increasingly supportive of abolishing the excesses of 
Jim Crow, the inexorable refusal o f Southern states to protect black victims o f  mob violence 
had been used to spotlight the acute flaws o f traditional states’ rights doctrines. These widely- 
publicized incidents o f  racial brutality provided an illustration o f the abominable way in 
which states’ rights doctrine deprived a sizable class of the American citizens from the most 
elementary civil rights, including the right to life. By diminishing the legitimacy o f  states’ 
rights doctrine, this campaign had served to remove an inpediment which had inhibited the 
general development of federal law enforcement for decades.119
“Pro-Black” Criminalization and the Role o f  the Federal Government in 
Establishing National Standard o f Policymaking: The predicament of African-American 
victims had also served to support the second conventional rationale for legitimating the 
criminalization authority o f  the federal government, namely, the establishment o f national 
standards which would oblige state and local governments. Throughout the New Deal era, 
and particularly in the post-War years, the federal government assumed a much greater 
responsibility for modernizing the operation o f the state and focal agencies which addressed
117 Gottschalk(2006: 65).
118 Ibid, 65-76.
119 Ibid, 62.
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the nation’s core social problems.120 While in various domains o f  public policy this effort 
could have been effectively pursued through utilization o f fiscal incentives, in the domain 
of criminal justice, the efforts to impose national standards had been much more fervently 
contested, particularly in the South.
The intensity o f Southern resistance to the reformation o f  regional crime 
enforcement practices reflected the profound inprints o f Reconstruction in the region’s 
collective memory. This resistance was also motivated by the perceived need to retain the 
suitability o f  these institutions to keep and reinforce white supremacist norms. Yet, because 
the post-Reconstruction development o f  the Southern criminal justice system was 
profoundly interwoven with the formation o f white supremacist political and social 
institutions,121 the federal effort to set national standards o f crime enforcement had to begin 
in the South. In the post-War era, it was clear that the performances and institutional 
capacities of Southern crime control institutions fell conspicuously short o f the standards 
which had been established in the North from the Progressive Era onwards. As Michael 
Klarman has argued in his analysis o f the birth of modem due process jurisprudence, in an 
effort to legitimate its authority to take a more involved role in superintending states’ 
criminal trial processes (and thus to depart from nearly a century and half o f legal 
precedents), the Supreme Court had incentives to begin revoking the most incontrovertible 
cases o f procedural unfairness.122 And the starkest instances o f  unfair practices such as 
coercion o f defendants into confessions,123 the deprivation o f suspects from the right to 
defence counsel,124 or discrimination injury selection,125 prevailed in the South (and, in 
particular, in trials in which black defendants were accused o f  attacking white victims). 
Likewise, in the field o f prisoners’ rights, the first steps towards establishing the authority 
of federal courts to set national standards o f imprisonment conditions involved the
120 Simon (2004: 309).
A s shown in chapter 3 (section C2) o f this dissertation.
122 Klarman (2002: 122).
123 Eg. ii Moore v. Dempsey, (261 U.S. 86 (1923)), die Court invalidated a criminal conviction obtained whib 
howling mobs surrounded courthouses,demanding that the defendants betumed overfbr lynching.
124 E.g., in Powell v. Alabama (287 U.S. 45 (1932)), the Court overturned a conviction where defence council had 
been appointed in the morning ofthe trial fora capital crime.
125 In Norris v. Alabama (294 U.S. 587 (1935)), the Court overturned stale courts’jurisprudence which had made it 
nearly impossible to prove that blacks had been intentionally excluded from juries.
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invalidation o f remnants of plantation-like penal practbes such as relying on the whip as a 
disciplinary instrument or using prisoners as a pool o f agricultural labour.126
Thus, in the field of criminalization policy as in other domains o f  crime governance, 
the underperformance of Southern institutions provided the most obvious deviations from the 
way in which standards of due process and equal protection had been implemented elsewhere. 
The reclaiming o f federal authority to enforce Southern compliance with these standards was 
consistent with -  and played an instrumental role in the extension o f -  the broader efforts of the 
national administration to establish itself as a key policymaker in the field of criminal justice.
In conclusion, in this section, I have shown that the establishment o f  federal 
jurisdiction over interferences with civil rights played an instrumental role in building up the 
political legitimacy and institutional capacities of the national administration in the field o f 
criminal justice policy. One o f the major implications o f this argument lies in emphasizing 
the historical contingency (and thus susceptibility to change) of the political conditions which 
impelled the federal government to become involved in this project of racial egalitarianism 
This emphasis is important for grasping the complex long-term consequences of the “federally 
protected activities” campaign. From the 1970s onwards, the two forces which converged in 
the early 1960s and stimulated the emergence of this criminalization regime - namely, the effort 
to establish the authority ofthe federal government as a pivotal player in criminal justice policy, 
and the struggle for racial equality - would become increasingly at odds with each other. From 
now on, the federal government would continue to entrench its dominance in crime control 
policymaking, but its crusades would be inspired by an entirely different political vision. Much 
as the framework which justified the post-War expansion of federal crime control authority was 
embedded within the dominant political ideology o f the time (New Deal liberalism), future 
crusades would come to reflect the ascendancy of neoconservative and neoliberal thinking 
about the political and social roles of penal institutions. Insofar as this broader mode of thinking 
would be antagonistic to the egalitarian ideals which were pursued by the Civil Rights 
Movement, the new configurations of federal involvement in criminal justice policy would 
often have an adverse impact on the pursuit of these ideals over the next decades.127 And
126 Feeley & Rubin (1998: 158).
127 Stuntz(2008); M iller(2008).
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indeed, as I will show in the next chapter, the federalization o f criminal justice policy served as 
a major catalyst o f  the exacerbation of racial disparities in sentencing and incarceration from 
the late 1970s onwards. In the context of the current chapter, we can only pinpoint the oblique 
contribution of the “federally protected activities” campaign to the entrenchment of federal 
crime control authority as one o f the major unintended consequences of this campaign.
F. The Effects of “Federally Protected Activities” Legislation
Based on the analysis of the driving forces which shaped the unfolding o f  the campaign to 
criminalize interferences with “federally protected activities”, we can now move to consider the 
effects which this campaign and policy reform engendered. I will explore this question with 
respect to three major goals which “pro-minority” criminalization is believed to facilitate, 
namely, a) minimizing the vulnerability to victimization of minority groups; b) contributing to 
political struggles which seek to diminish social (racial) inequalities; c) eroding the legitimacy 
of degrading social norms (embodied by the outlawed form of conduct).
FI. The Preventive Effects of the Federalization ofAnti-Radst Criminalization Policy
The establishment o f the “federally protected activities” criminalization regime between 1964 
and 1968 was celebrated as a milestone in American race relations. Yet, in the four decades 
since its enactment, § 245 of the Civil Right Act o f 1968 has only rarely been used by the 
federal government. During the first decade after its appearance on the statute books, the 
Justice Department initiated only seventeen prosecutions under § 245 in the eleven ex- 
Confederacy states.128 This trend has remained consistent to date. According to a recent 
report released by the Civil Rights Division o f  the Justice Department (the agency assigned 
with primary responsibility for the enforcement o f “federally protected activities” 
legislation), between 2001 and 2006, it initiated only 27 prosecutions (many o f which 
referred to other forms o f bigotry-motivated violence, in particular, anti-Muslim).129
However, an assessment of the inpact of the “federally protected activities” legislation 
on patterns of white supremacist violence cannot be based solely on data regarding the volume
128 Belknap (1987:229).
129 http://www.usdoi.gOv/crt/actwitv.html#crrn (last visited, 25/04/08).
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of direct enforcement activities. Because this legislation left state governments with the primary 
responsibility to protect African-Americans through enforcing their own criminal codes, we 
should also consider the indirect ways in which the threat of federal intervention might have 
affected the enforcement performances of Southern states. Admittedly, since processes of 
criminalization bring into play the interactions between multiple social and institutional actors, 
it is impossible to insulate the direct inpact o f this legislative reform vis-a-vis various other 
determinants which naught have encouraged Southern states to enhance the penalization of 
white supremacist terror.130 In light o f  these methodological difficulties, my aim in this section 
is not to establish a conclusive causal link between the introduction o f this legislation and the 
declining recorded rates of white supremacist violence in the South.131 Nevertheless, I will try 
to offer a plausible interpretation of its contribution. This interpretation is based on placing this 
new legislative framework within its broader political context.
The mere introduction o f  federal jurisdiction over anti-civil rights terror could not 
have, by itself, forced Southern governments to abandon their long-standing refusal to 
bring white supremacist perpetrators to justice. However, this legislation was incorporated 
within a broader array o f policies enacted by the federal administration during the New 
Deal era. The institutionalization o f these policies increased the dependence o f Southern 
states and economic elites on federal largesse and on Northern business investments for 
securing the region’s economic stability. The establishment o f these policies was initiated 
in 1938, when the National Emergency Council released its Report on the Economic 
Conditions o f the South. The Report identified the region’s economic underdevelopment as 
a national problem which impeded America’s recovery from the Great Depression. The 
Roosevelt administration endorsed the recommendations, and instituted a series of 
programs aimed at integrating the South into the nation’s industrialized economy.132 With 
the institutionalization o f these policies throughout the following decades, new 
disincentives were attached to non-compliance with federal policies.
130 As Von Hirsch and Ashworth point out (1998: 44-51), the inability to control for the inpact o f  particular 
factors form one o f  the main methodological pitfalls o f  studies into the deterrent inpacts o f  legislative 
reforms.
131 Belknap (1987:237).
132 Schulman (1991).
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As long as the federal government had an ambivalent attitude towards its 
commitment to protect the civil rights o f Southern African-Americans, these economic 
disincentives remained less concrete. The hypothetical threat of federal intervention had to be 
counterbalanced against the various domestic factors which impelled Southern politicians to 
turn a blind eye to (and often to tacitly incite) the persistence o f  white supremacist terror. 
With the introduction o f  the C ivil Rights Act of 1964 and the Voting Rights Act o f 1965, the 
federal government had communicated a much clearer message regarding its commitment to 
eradicating these forms o f  racial discrimination. The passing o f this legislation had also 
signalled to the region’s political elites that the veto power of the Southern voting block, as 
well as the ideological currency o f the states’ rights doctrine, had fallen from grace, and that 
their power to inhibit the imposition of federal sanctions could no longer be secured.
This argument is consistent with the thesis presented throughout this study 
regarding the conditions which facilitate the enforceability o f “pro-minority” criminal 
legislation (and thus improve its preventive effects). In particular, I have focused on two 
major conditions. First, I emphasized that the extent to which “pro-minority” 
criminalization reforms are embedded within a broader network o f governmental policies 
aimed at alleviating the structural conditions which cultivate these forms o f violence is 
crucial for facilitating the preventive impact o f such legislation. Second, I showed that 
the compatibility between racial egalitarian reforms and the economic and political 
interests o f hegemonic elites is likely to enhance the enforceability o f such legislation.
By tracing the preventive impact o f “pro-minority” criminalization policy to its 
suitability to satisfy these conditions, we can also gain a useful explanatory perspective on why 
the “federally protected activities” regime had probabfy foiled to reduce the disproportionate 
vulnerability of African-Americans to other patterns o f victimization which were left outside 
the frame of the Movement’s campaigns. As millions o f African-Americans moved from the 
rural South to urban ghettoes throughout the nation, they became increasingly vulnerable to 
new patterns of victimizatioa These patterns are rooted in the criminogenic conditions which 
permeate the disintegrated urban landscape in which a disproportionate bulk o f the black 
population reside, where rates of poverty, unemployment and crime for exceed national
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averages.133 These forms o f victimization have been cultivated by mechanisms o f racial 
stratification (associated with the demographic and economic “ghettoization” o f the black 
population)134 which remained under the radar of the Movement’s campaigns.
As our analysis has inplied, the Movement’s neglect o f  these patterns o f black 
victimization might have been necessitated by the political opportunity structure within 
which it had to operate while attempting to mobilize public and political support for 
abolishing Jim Crow. Yet, although many o f the political constraints which the Movement 
had to overcome in the 1960s are no longer operative, this lack of focus continues to 
characterize present-day debates on the problem of black victimization. As I will argue in the 
next chapter, this tendency to marginalize forms o f victimization which do not fell into the 
traditional white supremacist pattern has considerably inhibited the success of contemporary 
American society in addressing the symbiosis between the overwhelmingly high rates of 
victimization among African-Americans and other patterns of racial stratification which 
thrive in de-industrialized urban ghettoes. This failure, I will argue, was shaped by the 
tendency of the anti-hate crime movement to give emphasis to the cultural (racist-laden) 
rather than to the socio-economic (class-based) dimensions o f interracial violence (as well as 
to marginalize the significance of intra-racial violence as a symptom of blacks’ social 
exclusion). To the extent that the trajectory of the hate crime campaign has been constrained 
by the priorities set by the Civil Rights Movement (even if such priorities were strategically 
necessitated by the circumstances which prevailed at the time), the Movement’s neglect o f 
these problems carried some long-term adverse effects on the future development of “pro­
black” criminalization policymaking. This dynamic of path-dependence makes our analysis 
of the historical contingencies which shaped the Movement’s mode of framing the problem 
of black victimization highly relevant for our understanding o f  contemporary challenges in 
this field.
133 Sampson and Wilson (1995).
134 Wacquant (2001: 101-103).
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F2. The Political and Cultural Effects o f the “Federally Protected Activities” Campaign
The political consequences o f the “federally protected activities” campaign exemplify the 
interplay between two contradictory effects which successful campaigns o f  “pro­
minority” criminalization are likely to engender. This is the dialectic between political 
recognition and political legitimation The passing o f such legislation serves as a salient 
medium through which the State recognizes the principled entitlement o f members o f a 
marginalized group to equal enjoyment o f citizenship rights. At the same time, it works to 
induce public belief in the fairness, impartiality, and effectiveness o f State institutions 
which are heavily invested in stabilizing the marginalization o f that group.
As demonstrated throughout this chapter, the campaign to criminalize interferences 
with “federally protected activities” served as a salient site in which the concrete terms of 
African-Americans’ formal status as citizens were negotiated and articulated. While the leaders of 
the Civil Rights Movement certainty attached intrinsic importance to the introduction of firmer 
penal measures, the focus on this particular aspect of the collective experiences of African- 
Americans was also motivated by strategic purposes. The inexorable refusal of Southern states to 
bring white supremacist perpetrators to justice provided a dismaying illustration of one the 
gravest forms of exclusion built into the American political system. The persistent failure of the 
national administration to compel Southern states to deliver this elementary function of modem 
government exemplified the acute gaps between the professed values of American democracy 
and the actual governmental and social practices which Southern blacks had to endure.
The Movement’s effective recourse to the ‘victimization frame’ made a 
remarkable contribution to its efforts to bring Northern public opinion to support the 
abolition of Jim Crow. At the same time, the salience o f the problem o f  white supremacist 
violence within the Movement’s agenda provided politicians with a convenient way o f 
responding to the protest. By introducing a new framework for penalizing the most extreme 
manifestations o f white supremacy, national politicians were able to present themselves as 
responsive to the Movement’s demands for reform while circumventing the more 
controversial issues which the struggle for racial equality sought to address.
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The Civil Rights Movement gave emphasis to the pursuit o f  two immediate goals. The 
first goal was to dismantle the oppressive caste system which prevailed in the South. The 
second was to re-establish the constitutional obligation o f the national administration to 
guarantee African-Americans’ civil rights. However, because racist beliefs and racist habitus 
have permeated numerous aspects o f American governmental and social systems,135 the 
transformative potential latent in the Movement’s crusade was much more for-reaching. The 
depth of the challenge posed by the Movement was explicitly stated even by the preeminent 
exponent of racial integration, Martin Luther King. In a speech in 1965, he declared:
“The black revolution is much more than a struggle for the rights of the Negroes. It is 
forcing America to fece all its interrelated flaws — racism, poverty, militarism, and 
materialism. It is exposing evils that are rooted deeply in the whole structure of our 
society.. .and suggests that radical reconstruction of society is the real issue to be foced”.136
In retrospect, it is clear that while the Movement was able to accomplish its two immediate 
goals, these achievements eradicated none of the four structural flaws identified by King. The 
civil rights legislation of the mid 1960s opened new opportunities for middle and upper class 
African-Americans. It also provided black movements and politicians who have worked within 
the established frameworks of American electoral and legal systems with new opportunities for 
initiating policy reforms. Nevertheless, this legislation did not directly target the root causes of the 
socioeconomic marginalization of the black population (particularly in the North). Although these 
legislative reforms were indeed fo flowed by a more vigorous governmental effort to address these 
deeper problems (the Great Society project), they ultimately foiled to cement a sustainable public 
and political commitment to the pursuit o f racial inequality. The historical dynamics which led to 
the collapse of the Great Society project will be discussed in detail in the next chapter.137 For the 
moment, it can be observed that the post-1968 crisis of American racial egalitarianism was rooted 
in the tendency to overstate the suitability of the substantial yet incomplete reforms initiated by 
the Movement to provide a sustainable solution to the wide range of social pathologies which 
America’s racial legacy had brought about.138 With the rise o f neoliberal policies in the economic
135 King and Smith (2008: 80).
136 Quoted in Hall (2005: 1233).
137 See discussion in chapter 5 (section C l. 1) o f  this dissertation.
138 Lieberman (2008: 225).
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sphere and neoconservative policies in the cultural sphere from 1980 onwards, these pervasive 
patterns of occupational marginalization and residential segregation (which were particularly 
widespread in the North) would block the further integration of African-Americans into the 
nation’s political and economic fabrics. However, the ability of racial reformers to mobilize 
popular commitment to eradicating these patterns would be impeded by the widespread belief in 
the suitability of the post-Jim Crow American political system to provide African-Americans 
with adequate opportunities for economic and political integration
Our analysis has demonstrated that the Movement’s “federally protected activities” 
campaign had effectively boosted Northern support fir abolishing Jim Crow. Yet it could also be 
argued that the agenda within which this campaign was incorporated was unsuitable to forge 
political commitment to the radical reform which was envisioned by King as the desirable end 
result of the Movement’s crusade. Because this strategy focused on spotlighting the most brutish 
aspects of the Southern caste system and on presenting them as embodying the character of 
American racism, the Movement’s campaigns might have diverted the nation’s attention from the 
less brutal yet pervasive patterns of discrimination which prevailed in the North As a result, these 
campaigns foiled to cement the commitment of Northern public opinion to eradicating the distinct 
mechanisms of racial stratification which, by that time, were fully entrenched in Northern economy 
and society. This failure found expression in the feet that during 1964, the very same year in which 
the sweeping Civil Rights Act passed Congress with overwhelming support from Northern public 
opinion, feir housing and school integration ordinances were being rejected in countless Northern 
locales.139 The enormous emphasis given to Southern violence (in both its legal and extralegal 
forms) truly represented the South’s significance as the cradle of American racism However, this 
emphasis might have been ill-equipped to tackle the more demanding task of mobilizing 
commitment toa structural reform of American bi-regional system ofracial stratification
The clash o f expectations which erupted by the late 1960s exposed the fragility of 
the forms of interracial solidarity which the strategic focus on the Southern scene was able to 
induce. As Malcolm Feeley puts it, the “beneficiaries” o f civil rights legislation “did not 
express gratitude, as their newfound equality o f opportunity did not translate into substantial 
substantive gains, and the benefactors, the silent majority, felt unappreciated for their
139 Klarman (1994: 144).
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efforts”.140 Although African-Americans in the North were not subjected to formal 
discrimination, they clearly came to identity themselves as governed by a systemic regime of 
race-based marginalization. In particular, this regime was suffused with pervasive 
unemployment and underemployment, inadequate housing and education, and police brutality. 
Their profound disappointment in the free of federal unwillingness to tackle these distinct 
structures and mechanisms o f social marginalization radicalized Northern blacks’ racial 
consciousness. Riots firstly flared up in New York in 1964, only eighteen days after President 
Johnson signed the Civil Rights Act, “as if to signal that such legislative redress was 
insufficient to meet Northern expectations and needs” 141 Between 1964 and 1969, more than 
four hundred racial riots erupted throughout the nation.142 The riots reflected the refusal of a 
new generation o f Northern blacks to adhere to the Movement’s preference to operate within 
the bounds of American ideological and institutional frameworks. In turn, the riots facilitated 
the triumph o f a new conservative agenda, which combined an appeal to Southerners’ racial 
anxieties (“the Southern strategy”) with a promise to restore law and order in American cities.
The culmination o f  the “federally protected activities” campaign transpired in the 
very threshold between these two periods. As such, it symbolizes the crossroad which black 
activists faced in this particular historical moment. On the one hand, “federally protected 
activities” can be understood as the climax o f a long, adamant, and highly impeded campaign 
to bring American society to recognize the entitlement o f African-Americans “to be protected 
in the ordinary modes by which other men’s rights are protected” (as put by Justice Arlen in 
his dissent in the Civil Rights Cases)}43 On the other hand, it heralded a new era of victim- 
centred rights mobilization. As I will show in the next chapter, the new policy frameworks 
which would come to dominate this new era are ill-suited to advance the integrationist goals 
which “federally protected activities” legislation attempted to promote. Within this context, 
this legislation symbolized the twilight of the egalitarian opportunities made possible by the 
short- lived convergence o f racial justice and social justice in the mid 1960s.
140 Feeley (2003: 122).
141 Marx (1998: 238).
142 Ibid, ibid.
143 Supra note 1.
Chapter 5:
Re-Penalizing “Hate Crime”, De-Contextualizing Racial Inequality: 
The Development of “Pro-Black” Criminalization Policy, 1968-2008
It is a widespread but fatal trap — precisely, a trap o f liberal opinion' — to split 
analysis from action, and to assign the first to the instance o f the ‘long term ’, which 
never comes, and reserve only the second to ‘what is practical and realistic in 
the short term ’...So if someone says to us: ‘Yes, but given the present 
conditions, what are we to do now? ’ we can only reply, ‘Do something about 
the ‘present conditions ’.
Stuart Hall, Policing the Crisis1
A. Introduction
In the early 1980s, a novel, and unprecedentedly popular, model o f  “pro-black” 
criminal legislation had emerged. In 1981, the Anti Defamation League (ADL) began 
to lobby for the introduction o f  a new legislative model as part o f  its campaign against 
anti-Semitic violence.2 This new model coined the term “hate crime” for labeling 
criminal offences motivated by bias, bigotry or prejudice toward the victim The main 
innovation o f  this new legislative model lay in the idea o f penalty enhancement. It 
required the judge to enhance the penalty for a criminal act if  it was proven that the 
offender targeted his victim because o f bias toward the group to which she belongs. 
The ADL hate crime statute model covered not only anti-Semitic violence, but also 
violence perpetrated on the ground o f  the victim’s race, colour, and national origin. 
Over the next decade, this model was adopted by legislatures across the nation. To 
date, 47 states have adopted at least one piece o f hate crime legislation, 45 o f  which 
have used the penalty enhancement formula. Congress enacted a series o f  penalty
1 Hall (1978: ix-x).
" A D L  Approach to Hate Crime Legislation (http://www.adl.org/99hatecrime/penaltv.aspA
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enhancement hate crime laws applying to federal offences.3 It also passed the Hate 
Crime Statistics Act (1990), which required the Attorney General to compile and 
publish annual surveys on recorded rates o f  “hate crime”.4 From the outset, racist- 
motivated victimization o f  African-Americans was recognized by all states as well as 
by Congress as a ground for penalty enhancement. Over the years, hate crime statutes 
have come to encompass various other categories o f victims, including those targeted 
on ground o f  their sexual orientation, gender or disability.5 While hate crime laws are 
not exclusively devoted to penalizing racist violence, they have come to redefine the 
way in which the age-old problem o f  black victimization is being understood and the 
way in which it is tackled by the criminal justice system
This chapter addresses two historical questions. First, why did this new model 
of “pro-black” criminalization emerge in the early 1980s? Second, what are the 
preventive, political and cultural effects which hate crime laws have produced? As 
explained in the introductory chapter o f  this dissertation, while grappling with these 
questions, I take issue with three conventional theses developed by the existing 
literature on the origins and consequences o f  hate crime laws. The first thesis suggests 
that hate crime laws were introduced in order to tackle the upsurge o f  bigotry- 
motivated violence in the early 1980s.6 The second thesis suggests that hate crime
t n
laws were introduced in order to symbolize progressive changes in racial attitudes. 
These changes, it is argued, led American society to perceive age-old racist practices 
in a new, and more critical, light. Hate crime laws were introduced in order to express 
the community’s sense o f  moral condemnation o f  such forms o f  conduct. The third 
thesis contends that hate crime laws emerged because o f  the growth o f  “new social
3 Hate Crime Sentencing Enhancement Act (Pub. L. § 103-322); Matthew Shepard and James Byrd, Jr. 
Hate Crime Prevention Act (H.R. 2647).
4 Throughout this chapter, I will use the term “hate crime” (with inverted commas) when referring to the 
conducts which are covered by this criminal category. J will not use quotation marks when referring to the 
laws which criminalize such conducts or to the name o f  the movement which mobilized such legislation 
(viz., when referring to hate crime legislation or the anti-hate crime movement). I use this distinction in older 
highlight the difference between the signified object (i.e. the activities that are labelled by this criminal 
category) and the signifying practices (both discursive and institutional) through which the dominant 
meanings o f  the concept “hate crime” are being constructed. This distinction is important in order to steer 
clear o f  assuming that there is a fixed essence that unite the broad (and, as I will argue, highly indeterminate) 
ambit o f  conducts that are policed, investigated, prosecuted and punished under hate crime laws.
5 Jenness (2001: 304).
6 See my discussion and critique o f  this thesis, pp. 11-13 o f  chapter 1. For an influential statement o f  
this thesis, see: Levin and McDevit (1993).
7 See my discussion and critique o f  the “enlightenment o f  racial attitudes” thesis, pp. 13-15 o f  chapter 
I. For an influential statement o f  this thesis, see: Kahan (1998).
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movements” and their success in effectively politicizing the issue o f  “hate crime” and 
impelling legislatures to endorse a new penal response (the distinctiveness o f  this 
thesis is that it neither affirms nor denies the claims made by the former two theses; 
instead, it focuses on the techniques o f  social construction which enabled social 
movements to induce public belief in the accuracy o f  these claims).
In chapter 1 o f  this dissertation, I presented a cluster o f  methodological and 
substantive challenges to the explanatory power o f  these three conventional theses.9 I 
will refrain from reiterating the grounds o f  this critique here. It is important to 
emphasize, however, that one o f  the underlying motivations o f  my analysis is to 
challenge the Whiggish implications o f  these three theses. The Whiggish implications 
o f the first thesis lie in the claim that, with the removal o f  particular institutional 
arrangements which produce racially disparate impacts (e.g. indeterminate 
sentencing), the criminal justice system will be better equipped to, and thus more 
capable o f  realizing the ideal o f  equal protection. The second thesis (focusing on the 
putative “enlightenment o f  racial attitudes”) is informed by a quintessentially 
Whiggish interpretation o f  American racial history.10 Echoing a long tradition o f  
conceptualizing criminal law as a communicative vehicle which expresses the 
community’s shared sense o f  moral disapproval,11 this argument portrays hate crime 
laws as mirroring the increasing willingness o f  American society to tackle symptoms 
of its racist culture. However, as argued in the first chapter, this thesis cannot explain 
how, at the very same moment in which American society became increasingly 
disturbed by this particular symptom o f  racial inequality (reaffirmation o f  degrading 
racial norms by individual bigots), it turned a blind eye to the exacerbation o f  racial 
disparities in various other contexts o f  public policy. I f  indeed an historic 
“enlightenment o f  racial norms” took hold in the 1980, why did these egalitarian 
sentiments foil to spur firmer political and grassroots opposition to the staggering 
increase in the number o f  African-Americans behind bars or below the poverty line? 
As for the third conventional interpretation (the “social movements/social problems”
8 See my discussion and critique o f  the “social movements/social problems” thesis, pp. 15-17. The 
leading exponent o f  this approach has been Valerie Jenness in a series o f  influential works, including: 
Broad and Jenness (1997); Jenness (2001); Jenness and Grattet (2002).
9 See pp. 11 -17 o f  the first chapter.
10 Cf. Klinker and Smith (1999: 3).
11 This tradition harks back to Durkheim (1984)[ 1893]; for recent developments in 
communicative'expressivist theories o f  criminal law, see,e .g . DufT(1996); Feinbeig (1994); Kahan (1996).
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thesis), I have argued that, because o f  its tendency to overemphasize the role o f  social 
action vis-a-vis social structure in shaping the forms and outcomes o f  legal 
mobilization, it foiled to explore the possibility that the “success” o f  the anti-hate 
crime movement was enabled by broader structural conditions which, ultimately, 
work to inhibit rather than to facilitate the mobilization o f  egalitarian social change.
In this chapter, I develop a distinct thesis for interpreting the origins and 
effects o f  hate crime laws. I will argue that the introduction of this new legal 
framework was enabled by a broader paradigm shift which came to pass in American 
politics. The model o f  New Deal liberalism, which dominated American politics in 
the post-War decades, and within which preexisting policy frameworks for tackling 
the problem o f  black victimization were embedded, was dismantled.12 One o f  the 
main political currents which grew out o f  the crisis of New Deal liberalism was the 
increasing salience o f  “governing through crime” as a frame through which social 
movements and legislatures represent and act upon social problems.13 These shifts 
made room for the mushrooming o f  single-issue advocacy organizations mobilizing 
around the problem o f “hate crime” at the national and state levels. They also 
provided legislatures with new electoral incentives to endorse such campaigns. 
Capitalizing on the salience o f  victims’ rights campaigns in post-1980 American 
politics, these movements were able to attract unprecedented media and political 
attention to harmful experiences which members o f minority groups are often 
subjected to and that had been neglected hitherto. The problem o f victimization 
became an increasingly focal and distinctive symbol o f  social inequality. Accordingly, 
the willingness o f  legislatures to adopt firm penal responses to these specific patterns 
of victimization became an increasingly prominent litmus test for their commitment to 
ameliorating social inequality. In particular, the model o f  determinate sentencing 
reform, which emerged as a popular locus o f bipartisan “race-to-the-top” electoral 
competition, provided a platform for the designation o f  new policy responses to the 
age-old problem o f  unequal protection o f  minority victims (thus the focus on penalty 
enhancement). Eventually, I will argue, these criminalization campaigns came to 
overshadow alternative forms o f  activism and policymaking which could have been 
more successful both in generating effective crime-preventive responses and in
12 Brinkley (1989).
13 Simon (2007a); (2000).
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increasing public awareness o f  the symbiosis between current patterns o f  black 
victimization and broader structures o f racial inequality in contemporary American 
society. Hate crime legislation has also legitimated the expansion o f  enforcement 
powers o f  criminal justice institutions (particularly, o f  prosecutors and the police) in 
ways which compromise (rather than promote) the declared egalitarian values 
emphasized by this campaign.
My interpretation o f  the effects o f  hate crime laws is premised on a broader 
argument about the nature o f  black victimization as a distinct symptom o f  social 
inequality. Like other patterns o f  racial inequality, the problem o f  black victimization 
is constituted by both cultural and socio-economic mechanisms.14 It therefore requires 
forms o f  policy redress which would integrate both elements o f  symbolic recognition 
and mechanisms which can alleviate the socio-economic conditions breeding these 
forms o f  violence.15 I will argue that the anti-hate crime campaign has foiled to 
mobilize policy solutions capable o f  achieving such integration. This failure is 
noticeable both in the way in which dominant discourses o f  “hate crime” frame the 
political meanings o f  current patterns o f  black victimization (i.e. in their functioning 
as an expressive tool) and in the manner in which these policies structure the 
enforcement practices through which the criminal justice system administers cases o f 
interracial violence (ie. in their operation as preventive instruments). The root causes 
o f this failure, I would argue, he in the very same conditions which enabled hate 
crime laws to emerge, i.e. their being embedded within the new forms o f  electoral 
mobilization which dominate the post-1980 American politics o f  crime.
Section B o f  this chapter introduces the main features o f  hate crime legislation 
and pinpoints the distinctiveness o f  this new model o f  “pro-black” criminalization 
policy vis-a-vis the legal regime which it came to replace. Section C exp fores the 
relevant structural transformations which took shape in American politics between the 
mid 1960s and the early 1980s (the historical moment in which hate crime laws 
emerged). Drawing on sociological and political-science literature examining the 
historical dynamics which led to the collapse ofN ew  Deal liberalism and the rise o f
14 On the interplay between culture and economic forces in shaping the collective conditions o f  
African-Americans, see: W ilson (2009: chapter 1).
15 Cf. Fraser (2000).
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new forms o f  political mobilization around the problem o f  crime,16 I focus on the way 
in which these structural transformations affected the policy frameworks through 
which the problem o f black victimization has been tackled in late-modem American 
democracy. I show that, by the mid 1960s, American polities provided conditions 
which were conducive to the development o f  two policy frameworks which could 
have addressed the interlocking socio-economic and cultural aspects o f the problem o f  
black victimization more successfully than sentencing enhancement reforms. These 
were: the welfarist and anti-poverty mechanisms integrated into the Great Society 
project; and the judicial and administrative mechanisms introduced in order to extend 
due process rights to African-Americans. I analyze the driving forces which fed to the 
collapse o f  these two policy frameworks and delineate the character o f  the new policy 
frameworks that came to replace them (and within which hate crime policies are 
embedded). This analysis provides the historical groundwork for examining whether 
these policy frameworks are suitable to address the distinctive dimensions o f  current 
patterns o f  black victimization. This examination will be conducted in the following 
sections.
Section D analyzes the strategies o f  mobilization and the collective action 
frames employed by the anti-hate crime movement, and traces the institutional and 
organizational conditions which brought them about. In particular, I consider how the 
feet that the anti-hate crime campaign has been mobilized by single-issue 
organizations operating at the state and national levels shaped the outcomes o f  this 
campaign. The discussion integrates political science perspectives on the inherent 
limitations o f  “pro-victim” single-issue organizations (operating at the state and 
national levels) in generating effective policy responses, with sociological and 
historical perspectives on the transformative processes which led to the increasing 
prominence o f  single-issue organizations in shaping the agenda o f  racial egalitarian 
reform.
Section E explores how dominant representations o f  “hate crime” in legal and 
political discourses have reconstructed the meaning o f  the problem o f  black 
victimization. I pinpoint the political assumptions which underlie the way in which 
these discourses represent the causes o f  and solution to existing patterns o f  black
16 M ost notably, the works o f  Beckett (1997); Garland (2001a); Gottschalk (2006); Lacey (2008) and 
Simon (2007a).
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victimization. I then consider the nexuses between these forms o f  representation and 
dominant modes o f  defining the responsibilities o f  the State in neoliberal ideology. I 
show that dominant modes o f representing “hate crime” have obfuscated the 
relationship between patterns o f  black victimization and related patterns o f  racially 
skewed socio-economic marginalization.
Section F  depicts and assesses the implications o f  hate crime policies on the 
way in which cases o f interracial victimization o f  African-Americans are being 
administered by the criminal justice system. In particular, I consider whether these 
policies have been successful in minimizing the risks o f  discriminatory exercise o f  
discretion by crime enforcement agents, and whether they are suitable to enhance the 
deterrent effect upon would-be racist offenders. Drawing on studies o f the role played 
by determinate sentencing reforms in structuring the measure o f  control o f  different 
enforcement agents on the outcomes o f the criminalization process, I show that the 
focus o f  hate crime policies on constraining judicial discretion was misplaced. This 
focus had provided prosecutors and the police with new powers that are likely to be 
disproportionately employed against suspects belonging to racial and ethnic 
minorities. Drawing on empirical studies on the deterrent effect o f  determinate 
sentencing reforms, I challenge the suitability o f  penalty enhancement laws to 
produce a significantly greater deterrent effect vis-a-vis that produced by the original 
criminal offence.
B. Hate Crime Legislation: Its Forms and Distinctiveness Vis-a-vis 
Preexisting Frameworks for Penalizing Racist Violence
The main innovation of hate crime laws as a model o f criminalizing racist violence lies in the 
idea of penalty enhancement.17 45 out of 47 states which instituted hate crime laws adhered
17 One introductory clarification on the focus o f  my inquiry is in order. The discussion in this chapter 
focuses on penalty enhancement hate crime legislation, rather than on concurrent campaigns which had 
addressed the problem o f  hateful conduct but did not yield criminalization reforms. A s defined in the  
introductory chapter o f  this dissertation, the concept o f  criminalization encompasses the entire range o f  
practices through which societies identify and respond to “crime”. Penalty enhancement hate crime 
laws have transformed the processes through which the scope o f  criminal responsibility and penal 
liability for the perpetration o f “racist conduct” is defined in the US. Simultaneously with the campaign 
for enacting penalty enhancement reforms, a salient campaign against hate speech had also gained 
ground. However, the anti-hate speech movement did not focus cm mobilizing criminalization reforms, 
but rather on ‘softer’ forms o f  disciplinary regulation or tort remedies (e.g. speech codes in campuses 
or tort claims for the creation o f  hostile working environment in the workplace) (see: Gould (2005: 
chapter 3)). Among other things, the anti-hate speech campaign was channeled toward non-penal forms
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to the sentencing enhancement formula.18 This legislative formula provides that an offender’s 
penalty might or must be enhanced if  he intentionally selected his victim because o f  her 
actual or perceived racial identity. The sentencing enhancement process was designed 
differently by different states. However, three models are particularly common.19 Under the 
first model, proof o f a biased motive as an element of a criminal offence automatically adds a 
specific number o f years to the length of the sentence for the underlying offence. For 
example, Alabama’s hate crime statute stipulates a mandatory enhancement o f an additional 
fifteen years when a felony is proven to be motivated by the “victim’s actual or perceived 
race, cotour, religion, national origin, ethnicity, or physical or mental disability”.20 Under the 
second model, which is in force in California, a conviction under a hate crime statute 
simultaneously increases both the minimum and the maximum sentences for the underlying 
offence. Under the third model, the maximum penalty might be doubled or tripled if the 
underlying offence was motivated by racial bias. In all three variations, hate crime laws are 
shaped in accordance with a broader model o f criminal legislation which became immensely 
popular in the early 1980s: determinate sentencing reform. As I will show in this chapter, the 
embedding o f this new model o f “pro-black” criminalization within the broader structure of 
determinate sentencing policies generates many of the institutional pitfalls which hinder the 
realization o f  the egalitarian values which such legislation symbolizes.
In order to introduce the distinctive features o f hate crime laws, let us consider 
how they differ from the legal framework which governed the problem o f  black 
victimization prior to their enactment.
o f  redress because o f  its explicit emphasis on the problem o f  racist expression, rather than on racist 
acts. Because the distinction between speech and acts is deeply rooted in American First Amendment 
jurisprudence, this focus posed insuperable constraints on the development o f  a campaign for criminal 
regulation o f  hate speech. This has become apparent in 1992, when the Supreme Court struck down a 
municipal ordinance that outlawed cross burning (and other forms o f  expressive racist speech) on the 
ground o f  its selective targeting o f  particular forms o f  speech (See RA.V. v. C ity o f  St. P aul 505 U.S. 
377 (1992)). The decision o f  the Court in the following year to uphold the constitutionality o f  penalty 
enhancement hate crime laws further established the distinction between these two forms o f  anti-racist 
policymaking (see Wisconsin v. M itchell 508 U.S. 47 (1993)). The focus o f  this chapter on penalty 
enhancement hate crimes is consistent with the conventional separation between these two fields o f  
regulation by the major sociological studies on hate crime. See, e.g.: Jacobs and Potter(1998: 6-7).
18 ADL Approach to Hate Crime Legislation, at the official website o f  the Anti Defamation League 
(http://www.adl.org/99hatecrime/penaltv.aspV
19 Goldberger (2004: 453-455);
20 Ala. Code § 13 A -5 -13(1994).
21 Cal. Penal Code § 190(a) (W est 1999).
22 See, e.g . Ohio’s hate crime statute: Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 2929.14(A ) (Anderson 2003).
23 See, e.g. Florida’s hate crime statute: Fla. Stat. Ann. §§ 775.085, 775.082 (W est 2002).
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Before the enactment o f  hate crime laws, the problem o f  interracial 
victimization o f  African-Americans was primarily tackled through the enforcement o f  
generic criminal laws by individual states (e.g. prohibiting homicide, arson or 
vandalism). From 1968 onwards, particular forms o f victimizing African-Americans 
(ie. those amounting to interferences with “federally protected activities”) were also 
subjected to federal prosecution in cases in which state authorities eschewed pressing 
charges against the perpetrator. However, as we saw in the previous chapter, this 
mechanism remained largely unused by the federal government. As Sara Beale has 
noted, “on average, there have been four to six prosecutions per year under § 245, and 
that section has never generated more than ten cases per year”.24 In addition, these 
federal statutes covered a much narrower ambit o f  conducts vis-a-vis hate crime 
statutes. This is due to a threefold distinction between the formulation o f  “federally 
protected activities” legislation and that o f  hate crime laws. Each o f  these distinctions 
is emblematic o f  broader transformations which came to pass in America’s 
governmental structures and political culture from the mid-1960s to the mid-1980s.
The first distinction pertains to the way in which each o f these criminalization 
regimes framed the mens rea requirement o f  the offence. In contrast with hate crime laws, 
“federally protected activities” legislation did not refer to the perpetrator’s hateful 
motivation per se, but rather to his intent to prevent the victim from exercising her 
political or civil rights because o f  her racial identity.25 As we saw in the previous chapter, 
the list o f  activities enumerated under this federal statute included specific forms o f  civic 
participation from which blacks had long been excluded by means o f  intimidation and 
terror (e.g. voting, enrolment in public schools or jury service). Prima facie, this 
expansion o f  the mens rea requirement might be interpreted as evidence o f  greater social 
recognition o f  the wrongfulness and harmfulness embedded within all forms of racist 
conduct, not only those which directly impede the exercise o f  political and civil rights.
However, as I will argue in this chapter, a closer look at the full range o f  
transformations which took place in American politics and society in the wake of the “civil 
rights revolution” puts the explanatory power of this interpretation in question. As will be 
shown, in various other contexts of public policy (and crime policy in particular), we have 
actually witnessed a retreat o f legislatures and of the judiciary from attempting to restrain
24 Beale (2000: 1238).
25 Jacobs & Potter (1998: 38).
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forms o f state action which generated large-scale injurious effects on African-Americans. 
For the moment, I will simply highlight an important distinction between these two 
generations of “pro-black” criminal lawmaking. Whereas the “federally protected 
activities” provisions were incorporated within a comprehensive framework o f civil rights 
legislation, the introduction of hate crime laws did not constitute a part o f a broader legal 
reform which extended African-Americans’ civil and political rights beyond the penal 
sphere. As we saw in the previous chapter, the “federally protected activities” legislation 
emerged in order to provide the national administration with enforcement tools for 
guaranteeing the political and civic rights enshrined in two omnibus pieces o f civil rights 
legislation, the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the Voting Rights Act o f 1965. These criminal 
provisions symbolized the political commitment o f the federal administration to guarantee 
African-Americans’ equal rights in various areas of governmental responsibility (including, 
education, housing and voting). By contrast, I would argue, it is difficult to locate hate 
crime laws as an integral component within a broader array of policy measures through 
which policymakers seek to alleviate prevailing structures and symptoms of racial 
inequality in contemporary American society. Furthermore, an inquiry into the conditions 
of existence o f this legislation reveals that it draws on — and in turn serves to extend - 
broader legislative and ideological crusades which exacerbate racial polarization.
A second important distinction between the “federally protected activities” model 
and the hate crime model refers to the specific problem o f enforcement which each o f  
these policies aimed to remedy. The main purpose o f “federally protected activities” 
legislation was to establish a permanent mechanism o f  federal intervention in cases in 
which patterns o f  institutional racism at the state and local levels deprived African- 
American victims from their rights to equal protection. As shown in the previous chapter, 
this legislation was embedded within a much broader array of doctrinal, statutory and 
administrative measures through which the federal administration sought to incentivize 
Southern authorities to ameliorate patterns o f  institutional racism26 By contrast, hate 
crime laws do not establish a complementary mechanism for tackling cases o f  de facto 
de-criminalization as a result o f  institutional racism Rather, they apply to conducts which 
are already prosecuted under generic criminal laws, and seek to provide prosecutors and 
judges with severer penal sanctions so as to reflect the aggravated gravity o f  bigotry- 
motivated perpetration o f  such conducts.
26 See discussion in chapter4, section FI.
155
In this chapter, I will consider whether the enhancement of penalties for bigotry- 
motivated offences was indeed necessitated in order to remedy systemic enforcement 
deficiencies. I will argue that, in an era o f  over-criminalization27 and the standardization 
of increasingly harsh penal responses to both violent and non-violent crime,28 it is 
doubtful whether this reform was responsive either to a problem of insufficient coverage 
of substantive criminal codes or to insufficient penalization o f  such offences. Moreover, I 
will show that, when placed within this broader terrain o f  criminal justice policy in an era 
of over-criminalization and excessive penalization, it is arguable that hate crime laws 
expose African-American (as well as Latino-Americans) suspects and defendants to 
greater risks o f disproportionate sentencing. These risks are increased because o f the 
tendency o f  determinate sentencing reforms to provide prosecutors with decisive 
influence on sentencing outcomes, a pattern which serves as one o f die main driving 
forces o f the system’s tendency to produce disparate results across class and racial lines.29
The third distinction between these two “pro-black” criminalization regimes is 
that, whereas “federally protected activities” legislation was predominantly concerned 
with the problem of racism, hate crime laws are aimed at mediating a broad variety of 
social antagonisms. For example, in the District o f Columbia, hate crime laws provide for 
enhanced punishment if the perpetrator selected his victim on the ground o f her personal 
appearance, marital status, education, or army service.30 The tendency to expand the 
scope and range of protected categories o f victims raises a cluster o f  doctrinal and 
political difficulties.31 In the context o f  this study, our main concern is that the 
juxtaposition o f  the problem o f  black victimization with such disputable forms of 
identity-based victimization leads to the eclipsing o f the distinctive dimensions o f  race as 
a unique source o f  social and political inequality in American society, past and present. In 
particular, it will be shown that legal and political discourses o f  hate crime work to 
obfuscate the socio-economic forces which shape current patterns of black victimization.
27 Stuntz(2001).
28 Whitman (2004: chapter 2).
29 Davis (2007).
30 Jenness (2001: 301-306).
31 Jacobs and Potter (1998: 16-21).
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C. The Structural Transformation of the Political Opportunity 
Structure for the Mobilization of “Pro-Black” Criminalization Policy
In order to understand why, in the early 1980s, American society established a new 
regime for penalizing racist violence, we have to understand how structural political and 
social changes which crystallized during this period enabled and constrained the forms o f  
mobilization available to “pro-black” activists. In this section, I will analyze the structural 
transformations which took place in American politics between the mid 1960s and the 
1980s, the historical moment in which hate crime laws emerged.
Cl. The Demise ofNon-Punitive Frameworks for Tackling the Problem of Black Victimization
C l.L  The Crisis o f  Welfarism and the Dismantling o f  Policy Frameworks for 
Tackling the Socio-Economic Dimensions o f  Black Victimization
As we saw in the previous chapter, between 1930 and 1968, the dominant ideological and 
institutional structures o f  America’s governmental system had been radically transformed 
throughout the entrenchment o f the New Deal model of government This model grew 
out of the disillusionment (which became widespread during the Great Depression) with 
the suitability o f  nineteenth century laissez-lare ideology to manage the crisis tendency o f  
modem capitalism and thus to secure political and social stability. Gradually, the principle 
that underpinned the 1930s New Deal programs -  namely, that a systematic reliance on 
the steering and regulatory tools o f government (and, particularly, o f  the federal 
government) was necessary for tackling the nation’s core social problems -  was adopted 
in one area o f public policy after another.32 Within the New Deal model government, 
welfare policies and institutions were perceived as pivotal to governmental efforts to 
ameliorate socio-economic inequalities and to alleviate levels o f  crime and social 
disintegration. The legitimacy o f  this political vision was consolidated throughout the 
post-War decades amid sustained economic growth, inproved standards o f living, and 
high levels of employment buttressed by Keynesian demand management.
32 Brinkly (1989).
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Although the trajectory o f  New Deal liberalism was not always consistent with 
the racial egalitarian cause,33 in the early 1960s, it came to converge with civil rights 
reformism This convergence, I argued in the previous chapter, was brought about by 
the interlocking operation o f  a set o f  historical pressures, including Cold War dictates, 
the thriving ofblack insurgency, and the dynamics o f  electoral competition between the 
two major parties. Operating in tandem, these pressures impelled the Johnson 
administration to invest an unprecedented amount o f  political capital in committing 
itself to both anti-poverty and racial justice projects. This commitment was symbolized 
by the introduction in 1965 o f the Great Society programs, which sought to alleviate the 
symbiotic problems o f  racial inequality, urban poverty and urban crime.
By positioning the triangle ofpoverty, crime and racial inequality in the forefront 
of its domestic policy agenda, and asserting that these problems could be diminished 
through extending federal spending on welfare and perfecting the strategies o f 
governmental intervention, the Great Society programs epitomized the most ambitious 
formulation o f  the ‘social engineering’ elements of New Deal governance.34 Inevitably, 
this ambitious undertaking also rendered the New Deal model more vulnerable, in the 
event o f  failure to meet its targets, to criticism o f  the structural ineompeteney o f welfarist- 
centred crime policy to deliver greater security and social stability.
The decline o f public faith in the efficacy of the New Deal model began to be 
noticeable in the 1970s. As David Garland depicts the decade’s public mood:
“It turned out that the institutions designed to meet the population’s need for 
housing, or health care, or education, or social work or income support had a 
tendency to discover more and more unmet needs, so that the problem appeared 
to become larger rather than smaller. So although budgets were regularly 
increased...welfare problems did not get ‘solved’: instead they became an
33 In particular, the incorporation o f blacks hto the framework o f  American welfare state was uneasy and double- 
edged. Essentially, this b  because, as Gosta Bping-Andersen p hpohts,“the welfare state b not just a mechanism 
that htervenes in, and possibly corrects, fire structure o f  iiequaliy; it b , in is  own right, a system o f  stratification”. 
Esping-Andersen (1990: 23). In the American context, the rejection o f  the universal model o f  entilement to 
welfare rights, and the institutionalization o f  complex means-testing eligibility rules, made welfare recpients 
particularly vulnerable to stigmatization. Because blacks were disproportionately represented as beneficiaries o f  
welfare programs, such stigmatization inevitably came to be iitertwined with racialized cultural and policy 
assumptions. See: Lieberman (1998: 4). The explosive undercurrents o f  such stigmatization would eventually be 
reflected in the distinction between the deserving and undeserving poor that rationalized the Reagan ist assault on 
the premises o f American welfarism. See: Quadagno (1994).
34 Glazier (1987: 4).
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object of policy and administration and, in the process, became more visible,
r
more complex and more demanding on state funds”.
Consequently, although various indicators attested to noteworthy accomplishments o f the 
Great Society experiment, public opinion increasingly came to adopt the view that American 
public policy had become trapped in a self-reinforcing process o f constant bureaucratic 
expansionism which adversely perpetuated the very problems it purported to eliminate. This 
paved the way for the rise of a foil-blown anti-welferist ideology which posed a fierce challenge 
to the legitimacy ofNew Deal policy creeds. Reagan’s femous jest that “some years ago, the 
federal government declared war on poverty, and poverty won”, encapsulated this 
increasingly widespread view on the legacyofthe Great Society experiment.
Concurrently, the faith in the capability o f enlarged welfarist expenditures to 
reduce crime rates was also crumbling. Crime rates rose sharply and consistently from 
1960 onwards, with the highest rise between 1965 and 1973.38 These figures led to a 
new strand o f anti-welfarist argument which used these increasing crime figures as a 
salient yardstick o f  governmental failure. The neoconservative attack not only contested 
the suitability o f  welfare-centred crime policy to reduce victimization rates. It argued 
that benevolent welfare policies were in feet increasing crime levels by eroding the 
values o f  individual responsibility and personal accountability. In the criminological 
literature, this approach was most prominently elaborated by James Q. Wilson. In his
influential 1975 Right-Realism manifesto Thinking About Crime, Wilson urged
“10policymakers to abandon the “illusive” quest for detecting the root causes o f crime. 
He dismissed the effort to reduce crime rates through attempting to transform broad 
socio-economic structures (an objective which, in his view, is unattainable as it depends 
on various determinants which are impervious to governmental influence). As an 
alternative, he called for the creation o f  stronger disincentives to engage in crime. Such 
disincentives would include the introduction o f tougher penal responses and the
35 Garland (2001a: 93).
36 A s Katz (1989: 113) points out, “between 1965 and 1972, the government transfer programs lifted 
about half the poor over the poverty line.. .Medicare and Medicaid improved health care dramatically. In 
1963, one o f  every five Americans who lived below the poverty line never had been examined by a 
physician...by 1970, the proportion never examined had dipped to 8 percent...between 1965 and 1972, 
poor women began to consult physicians far more often during pregnancy, and infant mortality dropped 
33 percent” .
37 Quoted in Garland (2001a: 240).
38 Garland (2001a: 90).
39 Wilson (1975).
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enhancement o f  the probability of their imposition (e.g. through more rigorous police 
apprehension and the creation o f  determinate sentencing schemes). The validity o f  this 
critique o f  welfarist-centred crime policy seems contestable, as might be demonstrated 
by the relative success o f  established welfare states (belonging to the universal and 
corporatist models in Esping-Andersen’s typology)40 in keeping crime rates relatively 
tow throughout the move to late-modemity.41 Nevertheless, Wilson’s blueprint 
emerged as a primary source o f  inspiration to American policymakers.
With the decline o f  public faith in the suitability o f  welfarist interventions to 
provide a remedy to the core social problems which engrossed American society in the 
late 1960s, policymakers turned to invest in new political projects which would prove 
more effective in sustaining government’s authority and in boosting politicians’ 
electoral appeal The economic downturn o f  the mid 1970s, coupled with increasing 
competitiveness o f  developing economies abroad, triggered structural changes in modes 
of capitalist production.42 As industrial manufacturing came to be increasingly 
dependent on capital mobility and technological advancement, the focus o f  the Great 
Society programs on the reintegration o f  the economically and socially excluded 
became inconsistent with the demands of an emerging post-industrial market economy.
With the demise o f  the Great Society project, the reliance on redistributive 
welfarist reforms as a central component o f  anti-crime policy would be discredited and 
gradually abandoned. From 1980 onwards, a radically alternative political paradigm 
would come to dominate American politics. This paradigm would preclude the 
development o f  welfarist frameworks for tackling crime in general As I will show 
below, because patterns o f  victimization among African-Americans are particularly 
interwoven with socio-economic factors, this paradigm shift would prove detrimental to 
the development o f  adequate responses to the problem o f black victimization. At the 
same time, the new paradigm (which combines anti-welfarist with a ‘tougft on crime’ 
posture) would facilitate the emergence o f  penalty enhancement hate crime laws.
40 Esping-Andersen (1990).
41 Lacey (2008:27-29); Reiner (2007a: 103-110). It is important to note that the comparative and 
historical analysis o f  crime rates is vexed by measurement problems. However, the figures seem to 
plausibly fit the typology between different configurations o f  welfare states, as developed in Esping - 
Andersen's work.
42 Harvey (2005: chapter 3).
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C l.2. The Crisis o f  Due Process Reformism and the Dismantling o f  Procedural 
Frameworks for Tackling the Under-Protection o f Black Victims
By the mid-1960s, legislative and judicial due process reforms had become increasingly 
interwoven with racial egalitarian projects. As shown in chapter 4, the post-War 
impetus o f  due process reform was part and parcel o f  the efforts o f  New Dealers to 
modernize the local and state agencies which served at the front line o f tackling the 
nation’s core social problems.43 These efforts became profoundly interwoven with 
racial egalitarian projects because o f  the arrant failure o f  Southern policing, prosecution 
and imprisonment institutions to approximate the standards established throughout the 
rest o f  the nation, de jure if not de fee to.44 As shown in the previous chapter, the 
introduction o f “federally protected activities” legislation was embedded within a much 
broader array o f judicial and legislative measures aimed at reforming the modus 
operandi o f  Southern crime control institutions (e.g. laws and doctrines conferring the 
right to counsel for indigent defendants; procedural rights; bail reforms).
Any attempt to understand the origins o f  the crisis o f  “pro-black” due process 
reformism has to take into account a peculiar feature o f the way in which such reforms 
were pursued. Although remarkable reforms o f  criminal procedure were initiated by the 
legislative and executive branches during the post-War decades,45 public opinion came 
to identify the Supreme Court as taking the helm in pushing towards the extension o f  
procedural rights. Beginning with the 1961 landmark decision in Mapp v. Ohio 
(providing that the exclusionary rule on the use o f  unconstitutionally obtained evidence 
should bind in state courts),46 and continuing with the constitutionalization o f  the right 
to counsel (on appeal47 as well as on trial48) and the right to trial by jury,49 the Warren 
Court established a string o f  constitutional doctrines that constrained the exercise o f  
discretion by crime enforcement authorities. The Warren and Burger Courts’ capital 
punishment jurisprudence, most notably the landmark decision in Furman v. Georgia,50
43 Simon (2005: 309).
44 Klarman (2000); Feeley and Rubin (1998).
45 A s Lain (2004) show s, in various areas o f  due process reforms, state legislatures moved faster and 
more radically than the Warren Court.
46 367  U.S. 643 (1961).
47 Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963).
48 Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
49 Duncan v. Louisiana, 391U.S. 145(1968).
50 Furman v. G eorgia, 408 U.S. 23 8 (1972).
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likewise reflected judicial concern with the possible impact o f  institutional 
discrimination on racial disparities in capital punishment.51
The Court had usually steered clear of explicitly referring to the racial 
implications o f  these landmark decisions. However, it was noted both by contemporary 
observers and by legal historians that the focus on criminal procedure was motivated by a 
deliberate judicial strategy.52 This strategy sought to retain the role o f the Court as a 
central policymaker on civil rights issues while avoiding another cycle o f  political 
resistance akin to the fierce Southern defiance that followed its 1950s landmark decisions 
in Brown53 and Baker54 The solution was to tackle institutional racism by means of 
constraining discretionary governmental practices that were particularly prone to racial 
abuse rather than by tackling racial segregation head on.55 However, in the mid-1960s, 
amid the rise in recorded crime rates and racial riots across the nation, this strategic plan 
backfired. It created an adverse boomerang effect and rendered the Court vulnerable to 
exceptionally fierce criticism. This criticism overplayed the constraining inpact inposed 
by these new procedural doctrines on the actual practices o f  crime enforcement agencies, 
and presented the Court’s putative ‘soft on crime’ stance as the major obstacle which 
prevented focal, state and federal governments from eliminating the threat posed by crime 
and criminals to law abiding citizens.56
As we will see in the next two sections, the backlash against the progressive 
procedural jurisprudence epitomized by the Warren Court led to the rise of new strands of 
conservative crime jurisprudence and populist penal lawmaking. While future Courts 
(dominated by conservative-appointed justices) refrained from overturning any major 
precedent o f the Warren Court’s due process revolution, they significantly curtailed the 
scope o f these rights and entirely abandoned the strategic path o f  promoting racial justice
51 See M cC leskey  v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 330-2 (1987) (Justice Brennan, J., dissenting) (suggesting 
race played a role in Furman decision).
52 Kahan & Mears (1998: 1155-1159).
53 Brown v. B oard o f  Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
54 B aker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
55 Kahan & Means (1998: 1155-1159).
56 Simon (2007a: 116). A s William Stuntzhas argued, these accusations are ungrounded, among other 
things, because the Court has left entire fields o f  crime enforcement impervious to constitutional 
intervention (e.g. the content o f  offence definitions; proportionality; and noncapital sentencing). Thus, 
for Stuntz, the Warren Court's legacy helped to create the post-1980 pathologies o f  overcriminalization 
and overpenalization in two complementary ways. First, it provided politicians with new incentives to 
engage in crime policymaking; second, it channelled their efforts towards those policy fields which 
remained beyond the reach o f  criminal intervention (thus impelling legislatures to focus on creating 
new offences, enhancing penalties, and engaging in sentencing reforms). Stuntz (2006).
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through criminal justice reform.57 At the same time, legislatures at both national and state 
levels had turned with new vigour to mobilizing a public outcry against ‘soft on crime’ 
judges. As a result, this second policy path for tackling the problem o f  black victimization 
(ameliorating patterns o f institutional racism which generate racially-skewed outcomes 
and thus preclude the equal protection of black victims) had also become highly impeded. 
At the same time, determinate sentencing reform flourished, as it provided legislatures 
with high-profile opportunities to demonstrate their concern for public safety through 
statutory curtailment o f  the scope o f judicial discretion in sentencing. The bipartisan 
support for determinate sentencing reform would provide black activists with favourable 
opportunities for mobilizing sentencing enhancement hate crime laws. However, it was 
embedded within a broader structure o f  political rhetoric, policymaking strategies, and 
institutional arrangements which produce starkly racially-skewed outcomes at virtually 
every aspect o f crime-enforcement (as well will see in section C4 below). Because 
processes o f criminalization consist o f  various layers o f  institutional decision-making, 
the feet that the contemporary “pro-black” criminalization policy was channelled to the 
field o f  penalty enhancement (and remained largely ineffective in reducing patterns o f 
police and prosecutorial decision-making which produce racially disparate outcomes)59 
has vastly inhibited its transformative effect.
C2. The Radalized Origins o f the Advent o f the New Politics o f Law and Order: The 
Formative Years. 1964-1980
The structure o f  contemporary law and order politics took shape during the period 
1964-1980. Two historical processes were particularly consequential throughout this 
formative period. First, anti-crime policymaking had moved from the periphery o f  the 
electoral arena to its very centre. As David Garland notes, whereas, from the 
Progressive era to the mid seventies, the shaping o f  crime policy was devolved to 
professional experts and administrators, from this period onwards, “legislators were 
becoming more ‘hands on’, more directive, more concerned to subject penal decision­
making to the discipline o f  party polities and short-term political calculation”.60
57 Bilionis (2005).
58 Lacey (1995).
59 As I will show  below, section F o f  this chapter.
60 Garland (2001a: 13).
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Second, the traditional ideotogical divides between the two major parties had 
dissolved. In the post-War years, public debates on crime policy reflected a 
controversy between two competing approaches. For social-democratic liberals, the 
problem o f  crime was conceptualized as a symptom o f  more structural social 
pathologies associated with poverty and inequality. Accordingly, proponents o f  penal 
welfarism argued that crime rates were reducible by extending public spending on 
anti-poverty measures and the rehab ilitation o f  convicted offenders.61 As noted above, 
by the 1950s, New Deal liberals had also become increasingly concerned with the 
tendency o f  the criminal justice system to over-target racial minorities and the poor 
and thus to entrench deep seated patterns o f  social inequality.62 The centring o f  due 
process rights on the social-democratic agenda reflected this recognition (which had 
also found more radical expressions, e.g. the campaigns for de-criminalization and the 
de-institutionalization o f  penal policy, mobilized by New Leftists).63 On the other 
hand, the conservative approach expounded “crime” as a product o f  individual choice 
and moral wrongdoing. Derivatively, conservatives stressed the need to erect tougher 
disincentives which would dissuade would-be perpetrators from committing offences.
By contrast, the post-1970s American politics o f  crime has been shaped by the 
convergence o f  the ideotogical positions o f  both major parties around the etiological 
narrative and policy solutions which were hitherto advocated by conservatives. As will be 
shown, this process o f convergence resulted in a constant escalation o f  the punitiveness o f 
criminal justice policymaking. In what follows, I will briefly explore the processes which 
shaped these two constitutive features o f  contemporary American politics o f  crime. Our 
discussion will give particular emphasis to the way in which these changes were shaped 
(inter alia) by strategic forms o f political mobilization aimed at appealing to voters who 
opposed civil rights reforms. This emphasis is important for understanding the racialized 
character of contemporary law and order politics. I will then show how this racialized 
character inhibits the receptiveness o f  contemporary law and order politics to most forms 
of “pro-black” reform. This observation will serve as a basis for raising a cluster o f  
distinctive questions regarding the uneasy relationship between hate crime laws and racial 
justice.
61 Garland (2001a: chapter 2).
62 Simon (2004).
63 Christie (1986).
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Although, as Marie Gottschalk shows, the agitation o f  law and order concerns 
served as a vehicle o f  political mobilization in various early epochs in American 
history,64 the first systematic attempt to test the strategic fecundity o f  “governing 
through crime” in a national electoral campaign was introduced by Republican 
candidate Barry Goldwater during his 1964 presidential contest with Lyndon 
Johnson.65 The fact that this electoral experiment emerged at the very same year in 
which civil-rights reformism had moved to the forefront o f  the domestic agenda o f the 
Democratic Party was no coincidence. Goldwater’s efforts to distinguish himself from 
his contender by emphasizing that he “would not support or invite any American to 
seek redress...through lawlessness...and violence”66 formed a part o f  a deliberate 
strategy to appeal to Southern Democratic voters who had become alienated by their 
Party’s leaning toward the racial egalitarian cause. In scorning the receptiveness o f  
the Johnson administration to civil rights protests as precipitating “lawlessness and 
violence”, Goldwater introduced into the national political debate a set o f  rhetorical 
themes that had been strategically utilized by earlier generations o f  Southern white 
supremacist politicians. As we saw in chapters 2 and 3, the claim that the political 
emancipation o fb  lacks would yield a surge o f  crime and disorder was invoked by the 
antebellum planters’ elite, and then by post-bellum Redeemers, in order to undermine 
the legitimacy o f  Northern intervention in Southern racial affairs. Resonating with 
social Darwinist theories o f  blacks’ innate violent propensities, this argument 
continued to rationalize Southern resistance to desegregation throughout the first half 
of the twentieth century. With the escalation o f  black protest against desegregation 
and disenfranchisement in the 1950s, Southern authorities represented civil rights 
protest as eroding respect for law and order, and used such apologetics to rationalize 
the use o f  exceptionally repressive measures to quell black protest. However, 
although Goldwater’s strategy proved consequential in attracting a larger portion o f  
white Southerners to the ranks o f  the national Republican Party, it ultimately foiled to 
establish law and order as a powerful wedge issue which would destabilize the 
Democratic voting base, as is evident from Johnson’s landslide victory.
The feet that a political platform that was so utterly rejected in 1964 played a 
decisive role in securing the Republican triumph in the following presidential elections,
64 Gottschalk (2006: chapter 3).
65 Beckett (1997: 31).
66 Quoted in Beckett (1997: 31).
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and has been an indispensable component o f  the policy platforms o f  both major parties 
ever since, demonstrates the profound impacts o f  the tumultuous period o f  1964-1968 
on the nation’s political consciousness.67 Starting with the Watts riots o f  1965, which 
erupted only one week after the signing o f  the Voting Rights Act into law, more than 
400 recorded riots flared up in black urban ghettoes across the nation. The riots 
dramatically polarized public opinion on the next steps that should follow the landmark 
civil rights legislation o f  the mid 1960s. In the eyes o f  African-Americans, the riots 
reflected a spontaneous protest against the incompleteness o f  these recent reforms. They 
were intended to communicate to a Northern audience that the nation’s reckoning with 
the problem o f  racial inequality could not end with the abolition o f  formal segregation 
and the provision o f  equal opportunity and voting rights. A sustainable solution to the 
nation’s racial wounds would also have to address the forms o f  informal racial 
discrimination which permeated Northern economy and society. Conversely, in the eyes 
of the majority o f  whites, the riots provided an alarming signal that their receptiveness 
to racial reformism generated unreasonable expectations among African-Americans. 
Then followed a cyclic dynamic o f  the radicalization o f  blacks’ racial consciousness 
(including the revival o f  black separatist ideology), on the one hand, and o f  the 
diminishing legitimacy o f  black protestors’ grievances, on the other hand. The 
disruptive potential o f  Northern black insurgency became particularly salient since it 
constituted part o f a wider ‘cycle o f  protest’ that surged across the nation. By 1968, 
college campuses became sites o f  mass demonstrations (particularly against the 
Vietnam War and against nuclearization) and an emerging hippie culture was calling 
into question various sorts o f  political and social authority.69
This political climate was conducive not only to the elevation o f  the law and 
order issue from the periphery o f  national political debate to its very centre. It also 
facilitated the proliferation o f  a new conservative discourse which amalgamated 
opposition to the furthering o f  civil rights reforms with calls to ‘get tough’ on crime. 
The electoral fecundity o f  this discourse was proven for the first time in the watershed 
presidential contest o f  1968. In an attempt to win white working class voters, Nixon 
“promised to reverse the soft approach allegedly practiced by ‘bleeding heart’, ‘do-
67 Flamm (2005); Edsall & Edsall (1992: 48-9).
68 Marx (1998: 240); Button (1978).
69 Tarrow (1989).
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gooding’ liberals”70 with an uncompromising response to urban crime and disorder 
Under Democratic administrations, Nixon complained, “we didn’t have strong enough 
law enforcement officials; we didn’t have strong enough laws; we didn’t 
have...judges who...clearly realized that it is important to strengthen the peace forces 
as against the criminals in this country”.71 As an alternative, the Republicans 
advocated the introduction o f  measures such as mandatory minimum sentences, fewer 
pre-trial releases, and the nomination o f  judges who espouse to a “tough on crime” 
approach. The Democratic Party dismissed these challenges and sought to contain 
them by reaffirming the principles o f  penal welfarist orthodoxy. However, this 
strategy proved ill-advised from an electoral perspective. The failure o f  the 
Democratic anti-crime platform was dramatized when its National Convention, held
TXin Chicago, was severely interrupted by the outbreak o f  fierce focal racial riots.
The political forces pushing toward the ideological convergence between the 
anti-crime platforms o f  the two major parties were associated with the de-alignment o f  
the New Deal coalitioa The civil rights reforms championed by the Johnson 
administration consolidated the bond between African-American voters and the 
Democratic Party. However, paradoxically, it was this consolidation o f  blacks’ party- 
affiliation that diluted their political leverage, as they were no longer identified as swing 
voters for whose allegiance the two major parties had to compete.74 At the same time, 
blue-collar whites, who, throughout the New Deal era, were considered the solid core o f  
the Democratic voting base, became increasingly alienated by the Party’s racial 
reformist platform They were now identified as a stockpile o f  volatile swing voters, 
who felt particularly concerned over the problems o f  urban crime and disorder and 
welfare abuse. Taken together, this reconfiguration o f  the Democratic voting base 
entailed both an increasing polarization between its two main electoral blocks, and a 
remarkable shift in the balance o f  electoral leverage between these two constituencies.
By appropriating the law and order issue in the late 1960s, Republicans were 
able to realign a new winning coalition by drawing masses o f  social conservative 
blue-collar voters across the partisan aisle. This trend became noticeable with Nixon’s
70 Marion (1994: 69).
71 Quoted in Marion (1994: 71).
72 Marion (1994: 70).
73 Ibid, 72.
74 Stuntz(2008: 2006).
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appeal to the “silent majority” It became more conspicuous throughout the 1980s 
when “Reagan Democrats” played an important part in securing his landslide 
victories. Reagan’s crusade against ‘welfare abusers’75 and ‘soft-on-crime judges’, 
and his effective agitation o f  working-class resentment o f  the alleged symbiosis 
between welfare dependency and criminality, were pivotal to his success in aligning a 
coalition o f  fiscal conservatives and blue collar workers.
The success o f the Republican Party in mobilizing around the law and order issue 
was gradually met by a strategic inclination o f the Democratic Party to abandon the 
principles of welfarist crime policy.76 Between 1972 and 1980, while liberal Democrats 
controlled Congress, two-thirds o f state legislatures, and the large majority o f 
governorships and big-city mayoralties, the nationwide prison population rose by 50 
percent.77 Although less inclined to advert to racist codes while debating crime-related 
issues, Democratic candidates had steered clear o f associating themselves with policy 
campaigns which challenged the creeds o f the new ultra-punitive crime policy. Following 
this twofold structural change (the increasing salience o f law and order politics, and the 
collapse o f the ideotogical divides between the two major parties), late-modern American 
politics o f  crime became a locus o f fierce “race to the top” contests o f  penal populism. 
The structure of the political debate poses decisive electoral imperatives which dissuade 
legislatures from questioning the premises o f ‘tough on crime’ policymaking.78 Within 
this context, criminal lawmaking is no longer exclusively -  or even predominantly - 
concerned with devising the most effective policy interventions for minimizing the scope 
of some unwarranted social phenomenon. Rather, “governing through crime” became a 
generic frame o f  social construction which serves to advance a wide range o f  independent 
electoral and administrative goals.
75 One o f  Reagan’s favourite anecdotes was a story o f  a Chicago welfare queen with “80 names, 30 
addresses, 12 Social Security cards and a tax-free income o f  $150,000” . Quoted in Edsall & Edsall 
(1991: 148).
76 Interestingly, the process which eroded the ideological divide between the Tory and (New-)Labour in 
British politics o f  crime followed a similar dynamics. See: Lacey (2008: 173-178).
77 Stuntz(2008: 2008).
78 Lacey (2008: 69-70).
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C3. 1980 and Beyond: The Rise o f Victim-Centred Lawmaking from the Ashes o f the 
“Civil Rights Revolution ”
Since the early 1980s, the American politics o f  crime has been dominated by a new 
model o f lawmaking, which is specifically geared to facilitate legislatures’ 
capitalization on the electoral rewards o f  penal populism. This model combines two 
fundamental aspects. First, it is premised upon a selective mode o f framing the 
putative needs and interests o f  crime victims. These needs and interests are portrayed 
as revolving around the imposition o f  harsher penalties and the curtailment o f 
offenders’ procedural rights. Non-retributivist forms o f  tackling crime and particularly 
its socio-economic dimensions are systematically nudged out o f  the current agenda o f  
victims’ rights politics.79 The second aspect pertains to the intensive use o f  the 
symbolic figure o f  the victim o f  crime as an idealized political subject whose 
experiences and vulnerabilities are treated as defining the needs o f  the citizenry at 
large. As we will see in Parts D  and E  o f this chapter, these two features o f 
contemporary criminal lawmaking have been highly influential on the contours o f 
hate crime legislation. The limited suitability o f  hate crime legislation in addressing 
the needs o f  African-American victims reflects the generic flaws o f  this model o f  
“pro-victim” lawmaking.
The impetus for the surge o f “pro-victim” criminal lawmaking has been provided 
by the victims’ rights movement, which emerged in the mid 1970s.80 The Movement 
grew out o f  concerns with the failure o f modem procedural doctrine to accommodate the 
legitimate needs o f  victims in the criminal process. However, while political concerns 
with the suffering o f  crime victims could have been translated into various forms o f  
policy responses (including, for example, the extension o f social services to victims and 
their families; investing in restorative justice schemes and other deinstitutionalized forms 
of responding to crime),81 in the US, the concept of victims’ rights has been framed in a 
very narrow fashion. The dominant way o f  interpreting the meaning o f victims’ rights in 
American law was encapsulated by the preamble to California’s Bill o f  Victims Rights. 
Enacted in 1982, the preamble defined the term victims’ rights as reflecting an
79 Gottschalk (2006: 114).
80 W eed (1995).
81 Christie (1977).
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“expectation that persons who commit felonious acts causing injury to innocent victims 
will be appropriately detained in custody, tried by the courts, and sufficiently punished so 
that the public safety is protected and encouraged as a goal of highest importance”.82
The wave o f procedural and penal reforms passed over the last decades in order to 
institutionalize this notion o f  victim’s right was predominantly couched in terms o f  a zero- 
sum-game in which victims are believed to be empowered mainly by the harshening of 
penal standards and the curtailing o f procedural rights. The repertoire o f symbolic 
legislation enacted in the name o f  concern with victims’ rights currently encompasses 
draconian penal policies such as ‘three strikes and you’re out’, ‘10-20-life’, ‘adult time for 
adult crime’ and various other examples o f ‘sound-bite’ driven policies.83 Another salient 
strand o f “pro-victim” legislation has introduced severe post-detention civic sanctions on 
convicted offenders. For example, the Work Opportunity and Personal Responsibility Act 
of 1996 banished most ex-convicts from Medicaid, public housing, and related forms o f  
welfare assistance.84 The scope and range o f  felon disenfranchisement laws has also 
expanded dramatically over the last three decades.85 ha 2003, nearly 4 million Americans 
had temporarily or permanently tost their right to vote, o f  which 1.39 million had 
already served their sentence in full (in ten states, all ex-felons are disenfranchised for
O/'
life). While these sanctions are presented as “pro-victims”, their suitability to 
discourage recidivism and thus to serve their purported protective goals seem highly 
questionable. More plausibly, their tendency to erect insuperable barriers to ex- 
offenders’ integration into normative social and economic networks serves the very 
opposite purpose and thus exacerbates levels o f  crime and victimization.
The trajectory of the determinate sentencing reform movement reflected the broader 
process whereby the ideotogical divides between the two major parties had been dissolved 
in favour of a bipartisan adherence to populist forms o f “pro-minority” policymaking. In the 
early 1970s, the indeterminate sentencing model (which ptoyed a pivotal role within the 
system o f  penal welfarism)88 came under attack from both left and right. However, by and 
large, the sweeping sentencing reforms institutionalized over the next decades were
82 Cal. Cons. Art. I, S. 28.
83 Garland (2001a: 13).
84 Wacquant (2002: 58).
85 Behrens (et al, 2003).
86 Wacquant (2002: 58).
87 Western (2006: 5).
88 Garland (2001a: 34-35).
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insulated from the concerns raised by leftists. The left critique o f indeterminate sentencing 
was threefold. First, liberal critics pinpointed the susceptibility of open-ended sentencing 
guidelines to create opportunities for discriminatory exercise o f discretion by judges and
OQ
parole boards. Second, liberal penal theorists argued that indeterminate sentencing 
schemes compromised principles o f  proportionality and just desert.90 Third, New Left 
critics scorned the intrusive and paternalistic aspects o f the power/knowledge matrixes 
which modem penology, and the correctional bureaucracies to which it gave rise, brought 
with them in treating offenders as objects o f rehabilitative interventions.91 As Michael 
Tonry has noted, none of these three aspects o f the left critique o f  indeterminate sentencing 
frameworks appear to have been ameliorated following the massive institutionalization o f  
sentencing reforms throughout the last three decades 92
Instead, the late-modem agenda o f  determinate sentencing reform focused on 
amplifying the conservative critique o f  progressive due process judicial reformism. This 
critique portrayed the individualized nature o f judicial policymaking as tilted towards 
an imbalance between the rights o f  criminal defendants and the rights o f law-abiding 
citizens to be “free from violent crime”. As we saw earlier (section C l.2), the political 
salience of this critique was boosted in the mid-1960s amid the coupling o f  climbing 
crime rates and an increasingly visible involvement o f  the Supreme Court in 
incorporating racial egalitarian principles into constitutional procedural doctrine. Also, I 
have argued that these forms o f  electoral mobilization have been profoundly interwoven 
with strategic efforts to appeal to counter-egalitarian popular sentiments by means o f  
revivifying the age-old association o f  blackness with criminality.93 Thus, much as, for 
the Warren Court, the focus on due process jurisprudence was motivated by strategic 
efforts to engage in racial egalitarian judicial policymaking without endorsing race- 
specific campaigns, so, for conservative politicians, calls to rein injudicial involvement 
in crime policymaking served as a legitimate medium for appealing to anti-civil rights 
constituencies. In this context, it is unsurprising that, as Michael Tonry has shown, 
determinate sentencing reforms disproportionately targeted forms o f  criminality which 
are particularly prevalent amongst urban black males.94
OQ .
American Friends Service Committee (1971).
90 Von Hirsch (1976).
91 Foucault (1979).
92 Tonry (2005: 1249-1260).
93 Wacquant (2002: 55-56).
94Tomy (1995: 104-116).
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Concurrently with the wave o f  ‘tough on crime’ criminal lawmaking, American 
politics o f  crime became inexorably unreceptive to policy initiatives that focus on the 
socio-economic causes and implications o f  victimization. The peculiarity of this 
development has been illuminated by Marie Gottschalk in her comparative study o f  
collective action frames used by victims’ advocacy movements in USA and in Europe.95 
As Gottschalk demonstrates, in continental Europe, victims’ rights movements have put 
much greater emphasis on extending social and therapeutic services for victims and their 
families, and did not at all focus on demands to curtail offenders’ procedural or welfare 
rights. These disparities shed light on the extent to which the development o f  adequate 
policy responses to the problem o f  victimization in the US have been constrained by the 
limited degree o f social consensus around the principles and institutions o f  the we 1 fere 
state (in comparison with the universal or corporatist models o f  welfarism which prevail 
in continental Europe).96 This feature has channelled both activism and policymaking in 
this field towards symbolic -  rather than material -  avenues o f  reform and redress. As 
Robert Elias has shown, although social assistance provisions were also included in many 
pieces o f victims’ rights legislation, the actual realization o f  such provisions has been 
severely compromised by problems o f  underfunding and the general deterioration o f the
0 7welfare institutions through which these services had to be delivered.
As I will argue, because patterns o f  minority victimization are profoundly 
interwoven with patterns o f  socio-economic deprivation, the structure o f  American 
victims’ rights discourse has highly constrained the development o f  adequate policy 
responses to the problems o f  minority victimization (and particularly, given the 
disproportionate rates o f poverty among African-Americans, to the problem o f  black 
victimization). This observation might be obscured by the favourable conditions 
provided by this structure to the mobilization o f  hate crime policies.
C4. The New Politics o f Crime and the Demise o f the “Civil Rights Revolution”
As American legislatures became engrossed in a race-to-the-top competition over the 
introduction o f  harsher penal responses to crime, the nation’s prison population began 
to grow at rates that appear to be unparalleled in both historical and comparative
95 Gottschalk (2006: 81).
96 Epsing-Anderson (1990).
97 Elias (1983: 213-24); see also Gottschalk (2006: 89).
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perspective.98 Between 1970 and 2003, the American prison population multiplied 
sevenfold.99 Today, the US boasts the highest incarceration rates per capita 
worldwide.100 The revanchist character o f  contemporary American crime policy is 
also reflected in various other contexts. Since the resurrection o f  the death penalty 
after a de-facto moratorium on executions between 1967 and 1977 (and declining 
rates o f  death penalty during the preceding decades), the number o f  offenders 
sentenced to death has climbed and the rates o f  executive pardons have substantially 
declined.101 Following the spread o f determinate sentencing reforms, average 
sentencing periods in the USA have became significantly bnger than in other Western 
democracies.102 These penal trends have been fuelled by the constant expansion o f the 
scope and range o f  criminal laws over the last decades.103 Though the problem o f  
over-criminalization harks back to the heyday o f  New Deal regulatory expansion104 
(and, in some contexts, was arguably noticeable already in the nineteenth century),105 
its scale has grown immensely in recent decades.106 The rise in pub he spending on 
prisons,107 and the tried-and-tested electoral rewards o f penal populism, impel 
politicians to reconstruct virtually all sorts o f  social problems in terms o f  crim e.108
African-Americans have been at the receiving end o f these penal trends. 
Although the overrepresentation o f  African-Americans in jails and prisons has been 
persistent since the post-Reconstruction era, the racial composition o f  America’s 
carceral institutions has become dramatically uneven throughout the last third o f  the 
twentieth century. In 1960, before the ‘civil rights revolution’, blacks amounted to 37% 
of state and federal prison inmates. Their proportion had climbed to 41% by 1970,44% 
by 1980, 49.2% by 1990 and 49.9 by 1995109 (throughout that period, the proportion o f 
blacks in the overall population remained stable around 13%). O f course, the staggering
98 Western (2006: 12-15).
99 The prison population in 1970 was 198,831; by 2003, the number stood at 1387,269. Stunz (2006: 
789).
100 Bosworth (2009: 3).
101 Banner (2002: chapter 10); Steikerand Steiker (1995).
102 For example, as o f  1999, average sentences in France amounted to 8 months vs. 34 months in USA 
(Whitman, 2003: 70).
103 Stuntz(2001: 512-522).
104 Kadish (1963).
105 Novack (1996).
106 Stuntz (2001:512-522).
107 Between 1972 and 2001, overall public spending on prisons had suiged 455% in constant dollais. See: Stuntz 
(2001: 784).
108 Simon (2007a: 4).
109 Tonry (2005: 1255).
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mounting-up o f  the overall inmate population during that period makes these figures 
even more dramatic. The black/white incarceration ratio for males has grown from3:l 
in 1968 to 7 .6:1 in 2002110 (the black/white incarceration ratio for women by 2002 was 
5.5:1).111 In 1994, one in every three black men between the ages o f  eighteen and thirty- 
four was under some form o f  correctional supervision.112 This rendered the odds of an 
African-American man going to prison today higher than the odds he will go to college 
or get married.113 It is striking, and sad, that these figures refer to a generation o f  
African-Americans that were born immediately after the “civil-rights revolution”.114
In Malign Neglect, Michael Tonry rebutted two conventional explanations o f  
the aggravated overrepresentation o f  African-Americans behind bars.115 According to 
Tonry, the post-1970s prison-boom did not reflect an increasing frequency or more 
violent patterns o f  black criminality. Nor was it a product o f  a more biased application 
of judicial discretion in individual cases.116 Rather, the figures appear to be directly 
linked to the introduction o f  a cluster o f  criminalization and sentencing policies that 
disproportionately targeted forms o f  criminality associated with black offenders. Such 
policies were firstly introduced as part o f  the War on Drugs in the 1980s (most 
notably, the crack/cocaine 100:1 sentencing ratio).1,7 From the 1990s, the widespread 
introduction o f  novel and stricter policing strategies for addressing street crime (e.g. 
‘zero-tolerance policing’ and other derivatives o f the proliferating ‘broken windows’ 
theory)118 and o f  determinate sentencing schemes (e.g. habitual offending laws)119
■I
have produced starkly disparate outcomes across racial and class divides. As Tonry 
argues, even if the introduction o f  these policies was not motivated by sheer racial 
animus, it surely reflected a reckless disregard o f  the foreseeable consequences o f  
aggravating racial disparities in incarceration. The fact that these policies have not 
been repealed in the face o f  overwhelming evidence o f  their racially-skewed
110 Gottschalk (2006: 3). This figure stands for the number o f  inmates per a 100,000 population.
111 Tonry (2005: 1256).
112 Lacey (2008: 124).
1,3 Simon (2007:141).
114 The most comprehensive empirical study o f  the links between mass incarceration and other patterns 
o f  racially-skewed socio-econom ic exclusion can be found in Western (2006: chapter 1); for a 
qualitative informed study o f  this questions, see: Anderson (2009).
l l5 Tomy (1996).
116 Tonry (2005: 1256).
117 Sklansky (1995); Cole (2000: 141-144).
118 Harcourt (2001).
119 Zimring (et al, 2001).
120 Cole (2000: 148-149); Mauer (1999: 136-137).
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application provides a troubling illustration o f  the extent to which the structure o f  
contemporary American politics o f  crime preclude legislatures from actively and 
openly supporting the types o f  criminal justice reforms which are most necessary for 
ameliorating the selective targeting o f  black offenders by the criminal justice system
The overwhelming incarceration rates among African-Americans have dramatic 
detrimental effects on their prospects of social and economic integration. These effects 
are produced both by formal legal restrictions on ex-convicts’ civic entitlements, and, 
more pervasively, by informal and thus more elusive forms o f  exclusion. The most salient 
illustration o f the power o f  “pro-victim” legislation to serve as a constitutionally 
permissible form o f  large-scale exclusion o f  citizenship rights is provided by felon 
disenfranchisement laws.121 By 1997, felon disenfranchisement laws banned one in seven 
black men nationwide from voting.122 However, it seems that these figures reveal only the 
tip o f a very big iceberg: the whole range o f  informal exclusionary effects which emanate 
from the hyper-incarceration of young African-American males. In various contexts o f  
everyday life, the framing o f  racial animus as a problem o f crime-govemance serves to 
legitimate exclusionary practices which were de jure outlawed in the wake o f  the “civil 
rights revolution”. For instance, while formal racial segregation is passe, de facto 
segregation in public education brought about by white flight from black-concentrated 
residential areas is still pervasive,123 and “efforts to keep largely minority group city 
residents out o f  suburban shopping centers, parks, and residential communities” have 
been normalized.124 A sizable body of quantitative and qualitative studies has 
documented the devastating collateral impacts o f  mass incarceration on black
t^r #
communities and families. Studies examining the inpact o f  mass incarceration on 
patterns o f  racial exclusion from the labour market have shown not only that ex-convicts 
are de facto prevented from gaining access to secure jobs,126 but also that the common 
association o f  blackness with “dangerousness” (which has, of course, deep roots in 
American history but has been revivified by the pervasive racialization o f  the late-modern 
politics o f  crime) diminish the entry-level prospects o f African-Americans who do no
121 Roberts (2003: 1291-1293).
122 Wacquant (2002: 58).
123 M essay (1995).
124 Simon (2000: 1125).
125 Chesney-Lind and M auer(2003); Roberts (2003: 1281 -1297); G ear (2009).
126 Western (2006: chapter 5).
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have a criminal record.127 Thus, in the very same period in which “diversity rhetoric” has 
gained currency in constitutional jurisprudence, mainstream political discourse and even 
in managerial literature,128 the disproportionate targeting o f  African-American males by 
criminalization policies serves to reinforce forms o f  exclusion which probably would not 
have been openly tolerated in virtually any other public policy context.
The feet that the hate crime campaign, an unprecedented ly prolific form o f  “pro­
black” criminal legislation, had flourished within the political environment which have 
produced these relentless forms o f  racial exclusion should prompt us to consider a range 
of distinctive questions regarding the functions played by hate crime reforms in 
contemporary American democracy. Have the prolific hate crime campaigns served to 
displace other forms o f  “pro-black” activism and policymaking in the criminal justice 
field? To what extent are political and legal discourses o f  hate crime successful in 
spotlighting the nexuses between the problem o f  black victimization and other patterns 
of unequal enforcement o f  criminal laws (as well as the collateral impacts o f  such 
unequal enforcement)? How does the embedding o f  the hate crime criminalization 
regime within the broader ideological and institutional structures which produce such 
disparate outcomes affect its performances in protecting black victims?
CS. Summary: Toward an Understanding o f the Impact o f the Restructuring o f  
American Politics on the Contours o f Hate Crime Policy
To summarize, in this section I have delineated the broad structural transformations 
which took shape in American politics o f  crime over the last decades. I showed that, 
throughout this period, the two major policy domains which dominated the agenda o f  
racial egalitarian reform in the mid 1960s (namely, redistributive welfarism and due 
process reform) were dismantled. Their decline was intertwined with the rise to 
dominance o f  a new strand o f  criminal lawmaking, revolving around the introduction 
of more severe and more determinate penal responses to crime in the name o f  concern 
with victim’s rights.
In the next sections, I will show that the rise o f  this new strand o f  “pro-victim” 
lawmaking has facilitated the emergence o f  hate crime laws in two major ways. First, it
Pager (2007); Roberts (2003: 1293).
128 Edelman (et al, 2001: 1590).
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created an institutional setting which was conducive to the mushrooming o f  single-issue 
organizations which focus on the problem o f  victimization and effectively mobilize for 
policy reforms. However, our analysis in this section has shown that, because o f  the 
intrinsic limits of this strand o f “pro-victim” legislation, the range o f  policy remedies 
available to black activists mobilizing around the problem o f  victimization was very 
narrow (in essence, it is confined to legislative models which can affirm legislatures’ 
“tough on crime” credentials). Second, as our discussion in section C4 has 
demonstrated, the exacerbation o f  racial disparities in incarceration created a set o f  
incentives to enact a new legal framework which would reconcile “tough on crime” 
policymaking with the nation’s self-image as a multicultural democracy. Insofar as the 
enactment o f hate crime policies has indeed served to reinforce public belief in the 
racial neutrality o f  contemporary law and order politics, it had double edged effects on 
the struggle for racial justice.
The broad structural shifts delineated in this section created a climate which was 
conducive to the refraining o f -  and to the designation o f new penal responses to - the 
age-old problem o f  white supremacist violence. The institutional design and ideotogical 
representations which have shaped this new legal framework were mediated by the 
strategic activities o f  the advocacy organizations and policymakers who have conjointly 
shaped the hate crime agenda. In the next sections, I move to took more closely at the 
underpinnings, patterns and effects o f these strategic activities of legal mobilization.
D. The Organizational and Institutional Underpinnings of the 
Reframing of Black Victimization as an Instance of “Hate Crime”
D l. The Emergence of New Forms ofMobilization around the Problem of Black Victimization
As Kendal Broad and Valerie Jeimess have demonstrated, the idea o f devising a distinctive 
legislative framework for penalizing the victimization o f minority groups began to gain 
ground on the agenda o f progressive social movements in the early 1980s. In older to 
facilitate that goal, a coalition of advocacy organizations from within the feminist movement, 
the gay and lesbian movement, the black community, the Jewish community, and the 
disability rights movement, began to mobilize at both state and national levels. These
129 Broad and Jenness (1997: chapter 6).
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campaigns sought to prod greater public awareness o f forms o f  victimization which had 
long been under-enforced by the criminal justice system, and to persuade legislatures to 
enact a new legislative model which would remedy these traditional patterns o f unequal 
protectioa
The strategic focus o f the hate crime campaign on demanding the introduction o f 
penalty enhancement as the primary redress for the ordeal o f minority victims was by no 
means inevitable. In the 1970s, anti-violence organizations within the gay and lesbian 
movement, the feminist movement and the black community predominantly focused on 
establishing victim-assistance services, conducting educational campaigns, working with 
focal level crime enforcement agencies, and documenting and publishing data on the 
extent and patterns of anti-minority violence. These initiatives were mostly conducted at 
the focal level, and were thus better positioned to link the problem o f  under-protection 
with related symptoms o f  inequality which members o f minority community had faced. 
As explained by political scientist Lisa Miller, locally based interest groups “are more 
likely to represent interests that are decoupled from bureaucratic imperatives”. 130 In the 
context o f  race in particular, they are also more likely to represent the concerns of citizens 
whose crime victimization is coupled with concern for community members who may be 
over-targeted by anticrime strategies.131 Indeed, as shown by Broad and Jenness, the 
forms o f  mobilization which emerged around the problem o f minority victimization in the 
1970s gave strong emphasis to linking the under-protection o f  minority victims to related 
issues o f relative disadvantage, such as police brutality and underrepresentation in 
legislative and administrative institutions.132
Distinctively, the campaigns which fed to the passing o f the hate crime legislation 
in the 1980s were primarily conducted at the state and national levels, and spearheaded by a 
network o f new advocacy organizations which focused exclusively on the problem of “hate 
crime”. As Broad and Jenness have shown, the accelerated development o f hate crime 
activism and policymaking since the 1980s was enabled by a process o f ‘coalition building’ 
in which these organization highlighted the similarities between the forms o f victimization 
to which different minority groups were subjected. Instances o f racist, homophobic, anti- 
Semitic and sexist violence were now reframed as related symptoms of a national epidemic:
130 M iller(2008: 23).
13! Ibid, ibid.
132 Broad and Jenness (1997: chapters 3, 4).
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intolerance toward “those who are different”.133 While such processes of ‘coalition 
building’ increased the effectiveness o f the hate crime campaign, it led to the obfoscation of 
the specificity o f  the causes and patterns o f the forms o f  violence to which each o f  these 
groups is subjected. The anti-hate crime campaign aligned the problem o f  black 
victimization with forms o f violence which do not appear to be closely associated with 
patterns o f socio-economic deprivation (e.g. homophobic and anti-Semitic victimization). 
At the same time, the problem o f  blacks’ vulnerability to interracial victimization was 
dissociated from the most acute patterns o f social marginalization and discrimination which 
are sui generis to the context o f  American race relations (e.g. the way in which racialized 
stereotypes o f black dangerousness permeate police culture or the way in which the 
impaired legitimacy o f  the criminal justice system within black communities impedes 
African-American victims from resorting to police protection).134
The particular mode o f framing the problem o f  “hate crime” and o f  designating 
penalty enhancement as a suitable solution was responsive to the new opportunities which 
the proliferation o f ‘law and order’ politics provided for mobilization around the problem 
of victimization. However, the forces which facilitated the integration o f  “pro-black” 
organizations into this campaign were also associated with endogenous changes which 
took place within the field o f  black activism itself These changes stemmed from the 
dismantling, between mid 1960s and the early 1980s, of the underlying demographic 
and political conditions upon which the effective struggle o f  the Civil Rights Movement 
rested. The removal o f  these conditions had constrained the ability o f  black activists to 
set a distinctive agenda o f  “pro-black” criminal justice reform, and impelled them to 
align themselves with organizations mobilizing around other forms o f  minority 
victimization. I now move to elaborate on this point with some historical detail.
133 Levin and McDevitt (2002). The hyperbolized and a-historic synopsis o f  this oft-cited book may 
illustrate the dominant tone o f  much o f  the public debate on hate crime in America. “ Hate 
crim es...were once considered the rare illegal actions o f  a small but vocal assortment o f  extremists 
who thrived on hating minorities. No more. In this new book...these most-recognized authorities and 
media commentators reinterpret this scourge o f  our generation - hatred based on race, religion, sexual 
orientation, ethnicity, gender, and even citizenship. In the aftermath o f  the worst act o f  terrorism in this 
country's history- the bombing o f  the World Trade Center on September 11, 2001- the authors probe 
the causes and characteristics o f  such acts o f  hatred and, most vitally, their consequences for all o f  u s ”. 
(Ibid, back cover).
134 Cole (2000: 11-12).
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D2. The Organizational Underpinnings o f Black Mobilization around the Problem of 
“Hate Crime”: From Grassroots Mobilization to Single-Issue Advocacy Organizations
As we saw in chapter 4, the problem of racist violence formed one of the most focal 
grievances around which the Civil Rights Movement mobilized The Movement effectively 
attracted ptiblic attention to the way in which the victimization o f African-Americans in the 
South exhibited an appalling symptom of a systemic political problem: the failure o f the 
national administration to intervene in the brutal repression o f blacks’ civil rights in the South. 
The Movement emphasized that the plight o f black victims could only be ameliorated by 
means o f abolishing the way in which race relations had been structured under the Southern 
racial caste system I have argued that this strategic mode of framing defocused various other 
forms of racial harm which prevailed in Northern society. Nevertheless, it constituted an 
exemplar of an effective integration of a “pro-minority” criminalization campaign into a 
broad and internally coherent (even if  incomplete) vision o f  structural racial reform
I have also shown in chapter 4 that the Movement’s success in establishing itself 
as a recognized collective actor mobilizing on behalf o f  the shared interests o f all 
African-Americans was made possible by a cluster o f specific conditions which became 
fully materialized in the post-War decades.135 For example, the spatial concentration o f 
blacks o f  virtually all classes in the segregated urban ghettoes cultivated the formation 
of communal institutions (most notably, black churches, colleges, and bcal chapters o f  
the NAACP). In turn, these institutions served as vehicles for forging collective 
political identity and for recruiting leaders and foot-soldiers for the Movement’s protest 
activities (in particular, direct action and marches). However, as Loic Wacquant has 
argued, over the last decades, growing gulfs between the black bourgeoisie and the 
black proletariat (and sub-proletariat) have taken shape, amid the relocation o f  the 
former from the heart o f  the ghetto to sate lhte black neighbourhoods in its periphery or 
to (white dominated) suburbs.136 In light o f  the transition from welfarist-centred to 
penal-centred governance o f  the everyday life o f  the ghetto’s population,137 today the 
urbanblack ghetto no longer serves as a vehicle ofpositive social cohesion, “a sheltered 
space for collective sustenance and self-affirmation in the face o f  hostility and
135 See section B o f  chapter 4.
136 Wacquant (2001: 103-108).
137 Beckett & Western (2001); Wacquant (2008).
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exclusion” 138 Rather, Wacquant points out, it has “devolved into a one-dimensional 
machinery for naked relegation, a human warehouse wherein are discarded those 
segments of urban society deemed disreputable, derelict, and dangerous” 139
The political conditions that facilitated the convergence o f  interests between the 
Movement and the federal administration in the 1960s had also evaporated. The 
electoral leverage of the black vote was curtailed in light o f  the destabilization o f the 
New Deal coalition (and the increasing need to appeal to blue collar median voters).140 
The ideotogical orientation o f  the federal administration was itself radically transformed 
following the Reagan revolution, which had discredited the very creeds upon which the 
New Deal model was premised. As a result o f such processes which decomposed the 
conditions upon which the post-War flourishing o f  black activism rested, the contours 
of the struggle for racial justice have been radically altered. The post-War terrain o f  
black activism was spearheaded by an allied network o f  organizations and elites, 
capable o f  mobilizing large masses o f  black protestors around a relatively coherent 
agenda o f  racial reform. This agenda encompassed a relatively wide range o f  issues, 
spanning such problems as discrimination in housing, education, voting, victimization, 
and equal opportunity at large. To emphasize, the relative coherence o f post-War black 
reformist agenda was not a product o f  the absence o f  oppositional voices or 
disagreements within the black community.141 It was enabled by the capability o f  this 
allied network o f  elites and organizations to effectively control the way in which the 
goals and strategies ofblack emancipation were prioritized and represented.
By contrast, the late-modern terrain ofblack activism is no longer orchestrated 
by a centralized leadership. Rather, it encompasses a plethora o f  specialist organizations 
which promote a much more fragmented agenda o f  progressive initiatives. This shift 
entails the declining strategic priority o f grassroots mobilization as a focal vehicle for 
forging racial solidarities and for expressing the ‘collective will’ o f  African-Americans, 
and the increasing salience o f  single-issue advocacy organizations as the dominant 
definers o f  the goals and strategies o f  the contemporary pursuit o f  racial justice.142 The
138 Wacquant (2001: 107).
139 Ibid, ibid. See also Wacquant (2004: 6).
140 A s explained in my discussion above, see section C l.
141 Haines (1988).
142 This development is pronounced not only in the field o f  black activism, but also in various other 
fields o f  progressive mobilization. For a variety o f  perspectives on the origins and consequences o f  this 
paradigm shift, see: Scheingold & Sarat (2004).
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limitations imposed by this structural transition on the prospects for egalitarian reform 
were discussed by Joel Handler in an influential critique o f  the legal campaigns 
mobilized by the new generation o f  civil rights activists.143 In Handler’s view, “the 
scattered set of issues, complaints and demands” mobilized by present-day racial 
reformers “do not constitute a unified force or vision...there is no comprehensive 
design o f  a just order as the necessary and desirable outcome o f  revolutionary or 
reformist change”. 144 ‘The absence o f ‘alternative’”, he emphasizes, “is not just a 
matter o f  the failure o f intellectual imagination or political vision”.145 Rather, he opines, 
it emanates from the structural constraints imposed by the post-modern condition- with 
its focus on challenging the epistemological premises o f  ‘grand’ emancipatory visions 
or the ontological integrity o f  the “political subject” which they seek to empower - on 
the very possibility o f  articulating a viable platform o f emancipatory political change.
Handler’s argument can be criticized for downplaying some of the welcome 
aspects of this development. As was convincingly demonstrated by black feminists’ 
reflections on the Movement’s legacy, the coherence o f the post-War vision o f black 
emancipation was enabled by the marginalization o f the distinctive experiences o f women 
within the African-American community.146 Indeed, it seems that such marginalization is 
inescapable for any attempt to assert the shared interests and aspirations o f individual 
members of an imagined community and to translate these inspirations into legalistic 
forms. Nevertheless, I believe that Handler’s critique usefully draws our critical attention 
to the risk that the fragmentation o f  modem social movements will end up producing a 
cacophony o f critical voices, none o f which possesses the ability to transcend beyond its 
particularistic viewpoint and to trigger a weighty challenge to white hegemony.
A neo-Marxist interpretation o f  Handler’s observation can further illuminate the 
driving forces which constrain the likelihood that such ‘cacophony ofblack voices’ will 
bring about structural egalitarian reforms. It is arguable that, although the fragmentation 
o f modem (first wave) social movements make room for representing a wider spectrum 
o f marginalized voices, the forces that push these campaigns toward conformity with 
the interests and priorities o f  hegemonic groups and governmental institutions remain
143 Handler (J992).
144 Ibid, 720.
145 Ibid, ibid.
146 Crenshaw (1991).
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powerful.147 This observation can be supported by a bulk o f  studies in social movement
literature showing how social movements’ organizations (SMOs) operating at the
national and state levels are increasingly compelled to align themselves with dominant
1^0
institutional and ideotogical forces. This greater dependency stems from the 
increasingly competitive multi-organizational environment wherein these organizations 
compete over the scarce resources (both symbolic and material) required for attracting 
media attention to their cause and for inducing legislators and state bureaucracies to 
sponsor their policy proposals. For example, studies o f the dynamics between different 
SMOs within a social movement show that, since these organizations often draw from 
the same pool o f philanthropic, volunteering and governmental resources, they are 
inclined to adapt their mode o f  framing the problem so as to maximize the media 
exposure of their campaign. In a media-driven policy context such as anti-crime 
legislation, these adaptations increase the likelihood that their proposed solution will be 
endorsed by legislators or become eligible to be supported by governmental funding 
schemes.149 Thus, the fecundity o f ‘law and order’ as an issue o f  media obsession and 
frenzy legislative reforms not only provided policymakers with new incentives to 
endorse the anti-hate crime campaiga It also impelled black activists to prioritize the 
problem o f  victimization, and to insulate it from other symptoms o f  racial inequality, in 
order to frame it in a way which conforms to the representational logic o f  media and 
political representations o f  crime.
D3. The Institutional Underpinnings of Black Mobilization around the Problem of “Hate 
Crime”: The Pails ofSinzle-Issue Mobilization around Crime at the State and National Levels
As Lisa Miller has recently showed, single-issue organizations mobilizing around the 
problem of crime at the state and national levels are particularly prone to adopt collective 
action frames which reflect the electoral interests of legislatures and the administrative 
priorities o f criminal justice institutions.150 As Miller demonstrates, the salience of crime as 
an issue of intense mobilization at all three levels of American governmental system (but
147 Cf. Marcuse (1986)[1964],
148 This issue has been particularly emphasized by the resource mobilization approach to the study ofsocial 
movements. See:Zald and McCarthy (1994).
149 See Herbert Haines’ fascinating study o f  the competition between radical and mainstream strands in 
the black movement o f  the 1960s, and in the post-1970s anti-death penalty movement. Haines (1988); 
(1996).
150 Miller (2008).
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especially at the state and national levels) generates a systematic bias in favour o f  repeat 
players, and excludes from the policymaking process the perspectives o f citizens living in 
the closest proximity to crime, as these usually lack the organizational resources or the 
professional capacity to mobilize at the state and national levels.151 As crime policy is 
increasingly shaped by legislative agendas that are geographically and psycho logically 
distanced from the realities o f victimization and crime enforcement as experienced by poor 
minority groups, even “pro-minority” reforms are likely to be framed in a way which 
reproduces the dominant cultural forms of contemporary politics o f crime, e.g. the zero- 
sum-game formula through which victims’ rights and public safety are believed to be 
sustained through the infliction o f  harsher penalties on offenders.152 This zero-sum-game 
formula then serves to obscure the highly intricate manner in which focal communities in 
crime-ridden urban areas experience the problem of crime. These communities suffer 
pervasive rates o f victimization but also from the collateral damage caused by mass 
incarceration to spouses, mothers, children, and ex-prisoners.153 As Glen Loury observes, 
“the young black men wreaking havoc in the ghetto are still ‘our youngsters’ in the eyes 
o f many o f  the decent poor and working class black people who are often their 
victims...for many o f  these people the hard edge of...retribution is tempered by 
sympathy for and empathy with the perpetrators”.154 Members o f  these communities are 
therefore less likely to support harsh penal measures, as they are all too aware of the 
tendency o f  excessive imprisonment to reinforce (rather than eliminate) both crime 
levels and other forms o f  social harm.155
Miller’s account implies that, ironically, the proliferation o f  the anti-hate crime 
campaign on the agenda o f  state and national legislatures has impeded the ability o f  
interest groups mobilizing on behalf o f poor black communities at the local level to 
initiate more pragmatic and holistic responses to the problem o f minority victimization. 
This observation is particularly unfortunate given the feet that, as shown by Broad’s and 
Jenness’ analysis o f  the early stages in the campaign o f  the gay community against 
homophobic violence, by the 1970s, the organizational infrastructure for mobilization 
around problems o f  minority victimization at the local level started to gain ground.156
151 Ibid, 6.
152 Ibid, ibid.
153 Chesney-Lind and Mauer(2003); Roberts (2003: 1281-1297); W estern (2006: chapter6).
154 Loury (1995: 301-302).
155 Clear (2009).
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Kristin Bumiller has depicted a similar (and concurrent) trajectory in the development 
of feminist mobilization around the problem o f  domestic violence.157 In the 1970s, 
feminist activism in this field was dominated by grassroots and local organizations 
which focused on establishing shelters for battered women and rape crisis centres. As 
her study shows, from the early 1980s onwards, advocacy organizations have 
increasingly focused on incorporating feminist concerns into the institutionalized 
schemes o f  welfare and criminal justice bureaucracies. Among other things, this focus 
led to the introduction o f  excessively harsh penal policies (e.g. “no drop” and 
mandatory arrests) and to the enhancement o f the interventionist capacities o f  welfare 
bureaucracies in battered women’s lives (with markedly disparate effects across racial 
and class lines).158
As the terrain of “pro-minority” criminalization policymaking becomes dominated 
by single-issue organizations concentrating on lobbying for the introduction o f  longer and 
more determinate sentences by state and national legislatures, these campaigns appear more 
successful in generating high-profile legal reforms. However, their success in generating 
policy reforms that are suitable to ameliorate the scale o f victimization among the most 
socio-economieally marginalized segments o f these minority groups seems questionable. 
Moreover, given the highly inflexible structure of sentencing enhancement laws, it is 
arguable that hate crime policies might hinder the development of more suitable responses 
to minority victimization at the community level. For example, it is likely that, given the 
formal and informal constraints posed by sentencing enhancement laws on judicial 
discretion,159 courts have been less likely to make room for the development o f  
restorative justice and alternative models o f community-based dispute resolution that seek 
some type o f reconciliation between victim and offender. The de-formalization o f the 
restorative justice model facilitates the personalized encounter between the victim and 
her harmer.160 This might provide a more suitable platform for facilitating the victim’s 
recovery and for reducing the perpetrator’s likelihood o f  reoffending.161 Indeed, 
studies o f  experimental uses o f  restorative justice mechanisms for tackling inter-group 
violence at the community level have provided evidence o f  the positive performances
157 Bumiller (2008).
158 See also Crenshaw (1991: 1262-1265); Mills (2003); Coker(2004).
159 Abrahamson (et al, 1994).
160 Braithwaite (1989); Christie (1977).
161 Dubber(2002: 167).
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of such processes in facilitating these goals.162 The arrested development o f  
restorative justice mechanisms for tackling “hate crime “illustrates the tendency o f 
contemporary American crime policy to prevent actual victims from influencing the 
administration o f  their case insofar as their preferences do not conform to and 
reaffirm the ultra-punitive creeds o f professed “pro-victim” ideology.
In the next section, I move to analyze the processes o f  framing through which 
the political meanings o f the problem ofblack victimization have been reconstructed 
by the anti-hate crime campaign. This examination will show how the structural 
constraints imposed by the organizational and institutional determinants discussed 
above inhibited the success o f  this campaign in illuminating the links between the 
problem ofblack victimization and related patterns and structures o f  racial inequality.
162 Coates (et al, 2006).
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E ,The Ideological Underpinnings and Implications of the Framing of 
“Hate Crime” in the Context of Racial Justice
Justifications o f  penalty enhancement hate crime laws attempt to establish a twofold 
proposition. First, they assert that “hate crime” is different from -  and more grievous than 
-  “ordinary crime”. Second, they contend that infliction o f  longer and more determinate 
sentences on bigotry-motivated perpetrators would better serve the general aims o f  
punishment (including, deterrence, retribution and incapacitation). As Heidi Hurd and 
Michael Moore have shown, competing arguments on why it is justified to inflict harsher 
penalties on bigotry-motivated offenders reflect broader controversies in normative 
criminal theory regarding the parameters which determine the relative gravity o f offences 
(e.g. harmfulness vs. culpability) and the social goods which punishment is believed to be 
able to advance (e.g. prevention o f  future harm vs. conveying moral disapproval o f  the 
offence).163 In this section, I will offer a critique o f  one o f  the most influential frames for 
justifying hate crime laws, namely, justifications predicated on the harm principle. 
Proponents o f penalty enhancement hate crime law have put forth two distinct (albeit 
complementary) theses regarding the aggravated harmfulness o f  “hate crimes”. The first 
thesis provides that the nature o f  the injury sustained by the immediate victim o f  “hate 
crime” exceeds the harm caused by a parallel crime — in the absence o f  biased 
motivation.164 The second thesis stresses that, independently o f  its impacts on the 
immediate victim, “hate crime” (unlike “ordinary crime”) produces palpable harm on the 
broader target community to which the victim belongs.165 On the basis o f these theses, 
various agents taking part in constructing the meaning and legitimacy o f  hate crime laws 
(including, scholars, advocacy organizations, judges, and legislatures) have justified the 
need to install penalty enhancement mechanisms in order to reflect the aggravated 
harmfulness o f such conducts.
The arguments which will be criticized in this section were presented in order to 
rationalize a particular policy reform, rather than with the aim o f  elaborating a full- 
fledged theory o f  the role o f  the State in minimizing social inequalities. However, 
because public debates over hate crime policy serve as a salient site in which American 
society deliberate on questions of race, equality and justice, these influential arguments
163 Hurd and Moore (2003: 1082).
164 Lawrence (1993: 323).
165 Lawrence (1999: 41-42).
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played a focal role in reshaping the racial consciousness o f  American society in the 
post-civil rights era. The inquiry offered in this section attempts to decipher the political 
messages which legal and political discourses o f  hate crime produce in order to probe 
their ideological functioning within late-modern American politics. What are their 
implicit assumptions regarding the way in which the State can and ought to minimize 
the problem o f  minority victimization? How do they portray the nexus between current 
patterns o f  black victimization and broader patterns o f  racial inequality in contemporary 
American society? What do they suggest about the relationship between current trends 
in American race relations and earlier chapters in the nation’s racial history? Do they 
displace more useful frames for thinking about these questions?166
EL A Critique ofthe *Direct Harm ’ Rationale o f Hate Crime Laws
The proposition that “hate crime” causes greater psychological trauma and emotional 
harm to the victim herself provides a common justification for penalty enhancement 
laws.167 In its landmark decision upholding the constitutionality o f penalty enhancement 
hate crime laws (Wisconsin v. Mitchell), the Supreme Court endorsed this rationale as the
1 ARmajor ground which authorizes the State to penalize bigotry-motivated conducts. The
persuasiveness o f this conventional rationale depends on two main conditions. The first 
concerns its empirical credibility, a question which remains in dispute. While some 
empirical studies found that the traumatic effects suffered by victims o f “hate crime “were 
similar to those suffered by victims o f comparable violent assaults,169 others have 
supported the ‘aggravated harm’ thesis.170 Second, as Heidi Hurd and Michael Moore 
have argued, even if we accept the claim that a larger than average proportion of victims 
of hateful violence suffer greater emotional harm, there remains the question o f whether 
this finding vindicates a blanket enhancement o f  penalties for all instances o f such 
viofence or simply requires the imposition of harsher penalties in those specific cases in 
which aggravated emotional harm had been proved.171 The normative and policy
166 It should be noted that, although harm-based justifications arguably constitute the most influential 
rationale o f hate crime laws, it would be insightful to inquire into the ideological assumptions and 
implications o f other rationales as well. I will not be able to pursue this line o f inquiry here, mainly due 
to considerations o f scope and focus.
167 Hurd and Moore (2003: 1085-1093).
168 Wisconsin v. Mitchell, 508 US. 476 (1993).
169 E.g. Bams and Ephross (1994).
170 E.g. Levin and Mcdevitt (1993).
171 Hurd and Moore (2003: 1088).
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dilemmas which arise while choosing between these two models should not be 
considered in the abstract. One of the main considerations which should be taken into 
account is the way in which each o f  these models shape the structure o f  the 
criminalization processes through which instances o f  interracial violence are tackled by 
the criminal justice system. As I will show in section F o f this chapter, the statutory 
inposition o f  penalty enhancement (vis-a-vis individualized consideration o f  the 
emotional harm caused to the particular victim as an aggravating factor throughout the 
sentencing process) considerably increases the control o f prosecutors on the outcomes of 
the criminalization process. This form of institutional design, I will argue, is ill-suited for 
minimizing the likelihood o f discriminatory exercise o f discretion by the criminal justice 
system It increases the risk of disparate sentencing outcomes across racial and class lines.
At this stage o f  my argument, however, our discussion focuses on probing the 
political underpinnings and ideological functions played by these justifications. 
Assuming the validity o f  the claim that “hate crimes hurt more”, I wish to take issue 
with the proposition that a sentencing enhancement arrangement provides the ultimate 
remedy for addressing the aggravated harmfulness o f  “hate crimes”. My critique will 
take its cue from Wendy Brown’s observations about the perils inherent in the 
construction o f  political identities and “pro-minority” reformist agendas around the 
image o f  the victimized political subject.172 According to Brown:
This effort, which strives to establish racism, sexism, and homophobia as 
morally heinous in the law, and to prosecute its individual perpetrators 
there...delimits a specific site o f  blame for suffering by constituting sovereign 
subjects and events as responsible for -the “injury” o f  social 
subordination...This effort casts the law in particular and the state more 
generally as neutral arbiters o f  injury rather than as themselves invested in the 
power to injure... in its economy o f  perpetrator and victim, this project seeks 
not power or emancipation for the injured or the subordinated, but the revenge 
o f punishment, making the perpetrator hurt as the sufferer does.173
Against the individualistic and penal-centred undercurrents o f the ‘direct harm’ rationale of 
hate crime laws, I would argue that it is more accurate to depict the African-American
172 Brown (1995).
173 Ibid, 27.
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victim o f  racist violence as placed at the receiving end of a broad array o f social and 
political processes which shape widespread racist norms and breed the criminogenic 
conditions in which such norms are likely to be expressed through acts o f personal violence. 
Such a contextualization would seek to identify the various ways in which the State is 
complieit in the facilitation o f such harms (even i£ ultimately, they are mediated by the 
wrongful actions o f an individual perpetrator). In the specific historical context in which 
hate crime legislation emerged (post-1980 American politics), it is important to consider 
how hegemonic State-sponsored projects such as the retreat from redistributive welfarism 
or the proliferation o f  racialized ‘law and order’ political rhetoric and policymaking have 
played a role in fomenting the conditions which exacerbate blacks’ disproportionate 
vulnerability to criminal victimization. Let us now briefly consider these questions.
As we saw in section C2 o f this chapter, it has been argued that two o f the 
dominant discourses which boosted the rise of the New Right in the 1980s gained 
political momentum by mobilizing popular resentment to the furthering o f racial 
egalitarian reform The assault on the Great Society vision,174 and the focus on restoring 
‘law and order’ in the wake o f  the racial riots o f  the late 1960s,175 have re-couched 
traditional racial stereotypes through the coining o f  new “code words” (such as “the 
culture of poverty” or “urban crime”). Granted, the political syntax of these discourses 
was primarily aimed at circumventing political correctness dictates (while engaging in the 
mobilization o f popular resentment o f  civil rights reforms) rather than at reviving 
traditional forms o f white supremacist political consciousness. Nevertheless, the wide 
circulation of these discourses provided a wellspring of stereotypes and myths which 
serve hate groups for articulating and legitimating their antipathies toward racial and 
ethnic minorities. For example, ethnographic studies o f Klan subculture have shown that 
images o f the “impertinence” o f  African-Americans (which loomed large in mainstream 
political critiques o f the putative tendency o f welfare policies to perpetuate the “culture o f
1 H IL
poverty”) are widely used in current justifications of the recourse to vigilantism.
The lolling back of the welfare state has played a detrimental role in exacerbating the 
socio-economic conditions which make African-Americans more likely to become victims of 
crime (whether intra-racial or inter-racial). Because of the concentration o f African-
174 Gilens (1999).
175 Beckett (1997: chapter 3); Flamm (2005); Murakawa (2008).
176 Perry (2003: 297).
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Americans as tow-skilled woikeis in labour-intensive industries, they have been at the 
receiving end o f the processes of de-industrialization which thrived in the post-1970s 
American economy.177 Pace neoliberal mythology, these changes were not brought about by 
the ‘invisible hand’ o f market forces but by deliberate policy choices. They were facilitated 
and accelerated by large-scale policy reforms which deliberately dismantled the mechanisms 
o f economic regulation (most importantly, in the context o f  African-Americans, regulation 
o f tow-wage labour markets) and die welfore schemes which provided a minimal measure 
o f social security for tower socio-economic stratums. The neoliberal turn in American 
public policy can therefore be charged with buttressing the processes of economic and 
social marginalization which rendered a large segment of the black population increasingly 
vulnerable to social and to physical insecurity. Over the last decades, various conditions 
associated with the production o f  criminogenic effects have worsened in black ghettoes 
(including, joblessness; rates o f non-marital childbirth; rates o f school dropouts; and
i n o
delinquency among adolescents). As a result, recorded rates of poverty and crime among 
African-Americans had soared. Between the 1970s and 1980, the proportion o f blacks 
living in extreme poverty areas had doubled (by 1980, it amounted to 40 percent of the 
black population).179 Although rates of victimization have been higher for blacks than for 
whites at least since the 1950s, the figures have become increasingly lopsided since the late 
1970s. For example, while rates o f death from firearms among whites remained stable 
between 1984 and 1988, for black males it more than doubled during this period.180 The 
lifetime risk of being murdered is one in 21 for black men, compared with one in 141 for 
white men.181 Today, blacks’ lifetime risk of being killed is double that o f  American 
servicemen in World War II.182
By constructing a putative dichotomy between ‘hate crime” and “ordinary crime”, 
the anti-hate crime campaign foiled to locate the problem of interracial victimization o f  
African-Americans as an integral component within this broader context of the relationship 
between socio-economic marginality and vulnerability to victimization. Patterns o f “hate 
crime” are believed to be only loosely related to such patterns of socio-economic 
marginality, not least, due to the strategic focus o f this campaign on highlighting sensational
177 Wilson (2009:9).
178 Ibid, 46.
179 Sampson and Wilson (1995: 42).
180 Ibid, 37.
181 Ibid, ibid.
182 Kennedy (1998: 20).
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cases o f white supremacist terror. However, an examination o f  the statistical data o f 
recorded “hate crimes” reveals an entirely different picture. In the most populous American 
cities, the lion’s share o f  recorded incidents involve violent conflicts between racial and 
ethnic minorities in poor urban areas, where fierce competition over scarce occupational 
and residential resources, and gang battles over drug turfs, foment fierce racial and 
ethnic frictions.183 For example, in Los Angeles, Latino-Americans composed 71 
percent o f  those prosecuted in 2007 for “hate crimes” against African-Americans (who 
comprise just 9 percent o f  the population in that county but were the victims o f 58 
percent o f  recorded “hate crimes” that year).184 O f recorded ‘bate crimes” against 
Latino-Americans, blacks constituted 56 percent o f  those prosecuted. Only 17 percent 
o f recorded hate crime cases involved white perpetrators.
The dichotomy between “hate crime” and “ordinary crime” obscures the extent to 
which both black-on-black violence and Latino-on-black violence seem to be rooted in shared 
criminogenic sources. These sources are associated with the destabilizing impact of the 
accelerating polarization o f the labour market, and the disinvestment in welfare institutions, 
on levels of poverty, joblessness and social isolation.185 These changes had led to the 
breakdown of community- level controls and to the thriving of gang subcultures in poor urban
1 RAneighbourhoods in which large segments of ethnic and racial minorities reside.
The remedy to these patterns o f interracial victimization is very unlikely to be 
found in determinate sentencing reforms, as the dominant frame o f  hate crime policy 
insists. In feet, the proposed solution (“tougher penalization”) provides one o f the most 
momentous sources o f  the problem. American jails are increasingly rife with racial 
segregation,187 grossly overcrowded and violence-ridden, and are ill-equipped to 
provide offenders with suitable skills for rehabilitation and reintegration. While racial- 
ethnfe conflicts can be repressively contained within prisons’ walls, the prison has come 
to play such a central role in shaping ghetto street culture (what Wacquant 
conceptualizes as “the wedding o f  the prison and the ghetto into an extended carceral
Perry (2001: H9-135).
184 Figures are drawn from the 2007 Hate Crime Report issued by Los Angeles County Commission on 
Human Relations. 
http://humanrelations.co.la.ca.us/hatecrime/data/2007%20Hate%20Crime%20Report.pdf. These figures 
have been largely similar to those reported in previous years.
185 Bourgois (1996); Wacquant (2008: 119-132).
186 Olzak (et al, 1996); Green (et al, 1998).
187 Bosworth (2009: 87).
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mesh”) 188 that its patterns o f  intense racial-ethno enmity are pronounced in the 
escalation o f gang battles for control o f  drugs, the rackets and turf in poor urban 
neighbourhoods.
The focus o f  the anti-hate crime movement on prioritizing the mobilization o f  
penalty enhancement exemplifies the way in which, as argued by Lisa Miller, the 
structure o f  American polities o f  crime “reinforces existing problem definitions and
1 OQ
policy frames into which existing groups can easily fit their claims”. However, while 
the suitability o f  penalty enhancement reforms to alleviate the victimization o f  African- 
Americans in urban ghettos seems meagre (at best), this campaign provides legislatures 
with an effective instrument for manipulating the political meanings o f  these forms o f 
victimization. Such de-contextualization is effected by highlighting the heinous 
character o f  sensational cases which attract obsessive media attention and de-focusing 
the role o f  structural socio-economic forces in shaping actual patterns o f  victimization. 
In the meantime, the socio-economic pathologies which breed violent conflicts between 
racial and ethnic minorities are left intact, while political pressures to “do something” 
about “hate crime” are contained through symbolic acts o f  “zero tolerance” lawmaking. 
In any event, it is clear that the numerous forms o f racially-skewed harm brought about 
by the investment o f  the State in “wedding o f the ‘invisible hand’ o f  the deregulated 
labour market to the ‘iron fist’ o f  an intrusive and omnipresent punitive apparatuses”190 
remained under the radar o f  the anti-hate crime campaign.
E2. A Critique of the ‘Vicarious Harm* Rationale o f Hate Crime Law
Penalty enhancement hate crime laws have also been rationalized by a second type o f harm- 
based justification. According to this rationale, ‘hate crimes” harm not only the direct 
victim o f  the criminal act. They also traumatize and stigmatize all other members o f the 
minority group to which she belongs.191 Accordingly, it is argued that penalty enhancement 
laws are required in order to incorporate these collateral harms within the set of interests
188 Wacquant (2001: 117).
189 Miller (2008: 11).
190 Wacquant (2001: 97).
191 Greenawalt (1993: 627); Lawrence (1994: 345-6); Lawrence (1999: 41-42).
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which the legal sanction reinforces. This rationale was accepted by the courts in various 
cases in which the constitutionality o f  penalty enhancement laws was upheld.192
The salience o f  the 4 vicarious harm’ argument in contemporary debates about the 
appropriate legal responses to racist victimization echoes the new forms of political 
mobilization around the symbolic figure o f  the Victim, as described above (section B3). 
As David Garland has argued, “the symbolic figure o f  the victim has taken a life of its 
own...the victim is now...a much more representative character, whose experience is 
taken to be common and collective” 193 “It is as crime victims”, Jonathan Simon 
observes, “that Americans are most readily imagined as unified; the threat o f crime 
simultaneously de-emphasizes their differences and authorize them to take dramatic 
political steps”.194 In this context, the ‘vicarious harm’ argument serves as a medium 
through which the agonizing experiences o f individual black victims are framed as 
representative o f  the collective grievances o f the black community (and indeed, o f other 
minority groups mobilizing around the problem o f  identity-based victimization). 
Implicitly, such framing serves to reassure liberal public opinion that the new civic ethos 
build around the symbolic figure o f  the Victim is not inherently biased against African- 
Americans. This ethos, it is inplied, can also serve as a vehicle for constructing political 
solidarities which are unbounded by conventional partisan divides over racial issues.
In particular, the recent proliferation o f  the ‘vicarious harm’ argument was 
facilitated by broader discursive shifts which took place in the functioning o f the harm 
principle within legal and policy debates. As Bernard Harcourt has shown, the harm 
principle, which has traditionally served as a negative constraint on the State’s power to 
criminalize (by means o f  excluding certain categories o f  activities from the legitimate 
sphere o f  legal intervention),195 has been playing the very opposite function in post- 
19808 jurisprudence and politics o f  crime.196 Paradoxically, the harm principle has 
become a powerful rhetorical tool whereby social movements and legislatures advocate 
the need to outlaw forms o f  conduct which were permissible hitherto by means o f  
illuminating their potential or actual harmfulness. One o f  the main facilitators o f  this
192 See, e.g. State v. Plowman, 838 P.2d 558 (1992) in which the Oregon Supreme Court upheld a 
sentencing enhancement hate crime statute.
193 Garland (2001a: 11).
194 Simon (2007a: 75).
195 Mill (1979); Hart (1963); Feinberg (1988).
196 Harcourt (1999).
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trend was the tendency to blur the distinctions between the harms suffered by the 
immediate victim and the more intangible harms putatively suffered by the wider 
community (the latter were hitherto incorporated within the concept o f ‘public interest’ 
rather than being perceived as self-standing grounds for criminalization). The ‘vicarious 
harm’ rationale exemplifies this trend. It thus raises important questions regarding the 
pitfalls inherent in the current tendency to use victimization as a frame through which 
the interests o f minority groups are being defined and legally codified. Similar 
questions have been discussed, for example, by feminist critics o f Catharine 
MacKinnon’s focus on sexual victimization as a prism through which the collective 
experiences o f  women can be elucidated, as well as o f  her inclination to advocate the 
introduction ofnew regimes o f  legal regulation as a putative solution to such harms.197
Despite its current political salience, there are several grounds for contesting the 
empirical validity, normative persuasiveness and strategic usefulness o f the ‘vicarious harm’ 
argument in mobilizing racial egalitarian claims. The empirical validity o f the claim that “hate 
crime” incidents produce levels o f fear among minority communities which are significantly 
higher vis-a-vis those experienced by the larger population in the wake o f comparable violent 
incidents remains disputable.198 Moreover, it seems that attempts to ground the justifiability 
of hate crime policies by pointing to the elevated fears o f targeted communities might be 
criticized for unwittingly exacerbating the severity of the very problem they purport to solve. 
As a bulk of criminological literature indicates, highly publicized and politicized anti-crime 
crusades do not necessarily reduce levels o f public anxiety.199 They might also fen public 
feais and increase the subjective sense of insecurity by “scattering the world with visible 
reminders of the threat o f crime”.200 Even if we are convinced by the claim that “hate crimes” 
are likely to incite a heightened sense of vulnerability to crime among members of targeted 
communities, it does not necessarily follow that racial and ethnic minorities would readily 
support penalty enhancement laws. Studies comparing racial differences in attitudes toward 
crime policies have demonstrated that African-Americans are less likely to support harsh 
penal measures and are considerably more critical o f the suitability o f “tough on crime”
197 Brown (1995: 128-134); Hailey (2008: 41-58).
198 Hurd & Moore (2004: 1091).
199 For some recent examples, see Crawford (2007: 899).
200 Zedner (2003: 163). Elsewhere, I have argued that this problem is not unique to the hate crime 
campaign, but was also noticeable in various other recent campaigns o f  “pro-minority” criminalization. 
See Aharonson (2010: 20-22).
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measures to provide safety and security.201 As noted above, this scepticism is deeply rooted 
both in African-American history, as well as in present-day encounters with the criminal 
justice system. As Gunnar Myrdal observed in the mil twentieth century: “The 
Negros.. .are hurt in their trust that the law is impartial, that the court and the police are their 
protection.. .they will not feel confidence in, and loyalty toward, a legal order.. .which they 
sense to be inequitable and merely part of the system o f caste oppression”.202 Given the 
exacerbation of racial disparities in incarceration throughout the last decades, it is 
unsurprising that the legitimacy of the criminal justice system remains widely contested 
among African-Americans today.203 In light o f the persistent use o f racial profiling and 
other forms o f racially- skewed crime enforcement, the disinclination of African-Americans 
to support “tough on crime” crusades also reflect their recognition that they are particularly 
vulnerable to being over-targeted even by policies which appear to be colour-blind or 
progressive. As we will see in section F 1, these concerns are not groundless.
Given these challenges, it seems that the ‘vicarious harm’ argument gains 
much o f its weight in contemporary policy debates from its effective emphasis on the 
parallels between present-day instances o f  white supremacist brutality and the legacy 
of lynching, Klan terror and slavery. This argument implies that the willingness to 
enact firm penal responses to “hate crime” serves as a litmus test o f  the willingness o f  
contemporary American society to repair the racial wounds which agitated the nation 
in the past. In particular, public belief in the existence o f  parallels between 
contemporary and historical forms o f  victimizing African-Americans stems from the 
tendency o f  the media to focus on appalling yet relatively rare cases o f  ritualistic 
white supremacist terror. Such, for example, was the atrocious 1998 murder o f  James 
Byrd Jr., a 49 years old black man who was chained to the back o f  a pickup truck by 
his neck and dragged for miles over rural roads by three white supremacist 
perpetrators. The media resonance o f such cases induces public disgust at the 
appalling nature o f  “hate crime”, and, in turn, boosts popular demands for the 
introduction o f  harsher penal responses. 204 As David Garland notes, ‘because 
legislatures -  particularly in the USA -  are now on a ‘war footing’ with respect to 
crime, and exercise direct control over sentencing levels, the system is set up to
201 Mears (2003).
202 Myrdal (1944: 52)
203 Kennedy (1998: 24-27); Cole (2000: 11-12).
204 For a sympathetic justification o f hate crime laws as a legitimate as well as warranted form of 
expressing this sense o f public disgust, see: Kahan (1998).
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produce an instance response”.205 Unsurprisingly, the murder o f  James Byrd, Jr. has 
been emphasized by proponents o f  sentencing enhancement hate crime laws. As part 
o f a wider trend in which new criminal laws are named after victims whose injuries 
been at the centre o f  immense media attention (e.g. Megan’s Law),206 Texas passed 
the James Byrd Jr. Hate Crime Act in 2001 and Congress had recently enacted the 
Mathew Shepard and James Byrd, Jr. Hate Crime Prevention Act. These laws 
provided state and federal agencies with new enforcement powers (which, as I will 
show in section FI o f  this chapter, expose African-American and Latino-American 
perpetrators to new risks o f  selective over-targeting by these agencies, an issue which 
was entirely elided from the public debate which led to the enactment o f  these “pro­
black” reforms).
However, in this context, too, when we take a sober took at the figures o f 
recorded “hate crimes”, it becomes clear that the focus on extraordinarily cruel cases 
such as Byrd’s murder distorts public understanding o f  the actual patterns o f  interracial 
violence prosecuted and penalized under these statutes. We have already discussed the 
feet that African-American and Latinos constitute the vast majority among perpetrators 
o f recorded “hate crimes”. It should also be noted that the majority o f  prosecuted cases 
o f “hate crime” do not involve physical assaults (but rather tow-level offences such as 
vandalism).207 On the basis o f  these figures, it is arguable that, ironically, the success o f  
the anti-hate crime movement in mobilizing popular and political concern o f the 
problem o f  white supremacist violence has crystallized in an historical epoch in which 
such violence has become ever less central as an instrument o f drawing and enforcing 
the ‘colour line’. The fourfold genealogical perspective developed in this dissertation 
provides a useful vantage point from which we can demonstrate this claim
As shown in the second and third chapters o f  this study, up until the 1930s, the 
victimization o f  African-Americans was facilitated by the demographic concentration 
o f virtually the entire black population in the Rural South; the lack o f  employment 
opportunities for blacks outside the agrarian Southern economy; and the operation o f 
political and legal mechanisms which legitimated and reinforced the inferior conditions 
of African-Americans through an unequivocal white supremacist ideology. The
205 Garland (2001a: 133).
206 Simon (2000: 1136).
207 Jacobs (2003: 422).
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‘vicarious harm’ argument seems accurate in describing the centrality o f  white-on-black 
violence in constituting the collective experiences o f  African-Americans in the slavery 
and Jim Crow periods. Such violence, I have shown, operated in tandem with various 
official mechanisms employed by Southern authorities for disciplining individual 
deviations from white supremacist behavioural codes, and for restricting blacks’ 
freedom o f  movement and association so as to reinforce their inferior economic and 
political status. The withdrawal o f  protection from African-American victims was 
openly rationalized by dominant political ideologies which affirmed the legitimacy and 
constitutionality o f  using racial categories as grounds o f differential legal treatment.
However, the ‘vicarious harm’ argument seems less accurate as a description 
of the role played by racist violence in constituting the social, economic and political 
status o f  African-Americans from the mid twentieth century onwards. Already in the 
1950s, the effective campaigning o f  the Civil Rights Movement around the problem 
o f black victimization had spotlighted forms o f violence which were not widely 
experienced in the North (Le. obstruction o f  blacks’ access to desegregated public 
school by white supremacist mobs). As argued in chapter 4, this strategic focus 
facilitated the Movement’s success in spurring the reform o f  federal civil rights policy 
and indeed in prec p ita  ting the abolition o f Jim Crow. However, by overplaying the 
extent to which such overt forms o f  white supremacist terror represented the 
collective conditions o f  African-Americans, this campaign foiled to mobilize a solid 
political and social recognition o f  the illegitimacy o f the systemic mechanisms o f  
social and political exclusion which prevailed in the North (as these did not take the 
form o f  overt extralegal reinforcement o f  white supremacist norms).
In contemporary American society, the validity o f  the ‘vicarious harm’ 
argument becomes increasingly questionable. Since the 1970s, the class structure within 
the black community has polarized dramatically, “with the black poor felling further 
and further behind middle- and upper-income blacks”208 As Lofc Wacquant notes, “the 
ability o f  middle-class blacks...to avail themselves o f  the new occupational 
opportunities created by affirmative action programs and to protect their offspring from 
downward mobility contrast sharply with the basic inability o f  the ghetto poor to enter 
the wagelabour economy and to secure the means to raise themselves and their families
208 Wilson (1980: 152).
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out o f  persistent poverty”.209 Inevitably, because o f  the symbiosis between poverty and 
crime, this polarization is also reflected in a greater cross-class differentiation among 
blacks with regard to their vulnerability to criminal victimization. To emphasize, racial 
identity did not evaporate as a factor which affects individuals’ likelihood of becoming 
a victim o f  crime. Indeed, as noted above, blacks continue to be overwhelmingly more 
likely to be victimized than whites, and in some categories (including murder) racial 
disparities have grown dramatically since the 1970s. However, as argued by William J. 
Wilson, at root, these figures reflect the demographic concentration o f  large segments 
o f the black population in poor and isolated urban ghettoes blighted by extreme rates o f  
poverty, joblessness, dysfunctional schools, and single-parent households.210 As in 
many other contexts, black-white disparities in victimization might actually reflect class 
disparities.
Placed within this broad historical context, it might be argued that the anti-hate 
crime campaign serves to highlight forms o f victimization which have become less 
consequential in shaping patterns o f racial inequality as such, and, at one at the same 
time, diverts public attention from the most prevalent patterns o f  victimization to which 
African-Americans are exposed. This ideological effect seems to exemplify Jonathan 
Simon’s observations that “the dangers o f ‘governing through crime’ are also those of 
unification within forms o f  subjectivity that are themselves too ungrounded in history or 
politics to generate effective formation o f  democratic will”.211 The salience o f  the anti­
hate crime campaign in shaping public perceptions o f  experiences of victimization among 
African-Americans serves to obscure the feet that four-fifths o f  recorded violent crimes in 
the US are committed by a person ofthe same race as their victims.212 This feet provides 
a troubling symptom ofthe pervasiveness o f  racial segregation in American society, but it 
is usually obscured in fight ofthe tendency to construct the symbolic image o f the Victim 
in ways which reflect the anxieties o f white, middle class, suburban citizens.213
Within this context, the anti-hate crime campaign displaces a wider agenda of 
progressive mobilization which would have presented victimization rates among 
African-Americans (not only when inflicted by white supremacist terrorists) as a telling
209 Wacquant (1989: 9).
210 Wilson (2009: 27).
211 Simon (2000: 1132).
212 Kennedy (1998: 19).
213 Simon (2000: 1137).
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symptom o f  their disproportionate vulnerability to social harm more generally, a pattern 
which can be shown to correlate with the racialized class structure in American 
society.214 The feet that this path was not vigorously taken by black activists seems to 
be rooted not only in the structural constraints which American politics pose on the 
development o f  class-based politics o f  victimization. It also reflects the reluctance to 
spotlight the problem o f  black-on-black victimization in light o f  the peril that such a 
focus would adversely reinforce pub he stereotypes o f  black dangerousness.
Hate crime discourses seek to circumvent this difficulty by means o f  
highlighting forms o f  victimization which are likely to be censured even by whites who 
oppose redistributive welfarist reforms or dispute the discriminatory nature o f  other 
types o f  racially-skewed enforcement patterns (e.g. racial profiling, which is often 
rationalized as a prudential response to blacks’ higher rates o f  criminal activity).216 
However, this strategic circumvention keeps public op info n oblivious to the patterns o f 
violence which have the most destructive impact on the most marginalized groups 
within the black community.217 Perhaps more importantly, by tailing to challenge the 
marginalization o f  class in current political debate about crime, discourses o f  hate crime 
leave intact the ideological mechanisms which construct the legitimacy o f  the policy 
frameworks that produce such patterns o f  racial polarization.
To sum up, in this section, I offered a critique o f  some o f  the most salient 
arguments which were accepted as justifying grounds for the introduction o f  hate 
crime laws. In particular, I have showed that these arguments have framed the 
political meanings o f  -  and required solutions to -  the problem o f  black victimization 
in a way which reproduced the ideological creeds o f  contemporary “tough on crime” 
thinking. By accepting these creeds as appropriate for representing the meanings o f  
the problem o f  black victimization, anti-hate crime campaigners were able to gain 
success in initiating what arguably amounts to the most visible project o f  “pro-black” 
criminal justice reform o f our time (or even o f  entire American history). However, I
214 Sampson and Wilson (1995).
~15 In The Boundaries o f  Blackness, Cathy Cohen has analyzed a similar dilemma, concerning the 
negative impacts o f  black mobilization around the problem o f African-Americans’ disproportionate 
rates o f infection by AIDS out o f concern o f the stigma-reinforcing effects which such campaigns 
might entail. Cohen (1999: chapter 2).
216 On constitutional and empirical difficulties in proving the discriminatory nature o f racial profiling, 
see: Banks (2003: 580-587).
2,7 Kennedy (1998: 19).
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have shown that such cooptation into the broader discursive terrain o f  populist “tough 
on crime” policymaking has constrained the success o f this campaign in serving as a 
vehicle of consciousness raising. In particular, in its framing o f the sources and patterns of 
the problem, the campaign had overemphasized remnants o f anachronistic systems o f racial 
domination while dissociating contemporary patterns of black victimization from the large- 
scale demographic and policy structures within which they are embedded. Secondly, in its 
framing ofthe required solution to this problem, it mobilized a narrow vision o f  how the 
State can and ought to minimize the ordeal of black victims. This vision focuses entirely on 
the stipulation o f harsher and more determinate penalties at the expense of a more holistic 
representation o f the various ways in which non-penal public policies can alleviate the 
structural conditions which nurture the materialization of such harms.
F. The Implications of Hate Crime Policies for the Enforcement of 
Crimes Causing Interracial Victimization of African-Americans
The introduction o f hate crime laws was intended to improve the performance o f the 
criminal justice system in protecting African-American victims in two main ways. First, by 
installing mechanisms for controlling discretion throughout different stages ofthe criminal 
process, hate crime laws sought to minimize the opportunities for discriminatory exercise of 
discretion by enforcement agents. Second, by attaching harsher penal sanctions to racist- 
motivated criminal conduct, hate crime laws attempted to enhance the deterrent effects 
upon would-be racist perpetrators. Both of these goals sound plausible and well-intentioned 
in the abstract. However, as I will now move on to show, their achievability has been 
hampered by the operation o f hate crime policies within the institutional and political 
structures which prevail in contemporary American criminal justice system
FI. Hate crime and the taming of institutional racism in the administration of criminal justice?
The first declared aim of hate crime laws is to minimize the likelihood that the protection o f 
African-American victims would be inhibited because of discriminatory exercise o f discretion 
by crime enforcement agents. The idea o f installing formal mechanisms for governing the 
exercise of discretion is responsive to a large body of evidence documenting the 
pervasiveness o f institutional racism within the professional culture o f policing, prosecutorial,
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and judicial institutions.218 The publication in 1971 o f the report Strugglefor Justice, prepared 
for the American Friends Service Committee, provided an early influential critique o f the 
extent to which the open-ended structure of indeterminate sentencing processes was
I Q
susceptible to biased exercise of discretion against African-Americans. Such criticisms had
intensified over the following decades. As Michael Tonry encapsulates the common critique, 
“die capacity o f every judge, probation officer and parole board to exercise individualized 
discretion within broad ranges o f authority created nearly limitless risks o f contamination of 
decisions by deliberate racial animus and unconscious stereotyping”. Hate crime legislation 
was advocated as providing a suitable remedy to this problem
As is often the case, the implementation o f hate crime policies has been shaped by 
institutional dynamics and determinants that were not folly anticipated by proponents of these 
reforms. In particular, the enforcement o f criminal legislation is dependent on the specific way in 
which the institutional structures within which it is implemented shape the interactions between 
different institutional actors.221 Among other things, these structures govern the degree and the 
manner in which each o f the key institutional actors in the administration o f crime policy (police 
officers, prosecutors, and judges) can influence the outcomes o f the criminal process In this 
context, I would argue, the enforcement patterns of hate crime laws have reflected broader 
problems which characterize the implementation of determinate sentencing in general
One o f the most illuminating accounts o f  the way in which the interactions 
between different crime enforcement agencies shape the outcomes o f  criminalization 
processes in the US has been developed by William Stuntz in his seminal article The 
Pathological Politics o f Criminal Law.222 According to Stuntz, the breadth and depth of 
American criminal law -  its tendency to cover an excessive range o f  activities and to cover 
the same conducts many times over through different criminal labels -  entrusts prosecutors 
with decisive influence on the outcomes of the criminal process. For Stuntz, “the story of 
American criminal law is a story of tacit cooperation between prosecutors and legislators, 
each of whom benefits from more and broader crimes, and growing marginalization o f  
judges, who alone are likely to opt for narrower liability rules rather than broader ones”.223
218 Kennedy (1998); Cole (2000); Mauer(1999); Davis (1999).
219 Garland (2001a: 55).
220 Tonry (2005: 1233).
221 Lacey (1995).
222 Stuntz (2001).
223 Ibid, 510.
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For prosecutors, the breadth and depth of criminal legislation is welcomed, as it widens the 
range of charging opportunities and thus improve their ability to induce guilty pleas and to 
gain greater conviction rates. This incentive is particularly significant given the feet that 
more than 95% o f tocal district attorneys in the US are standing for electioa224 Because of 
a combination o f  historical contingencies and structural features o f  the American 
constitutional system, the American jurisprudence o f crime has evolved in a way which 
focuses on regulating the trial process, some aspects of policing (e.g. search and seizure) 
and capital punishment, while refraining from regulating substantive crime definitions, the 
scale of non-capital punishment and prosecutorial discretion. This state o f affairs leaves 
judges with weak doctrinal tools to counterbalance the impetus o f the electoral pressures 
and institutional dynamics pushing toward over-criminalization and excessive penalization.
The re-penalizatfon of conducts which are already criminalized under generic laws by 
means of relabeling them as ‘hate crimes” nests neatly into this structure o f over-criminalization 
and excessive penalization. Hate crime laws shift control over the application o f these generic 
laws from courts to prosecutors and police officers. The exercise o f discretion by police officers 
and prosecutors while deciding whether to classify a particular conduct as a “hate crime” is very 
loosely constrained, while their decisions pose considerable formal and informal constraints on 
the exercise of judicial discretion.226 This observation can be explicated by a succinct analysis 
ofthe multi-institutional relations between the key institutional actors who take part in enforcing 
hate crime laws. As James Jacobs has argued, the processes whereby police officers decide 
whether to identify a particular event as a “hate crime” are highly speculative. Particularly given 
the highly politicized and subjective nature o f judgments into the perpetrator’s biased 
motivations, these processes can hardly be effectively guided and monitored according to 
consistent and binding criteria.227 As in many other instances of determinate sentencing 
policies, prosecutors are the main beneficiaries from the imposition of statutory restraints over 
judicial discretion. Because hate crime statutes create separate offences which can be charged 
in addition to the original offence, they provide prosecutors with a valuable tool for “charge 
staking”, that is, the ability to apply overlapping criminal prohibitions to a particular chain of
225 On the weak constitutional regulation o f  substantive criminal law, see: Dubber (2004); on the weak 
constitutional regulation o f prosecutorial decision-making, see: Bibas (2001); Davis (2007); For a 
general analysis o f how these patterns o f  over-regulation and under-regulation allocate control over the 
outcomes o f criminalization process between different institutional agents, see: Stuntz (2006).
226 Abrahamson (et al, 1994).
227 Jacobs (2003: 412-414). But see Bell (2002).
228 Bibas (2001).
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events and thus to pressurize a risk-averse defendant into pleading to a lesser crime.229 The 
power Id  negotiate the outcome of the case in the shadow of a threat o f sentencing 
enhancement provides a powerful bargaining chip in the hands o f prosecutors. Given the feet 
that the vast majority (nearly 95 percent) of criminal cases in the USA are settled by plea 
bargain rather than by a jury trial, this weapon might prove particularly consequential in 
enabling the criminal justice system to clear cases of interracial violence. Given existing 
patterns o f disproportionate targeting o f racial and ethnic minorities throughout all stages of 
the criminal process, and the feet that recorded rates o f black-on-white and black-Latino 
violence fer exceed the scale o f white-on-black violence,231 it seems highly probable that the 
favourable ‘charge staking’ powers with which prosecutors are provided by hate crime 
statutes are very often being used (and misused) against black suspects and defendants.
From this perspective, the focus o f hate crime policy on restricting judicial 
discretion seems clearly misplaced, as it concentrates on restraining “the least dangerous 
branch” o f  the American criminal justice system (in terms o f  its tendency to produce 
disparate outcomes across racial and class divides). Although many studies have 
documented the pervasiveness o f  racial disparities in sentencing, it is arguable that 
judicial decision-making is less prone to be permeated by institutional racism than are 
prosecutorial and policing practices. Granted, we should not overplay the extent to which 
the more formalized character o f  the trial process (vis-a-vis policing and p lea-bargaining) 
as well as the influence o f  rights ideology on the professional culture of the judiciary 
preclude courts from exercising discretion in a discriminatory manner. Nevertheless, it 
seems that the processes which hinder the equal protection o f  black victims are much 
more crucially hampered by police and prosecutorial discrimination. The feet that 
these aspects ofthe criminalization process were left practically unchecked by hate crime 
reformers can be traced to their strategic decision to capitalize on the fevourable 
conditions provided by the bipartisan support for determinate sentencing reform, while 
ignoring the warning signs concerning the racially-skewed application o f such policies.
229 Goldberger (2004).
230 Bibas (2001: 1150)
231 Jacobs (2003:416).
232 Skolnick (1993).
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204
F2. Hate crime and the reduction o f violence asainst black victims?
At the heart o f the debate over the deterrent qualities of hate crime laws rests the question o f 
whether enhancing the penalization of conducts which were already outlawed under generic 
criminal statutes is likely to produce significantly greater deterrent effects (vis-a-vis those 
engendered by the original criminal statute). The political currency o f determinate sentencing 
reforms is responsive to the popular belief in the existence o f a straightforward negative 
correlation between crime rates and sanction levels. This popular belief maintains that the 
stipulation of harsher penalties is likely to reduce the occurrence o f the prohibited conduct 
However, the empirical literature on the deterrent impact o f determinate sentencing reforms 
portrays a much more intricate picture.234 The main theoretical puzzle with which this literature 
grapples pertains to the optimum level beyond which the enhanced threat o f penalization foils to 
amplify the deterrent signal In particular, both the short-term and paiticularfy the long-term 
crime reductive inpacts of sentencing enhancement policies and o f other components of the 
determinate sentencing reform have been strongly contested by empirical studies. For example, 
Zimring (et al) compared crime trends in different counties in California following the 
enactment o f its ‘three-strikes-and-you’re-ouf legislation. Noting that this legislation left 
prosecutors with considerable discretion on whether to apply the ‘three-strikes’ provision in 
particular cases, they showed that counties with higher than average use of such provisions did 
not experience higher levels of crime reduction235 Michael Tonry has showed, in a longitudinal 
examination o f crime trends in the five most populous states (in the period 1980-2000), that the 
introduction o f California’s ‘three-strike-and-you’re-out’ crusade foiled to produce greater 
crime-reductive effects vis-a-vis other states which did not install such draconian measures. 
These findings seem to echo Sir William Blackstone’s observation nearly 250 years ago: “we 
may observe that punishment o f unreasonable severity.. .have less effect in preventing crimes* 
and amending the manners o f a people, than such as are more merciful in general, yet properly 
intermixed with due distinctions o f severity”.
In light o f  this body o f evidence, it could be argued that the difficulty hate crime 
laws have in achieving marginal deterrent effects stem from their being embedded within a 
broader network o f criminal statutes which contain harsh (and often disproportional) penal 
sanctions. It can be assumed that hate crime laws are likely to make a practical difference
234 Doob & W ebster (2003); Von Hirsch (et a f  1999).
235 Zimring (et al, 2001: 103).
236 Tonry (2004: 124).
237 Blackstone (1979: 4)[1765-1769],
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mostly to the enforcement o f tow-level offences which do not involve physical violence, 
rather than to those reminiscent of the lynching era which are usually invoked in order to 
dramatize the urgency of stiffening penal responses.238 This point can be illustrated by 
looking at the legal reforms declared in the name o f responding to the murder of James 
Byrd Jr. in 1998. As noted earlier, this horrendous case of lynching served as a catalyst for 
the expansion o f  hate crime laws at both state and federal levels. However, the outcome o f  
the trial o f  Byrd’s murderers did not evince a lenient sentencing approach. Two of his 
killers were sentenced to death and the third to life sentence without the possibility of 
parole. Thus, symbolic legislative reforms such as the James Byrd Jr. Hate Crime Act 
(enacted in Texas in 2001), as well the Matthew Shepard and James Byrd Jr. Hate Crime 
Prevention Act (enacted in 2009 by Congress), cannot be justified as remedying practical 
institutional deficiencies which were pronounced in these cases 239 At the same time, these 
reforms subjected a wide range of tow-level offences to harsher penalties.
The tendency to respond to public outrage in the wake o f sensational crimes o f extreme 
brutality by means of adopting harsh penal reforms which also apply to misdemeanours is a well- 
familiar pattern o f late-modern politics of crime.240 This pattern was exemplified by the ‘three- 
strkes-and-you’ re-out’ crusade which grew out o f public outcry against some egregious cases of 
violent behaviour by habitual offenders yet was institutionalized in a way which predominantly 
targeted non-violert forms o f offending.241 Markus Dubber’s account of the War on Crime, 
launched in the name o f combating interpersonal violence yet predominantly focused on 
possession offences, reveals a very similar pattern.242 In an era in which the frorttors of criminality 
are increasingly open-ended in light o f the proliferation o f ‘zero-tolerance policing’, ‘broken 
windows policing’ and similar schemes prescribing “getting tough” on petty crime or anti-social 
behaviour as a central component of crime-reduction efforts,243 hate crime laws are likely to be 
used for providing crime enforcement agencies with stricter measures for tackling low-level 
offences. In this context too, given the disproportionate targeting o f racial and ethnic minorities by
238 Jacobs and Potter (1998: 89).
239 Matthew Shepaid was murdered by two homophobic bgots in 1998 because o f his perceived sexual 
identity. Because the hate crime statute in Wyoming, where die murder was committed, did not apply to 
violence on the basis o f  the victim's sexual orientation, his murdereis were indicted under generic homicide 
laws (not for hate crime). Nevertheless, both were sentenced to two consecutive life sentences without the 
possibility o f parole. “Killer o f  Gay Student Is Spared Death Penalty", Los Angeles Times (05.11.1999, A 1).
“40 See, e.g. Simon's (2000) discussion o f  the case study o f M egan’s Laws; Garland’s discussion of 
‘acting out’ forms o f  penal lawmaking (2001a: 133).
241 Zimring (et al, 2001).
242 Dubber (2002).
243 Harcourt (2005: chapter 2).
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the police, it is likely that hate crime laws are mainly used for administering cases o f interracial 
low-level delinquency. A possible rejoinder to this argument might stress that the tackling o f 
everyday symptoms of racism which are categorized at the bwer end o f the criminal spectrum is 
itself a worthy cause.244 However, this rejoinder does not seem to be supported by the bulk o f 
empirical research on the performance o f ‘zero tolerance’ methods in minimizing the scale of 
physical violence 245 For example, it has been shown that habitual offending policies foiled to 
carry discernible crime-reductive effects on either felonies or low-level crimes.246
G. Conclusion
This chapter opened with a reference to Stuart Hall’s comment on the tendency o f the 
liberal blueprint of racial reform to be trapped by a cyclical affirmation o f “what is practical 
and realistic in the short term...given the current conditions” 247 The discussion in this 
chapter has shown that the anti-hate crime movement had been vulnerable to the de- 
radicalizing effect which the mobilization of piecemeal racial reforms within entrenched 
systems o f racial inequality is likely to entail Like many other campaigns launched under 
the banner ofthe politics o f  recognition, the anti-hate crime campaign had served, in the 
words of Nancy Fraser, “less to supplement, complicate and enrich redistributive struggles 
than to marginalize, eclipse and displace them”.248 This campaign has spotlighted the 
persistence o f v to lent patterns expressing racial stereotypes in contemporary American 
society. Yet it has foiled to link these patterns o f violence to broader political and 
institutional mechanisms which produce the socio-economic marginalization o f  African- 
Americans and their unequal treatment by the criminal justice system. The containment o f 
the struggle to ameliorate the plight of black victims within the predominant model o f 
neoliberal penality is highly problematic, as it is this model which has inspired and 
rationalized the new economic and penal policies which have exacerbated the vulnerability 
of poor racial minorities to victimization over the last decades.249
Matzuda (1990).
245 Tonry (2004: chapter 5); Harcourt (2005: chapters 3, 4).
246 As Zimring (et al, 2001) show, before California’s ‘Three Strikes’ laws took effect, individuals with one or 
two ‘strikes’ on their recond were responsible for 13.9 percent o f  all adult felony arrests n  Los Angeles, San 
Diego and San Francisco, foe three cities studied. After foe law went iito effect, that number changed only 
slightly, dropping to 12.8 percent o f arrests; Before ‘Three Strikes’ legislation came into force, 44.8 percent o f 
all felony arrests involved suspects with any kind o f felony conviction on their record - property crimes or more 
serious and violent offenses. After, that proportion remained essentially the same, 45.4 percent.
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Chapter 6:
Conclusion: “Pro-Minority” Criminalization Reforms -  How They 
Succeed, Why They Fail
A. Introduction
This dissertation has examined the historical evolution o f legal responses to the victimization of 
African-Americans from the slaveiy era to the present. In particular, it paid attention to the 
origins, effects and theoretical implications of “pro-black” criminalization (defined as legal 
regimes introduced with the specific aim of protecting black victims). I have attempted to show 
that the lessons gained from a study of the way in which the problem of black victimization has 
been understood and acted upon in earlier phases of American racial history can enrich our 
understanding of a cluster of timely questions in the sociology o f criminalization. In this 
concluding chapter, I will summarize the major contributions of this study to our understanding 
of the preventive and symbolic functions of hate crime policies, and of the potential and limits 
of “pro-minority” criminalization as a vehicle of progressive social change more generally.
In section B, I discuss the study’s main conclusions regarding the conditions 
which enabled and constrained the emergence o f  new regimes o f “pro-black” 
criminalization throughout American history. In section C, I summarize o f the major 
conclusions regarding the effects produced by these regimes. The performances o f  “pro­
black” criminalization are analyzed with respect to the two main goals which hate crime 
laws are believed to advance: a) minimizing the vulnerability o f racial minorities to 
criminal victimization; b) serving as a communicative instrument through which the State 
recognizes the entitlement o f  racial minorities to equal protection, and denounces racist 
norms more generally.1
1 To clarify, the discussion o fthe  expressive functions o f “pro-minority” criminalization have inplications 
on the achievability o f both the political and cultural rationales introduced in the first chapter.
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B. “Pro-Minority” Criminalization Reforms — Why They Succeed
What are the conditions which enable the emergence of new criminalization regimes which 
are specifically designed to protect racial minorities? The purpose of posing this question was 
not to improve our ability to predict future waves o f legislative reform in this field. My aim 
was to advance our critical understanding o f the conditions o f existence o f such legislation in 
order to consider how these conditions affect its suitability to achieve its two main intended 
goals: first, to reduce the vulnerability o f racial minorities to victimization; second, to erode 
the legitimacy of discriminatory political and social norms. I developed my thesis in an effort 
to move beyond the limitations o f three conventional theories o f  the conditions which enable 
the emergence of “pro-minority” criminalization in general. The first thesis describes the 
emergence o f such reforms as responsive to a “rising tide” o f violence against minorities; the 
second thesis depicts it as a barometer and facilitator ofthe weakening grip o f discriminatory 
social norms (thus, criminalization reforms reflect increasing social disapprobation o f  racist, 
sexist and homophobic forms of conduct which were acceptable hitherto); the third thesis 
attaches primary importance to the role played by social movements in politicizing patterns 
of minority victimization and lobbying for the introduction o f new penal responses.2 The 
explanatory framework developed in this dissertation sought to retain certain elements 
emphasized by the third thesis. However, I have attempted to show how the strategies o f  
framing and mobilization employed by progressive social movements were themselves 
shaped by larger structural determinants. I also emphasized that the achievements of these 
campaigns in initiating policy reforms were dependent on their compatibility with electoral 
and administrative goals pursued by policymakers and social elites.
The distinctive thesis advanced in this study was that the conditions which enabled and 
constrained the emergence of “pro-black” criminalization regimes throughout American history 
were shaped by the interplay between three sets of determinants. First, I examined the extent to 
which prevailing political and social structures made room for effective mobilization around 
the problem of black victimization. This discussion shed light on the economic, demographic, 
political and cultural preconditions which enable “pro-minority” criminalizatfon campaigns to 
gain political momentum. Among other things, I explored the role played by the following
2 This critique was presented in pp. 11-17 o f chapter 1.
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determinants in shaping the forms and the outcomes of “pro-black” criminalization campaigns 
and policies: the functions performed by black labour within the regional and national 
economic systems; the structure of the regional and national political systems (including, voting 
patterns and historical shifts in ideological positions over civil-righls issues); prevailing 
constitutional theories and shifting conceptions o f the relationship between state and federal 
governments; and the impact of demographic patterns (including, urbanization, segregation and 
ghetto izat ion) on the forms and outcomes ofblack protest.
The second set o f determinants shaping the contours of “pro-black” criminalization 
policy was associated with the strategies used by progressive social movements in framing 
the political meanings o f black victimization. In this context, I explored the patterns o f 
continuity and change in how this problem was represented by the Abolitionist movement, 
the NAACP, the Civil Rights Movement (which coupled the NAACP legalistic campaign 
with various forms of grassroots mobilization) and the anti-hate crime movement. I 
considered how these movements had linked the problem ofblack victimization with broader 
problems o f racial inequality, and how their strategies of flaming and campaigning affected 
the outcomes o f these crusades. This discussion has contributed to our understanding o f the 
motivations and incentives which impel progressive social movements to have recourse to 
‘the victimization flame’ (sometimes, at the expense of mobilizing around other collective 
action frames which could have make a greater inpact on the conditions ofthe marginalized 
community). I will discuss my conclusion regarding the distinctive effects which strategic 
mobilization around ‘the victimization frame’ engenders in section C2 of this chapter.
The third set o f  determinants affecting the likelihood o f the advent o f  new regimes 
of “pro-black” criminalization pertains to the extent to which such reforms are believed to 
advance the interests o f  political and social elites. I have shown that, throughout American 
history, the enactment o f such legislative reforms was amenable to new challenges o f 
legitimation and coordination with which policymakers and social elites were confronted. 
In most cases, the passing o f such legislation was motivated by efforts to contain demands 
for racial egalitarian reforms in ways which would not necessitate tampering with powerful 
electoral and economic interests invested in the preservation of the racial status quo. For 
example, it chapter 2 ,1 have shown that the introduction o f  laws penalizing slave abuse in
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the antebellum South was responsive to the success o f antislavery campaigns in prompting 
Northern opposition to the “peculiar institution” Among other things, such legislation 
sought to demonstrate that values of fairness and respect for slaves’ human dignity can be 
accommodated into slave law, and thus to weaken the moral case for abolition In chapter 
3 ,1 have shown that the failure o f both regional and national legal systems to devise anti- 
lynching legislation in the late nineteenth century was rooted in the removal o f  the electoral 
and administrative incentives which had impelled the Republican Party and the federal 
government to invest political capital in such reforms during Reconstruction.
In chapter 4, I have shown that the enactment of “federally protected activities” 
legislation between 1964 and 1968 was stimulated by the success of the Civil Rights 
Movement in utilizing the increasing electoral leverage ofblack voters and the implications of 
Cokl War dictates in order to create new pressures of legitimation on national policymakers. 
This legislation was found suitable to contain progressive racial protest within manageable 
ideological bounds because it focused on Southern manifestations of racial brutality. This focus 
left the more “civilized” yet highly pervasive forms o f marginalizing blacks within Northern 
economy and society virtually intact. Hence, this legislation buttressed the legitimacy of the 
informal forms o f segregation and discrimination prevailing in the North by portraying them as 
consistent with the nation’s professed democratic and meritocratic creeds.
In chapter 5, I have showed that the mushrooming o f hate crime laws since the 
early 1980s was enabled by the crystallization o f new electoral incentives which spurred 
politicians o f both major parties to endorse this campaign. In this context, the issue o f “hate 
crime” differs markedly from virtually every other issue on the agenda o f criminal justice 
reform. In an era in which pressures to conform to a “tough on crime” posture have become 
decisive, legislatures are dissuaded from taking a “pro-black” position in various areas in 
which legislative intervention is desperately needed to ameliorate racial disparities in crime 
enforcement (e.g. racial profiling, drug laws).
As stressed byGunnar Myrdal in An American Dilemma, America’s racial practices 
had always posed a fundamental challenge to the credibility o f its professed commitment to
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the ideals o f freedom and equality under the rule o f law. 3 In this study, I have shown that 
the introduction o f “pro-black” criminalization reforms was often aimed at reinforcing 
public trust in these ideals. The stimuli for such reforms was provided by the success of 
social movements in portraying governmental failure to restrain brutal forms o f  racist terror 
as inconsistent with even the most narrow interpretation o f American constitutional 
principles. Because criminalization campaigns focus on the most overtly repressive and 
obviously repulsive symptoms o f racial domination, it has been easier for racial reformers 
to initiate “pro-black” criminalization reforms even in periods in which public opinion 
opposed structural challenges to the racial status quo.
For example, in the antebellum period, the paternalistic sentiments o f  the planter 
elite found expression in their support o f outlawing particular forms o f  “slave abuse” 
(denounced as inconsistent with cultural codes o f Southern honour) notwithstanding their 
relentless opposition to Abolitionism. The campaign o f  the Civil Rights Movement had 
spotlighted the atrocious measures to which white supremacist mobs resorted in order to 
preclude African-Americans from realizing their constitutional rights to enrol in 
desegregated schools and college. This campaign had stimulated Northern criticism ofthe 
repressiveness o f Jim Crow and increased the pressures on the federal government to 
introduce more robust measures for combating racial segregatioa However, Northern 
reluctance to eradicate mechanisms o f de facto residential and occupational segregation 
which pervaded the region’s economic and social systems remained largely intact. The 
anti-hate crime campaign focused on appalling reminiscences o f lynching and Klan terror 
(e.g. the 1998 murder o f  James Byrd, Jr.). It reminded American society o f the ugly 
remnants left by its racist legacy. Unlike the campaigns mobilized by other minority 
groups while demanding to be included within hate crime laws (most notably, the 
campaign mobilized by gay and lesbian activists), the idea o f imposing tougher penalties 
on racist offenders won overwhelming bipartisan support from the outset. 4 At the same 
time, however, political support for socio-economic and due process reforms required for 
ameliorating the disproportionate rates o f poverty and incarceration within the black 
community remained feeble.
3 Myrdal (1944).
4 Jenness (2001: 301-306).
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In all of these cases, “pro-black” criminalization campaigns created a site in which 
respectable citizens could express their aversion to particular forms of racial domination while 
turning a blind eye to the structural conditions which made such excesses possible. For 
governments, the introduction o f new regimes of “pro-black” criminalization served to reassure 
mainstream public opinion that such conducts can be eliminated through the stipulation of 
tougher penalties. Such acts of criminal lawmaking served to manipulate the political 
implications of these forms of victimization by obfuscating the extent to which State-sponsored 
marginalization of African-Americans in the economic and political sphere nurtured the 
criminogenic conditions within which such viofence thrive. As Nicola Lacey has noted:
Government decisions to criminalize... can score political points by exp biting the 
ambiguity in the notion o f crime...on the one hand, government is constructing law 
and order problems as political issues, to which it is responding; formal fegislatbn 
thus offers government the opportunity to represent itself as instrumentally 
effective. At the same time, it can draw on a prevailing discourse o f  crime as in 
some sense pre-political — that is, as wickedness or ...even pathobgy5
Within this context, the unfolding of new regimes o f “pro-minority” criminalizatfon is shaped 
by (ad hoc) convergence of interests between progressive social movements and 
policymakers. Progressive social movements have primarily attempted to politicize patterns 
of minority victimizatfon in ways which would spotlight broader structures o f institutfonal 
discriminatfon and social deprivatfon. Governments and legislatures have mainly sought to 
contain such protest within manageabfe political and ideobgical bounds. The introductfonof 
new “pro-black” criminal offences served this endeavour by appealing to the combinatfon o f 
on the one hand, the popular belief in the instrumental efficacy o f  punishment, 6 and, on the 
other hand, deep-seated popular reluctance to endorse revolutbnary racial reforms. Such 
reluctance was rooted in the inlernalizatfon o f racialized ideofogies which portrayed existing 
social arrangements as basically fair and inevitable.7
5 Lacey (1995: 14).
6 Lacey, Quick and Wells (2003: 13).
7 Fields (1982).
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This interpretation o f the conditions o f existence o f “pro-black” criminalization 
regimes provides a basis for revisiting their suitability to meet their declared preventive 
and expressive aims. It is to this discussion that I now turn.
C. “Pro-Minority” Criminalization Reforms — How They Fail
Because hate crime laws re-label conducts which had already been punishable under 
generic criminal offences, the crux o f policy debates over their utility revolves around 
their marginal contribution to the pursuit o f criminal law’s preventive and expressive 
goals. Is the enactment o f a separate offence which specifies the perpetrator’s hateful 
motivation as a ground for enhancing his penalty likely to achieve better preventive 
results vis-a-vis those attainable by the generic criminal offence? Is the enactment o f  such 
legislation capable o f  mobilizing firmer social and political commitment to the pursuit o f 
racial equality? I now move to reflect on the contribution o f  this study to our thinking 
about these questions. I will also discuss some o f the implications for our understanding 
of similar problems pronounced in the expressive and institutional functioning o f  “pro- 
minority” criminalization regimes operating in other contexts o f  social inequality. 8
My basic argument will be that the suitability o f criminalization to protect and to 
empower minority groups does not depend on whether it takes the form o f specific (“pro­
minority”) or non-specific (generic) legislation. Rather, it hinges on whether the 
enforcement o f  criminal law (specific or generic) takes place within institutional 
environments capable o f  subverting prevailing racist, patriarchal and homophobic norms. 
The conditions in which hate crime laws emerged and have been applied in post-1980s 
USA prevented it from satisfying this requirement. The future performance o f  the 
American criminal justice system in protecting black victims will be primarily 
determined by forces which are exogenous to that system. Ultimately, it will depend on 
whether American society will undertake a fuller commitment to enhance African- 
Americans’ social and economic integration. Contrary to the accepted fore (recently
8 In a forthcoming article (Aharonson (2010)), I have discussed the generic pitfalls o f  contemporary “pro­
black” criminalization policy (including in the field o f  feminist law and order politics) in more detail.
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reiterated by the Obama administration) , 9 the investment in expanding hate crime policies 
will have, at best, a meagre effect as long as the broader institutional and ideobgical 
structures which dominate contemporary law and order pohey will remain intact
Cl. The Intrinsic Limitations o f “Pro-Minority” Criminalization as a Vehicle ofCrime Prevention
C l.l. Endogenous Constraints on the Marginal Contribution o f  “Pro-Minority” 
Criminalization Reforms to the Protection o f Minority Victims
One of the main intended goals o f “pro-minority” campaigns is to remove particular 
institutional arrangements which can be proved to impede the equal protection o f minority 
victims. W ith the removal of these particular arrangements, we are being assured, the criminal 
justice system will become better equipped to, and thus more capable o£ preventing cases of 
minority victimization. This blueprint of criminal justice reform is often underpinned by a 
notion of “criminalization as outcome”, 10 in which the formal outlawing o f a particular form o f 
conduct is believed to produce a determinate set of results (e.g. deterring would-be offenders 
and inciting pub lb disapproval of the prohibited conduct). My analysis was informed by an 
alternative approach to conceptualizing criminalization. This approach emphasizes the 
fragmented and indeterminate nature of the practices through which socbtbs label, identify and 
respond to “crime”. 11 This concept depbts criminalization as a set o f interpretive and 
institutional practbes whbh bring into play the complex interactions between multiple social 
actors whose exercise of discretion can never be folly determined by formal bgal rubs. I 
appfted this concept to analyze the processes whereby social movements, legislatures, citizens 
and crime-control officials have defined, identified and responded to “racist vb fence” 
throughout American history. Based on this analysis, I have shown that the highly diffused 
structure of processes of criminalizatfon is likely to inhibit the suitability o f  specific “pro­
minority” reforms to remedy the institutional failures whbh originally inhibited the equal 
protection of minority groups (ie. through the enforcement of generic criminal laws prohibiting 
personal vbfence). As fong as the institutbnal culture of crime-control agenefes and the broader
9 Holder Urges New Hate Crime Laws”, San Francisco Chronicle 16.06.09 (httpjVwww.sfgate.conVcgi- 
b in/art icle.cgi?f=/n/a/2009/06/l 6/national/w 134036D70. D T L i
10 On the distinction between ‘criminalization as an outcome’ and ‘criminalization as asocial practice’ see 
Lacey (2009: 942-943).
11 Lacey (1995).
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social settings within which they operate continues to be permeated by the same discriminatory 
norms which obstructed the equal enforcement of generic laws in the first place, the restructuring 
of the legal frameworks through which instances of white-on-black (as well as sexist or 
homophobic) violence are being processed is unlikely to produce significantly better results.
The institutionalization o f hate crime policies took place within cultural and 
institutional structures which in many respects were more conducive to the development o f 
effective enforcement mechanisms than those prevailing in earlier periods of American racial 
history. Nevertheless, our analysis demonstrated that the transformative impact of this 
campaign has remained bounded by structural limitations which seem to be inherent to 
projects of “pro-minority” criminalization reform. On the one hand, the hate crime campaign 
gained ground in an historical moment in which overt forms o f  white supremacist violence 
were no longer regarded as acceptable, including in the South. This development had 
alleviated one o f the most consequential cultural mechanisms which exacerbated blacks’ 
vulnerability to violence throughout American history, that is, the normalization o f extra- 
legal white supremacist violence in Southern culture. The alleviation o f  this pattern created 
conditions which have increased the tendency o f official and non-official actors who 
participate in processes of criminalization to recognize the criminal nature ofsuch violence. 12
In addition, the hate crime campaign emerged in a historical moment in which 
crime enforcement institutions had been subjected to unprecedented pressures to 
incorporate respect for diversity within their professional ethos and practices. 13 For better 
or worse, as crime policymaking becomes a major site o f  electoral competition at the focal, 
state and national levels, the challenges o f legitimation which crime control institutions 
lace become increasingly interwoven with those faced by legislatures. This constellation 
enabled the anti-hate crime movement to trigger not only legislative reforms but also the 
reform o f institutional procedures, most notably in the fields o f  sentencing14 and policing. 15
12 However, it should be noted thal it was not necessary to enact specific categories in order to utilize these 
conditions. Indeed, as James Jacobs observed, it could be argued that these cultural changes weaken the 
case for the enactment o f  specific “pro-black” arrangements. Jacobs and Potter (1998: 151).
13 Sklansky (2008); Loftus (2008).
14 Abrahamson (et a f  1994).
15 Bell (2002); Hall (2005).
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However, it is arguable that this distinctive aspect of the anti-hate crime campaign did 
not overcome the limits o f piecemeal legal reforms but merely reproduced them in new 
institutional settings. As I argued in chapter 5, the priority given to initiating sentencing and 
(to a lesser degree) policing reforms was motivated by strategic attempts by single-issue 
organizations to utilize the new political opportunities opened up by the fierce politicization 
of these particular sub fields o f  crime policy. Thus, the anti-hate crime movement had used 
evidence o f  racial disparities in sentencing to rationalize the need to install a penalty 
enhancement provision. However, because this campaign was not informed by a system- 
wide vision o f how the alteration o f this particular arrangement (the shift to a determinate 
sentencing format) would reallocate powers between different agencies involved in processes 
of criminalization, it ended up shifting the opportunities for discriminatory exercise of 
discretion from one agency (the judiciary) to another (prosecutors). The penalty enhancement 
arrangement provided prosecutors with a valuable bargaining chip which enhances their 
leverage in negotiating for plea bargaining. By rushing to inpose stricter formal constraints 
on the exercise o f  judicial discretion, this reform diminished the extent to which judges are 
capable of constraining discriminatory exercise of prosecutorial discretion.
The inpact o f the anti-hate crime campaign on the policing o f interracial 
victimization o f  African-Americans also reflects the inherent limitations o f piecemeal reform 
of particular institutional arrangements within a pervasively stratified social order. The 
increasing salience of public debate over police mishandling o f “hate crimes” has induced 
adaptive institutional responses aimed at providing visible benchmarks of improved 
performance. In particular, such reforms have focused on introducing formal criteria for 
labelling a crime as “motivated by hate” and the designation o f specialist units dedicated to 
investigating “hate crime”. 16 However, studies o f the application o f these guidelines by 
investigators have pointed to their inability to neutralize the subjective nature o f judgments 
regarding the existence o f ‘bias” in the selection o f a victim or of evaluations regarding the 
weight o f such ‘bias” in motivating the criminal act. 17 Moreover, it is also arguable that, 
given the feet that the rates of recorded intra-racial victimization fer exceed those of inter­
16 Hall (2005: chapter 9).
17 Hall (2005: 160-162); Jacobs and Potter (1998: 96-99).
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racial violence, 18 the allocation o f  greater resources to the latter problem, and its 
establishment as a paramount yardstick for assessing police performances in minimizing 
blacks’ vulnerability to victimization, is misplaced. 19 These reforms seem to be particularly 
suitable to advance the legitimation needs faced by the police, particularly in the face o f 
considerable evidence of over-targeting of African-Americans by racial profiling and other 
policing strategies.20 Their suitability to ameliorate patterns o f victimization among African- 
Americans is questionable.
Furthermore, the over-representation o f African-Americans and Latinos among 
those prosecuted for hate crimes provides an additional example o f how the 
transformative potential o f  this legislation is bounded by a perennial pitfall o f piecemeal 
institutional reforms, that is, their tendency to reflect the priorities and the habitus o f the 
institutions which enforce them rather than the original intentions o f  their initiators. This 
pitiall was pronounced in earlier phases in the development o f  “pro-black” 
criminalization policy as well. For instance, in the antebellum period, “slave abuse” 
legislation was predominantly enforced against poor white perpetrators outside 
plantations while leaving the large-scale mechanisms o f exploitation and cruelty within 
plantations virtually unregulated. This dynamic is apparent in various other contexts in 
which the enforcement o f  “pro-minority” criminalization regimes correlates with general 
patterns o f unequal enforcement and over-targeting o f  racial and ethnic minorities.21 
Studies o f the enforcement o f  “no drop” domestic violence policies, for example, have 
documented their tendency to expose victims who belong to poor black and Latino 
communities to new forms o f repression and intrusion by the State. The enforcement 
records o f such policies reveal high rates o f dual arrests and stricter surveillance by 
welfare bureaucracies. 22
In summary, the analysis presented in this dissertation has showed that the 
standards against which the performances o f hate crime policies are usually measured — 
namely, whether such policies work to tame visible patterns o f institutional racism -  are
18 Kennedy (1998: 19).
19 Guttel and Medina (2007).
20 Harcouit (2007: 221); Banks (2003: 574).
21 Crenshaw (1991: 1245-1251).
22 Coker (2004); Mills (2003: 37-38).
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both anachronistic and inadequate. They are anachronistic because, unlike earlier 
moments in American history, racial disparities in the administration o f  criminal justice 
today are produced by colour-blind policies. The feet that these policies over-target black 
offenders is usually attributed to their disproportionate offending rates, rather than to 
sheer racial discrimination. By and large, such rationalizations o f existing enforcement 
disparities have been accepted by the Supreme Court and continue to enjoy wide social 
and political approval. 23 However, when gauged against the more adequate standard o f  
their ability to counteract patterns o f unequal enforcement which are presently pervasive 
within the modus operandi o f  crime control institutions, the contribution o f  hate crime 
policies is fer from being certain. The over-targeting o f  African-Americans and Hispanic 
offenders (which correlate with their over-targeting in virtually all offence categories) ;24 
the re-criminalization o f  conducts which had already been outlawed (a trend which, as 
observed by William Stuntz, provides prosecutors with ultimate control over the outcome 
o f the process) ; 25 and the focus on producing visible symbols o f accommodating diversity 
rather than on fitting the allocation o f resources to the trends reflected by victimization 
rates (an image-driven adaptive strategy which, as David Garland notes, is tied to the 
unbridled politicization o f  the criminal justice process) 26 provide three troubling 
examples o f  how hate crime policies reproduce rather than eliminate general patterns o f  
unequal or inadequate enforcement. From a broader perspective, such cooptation reflects 
an important lesson about processes o f criminalization: the impossibility o f  maintaining 
an enclave o f racial egalitarianism within a broader institutional environment permeated 
by symptoms o f racial inequality.
23 Banks (2003: 583-586).
24 Gottschalk (2006: 19).
25 Stuntz (2001:510).
26 Garland (2001a: 119).
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C1.2. Exogenous Constraints on the Contribution o f  “Pro-Minority ” Criminalization to 
Preventing Minority Victimization
As we saw in chapter 5, the recent proliferation o f “pro-black” criminal lawmaking was 
enabled by a more fundamental paradigm shift. Over the last three decades, criminalization 
has come to play a much more pivotal role as a policy instrument through which social 
movements and governments reconstruct and act upon all sorts o f social problems. 27 Until 
the recent financial crisis, the increasing salience o f  criminalization was interwoven with 
declining public trust in the suitability o f welfare policies to ameliorate the core problems 
of American society. I argued that, while this political constellation provided single-issue 
organizations with favourable opportunities for initiating determinate sentencing reform, it 
also constrained the ability o f racial reformers to mobilize types o f policy intervention 
which could have been more effective in reducing crime levels. In essence, this is because, 
contrary to the main thrust of the anti-hate crime campaign, the preventive effects of 
criminal legislation (regardless o f  whether it is formulated as “pro-black”) do not ultimately 
depend on the stipulation o f longer and more determinate sentences. As explained above, 
this is partly because the internal fragmentation of processes o f criminalization and the 
exercise o f discretion by crime enforcement agents mediate between these formal rules o f 
penal liability and actual enforcement practices on the ground. The preventive qualities o f 
criminal legislation much more crucially depend on whether it is embedded within a 
broader array o f policy measures which work to eliminate the criminogenic conditions 
cultivating these forms o f offending. 28 This ultra-punitive character o f hate crime laws 
reflects the dominant creeds o f late-modern crime policy. However, as I have shown, this 
pitfall has been noticeable in previous eras o f American racial history as well At root, the 
failure to integrate criminalization with non-penal policy measures for reducing rates o f 
black victimization stemmed from the resistance to developing structural racial reforms 
even in times in which the introduction o f “pro-black” criminalization regimes was made 
possible (as discussed above).
27 Simon (2007a: 4).
28 Von Hirsch (et a I) (1999).
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In chapter 2, we saw that the patterns o f  racial brutality outlawed by antebellum 
“slave abuse” laws were systematically facilitated by the pervasive mechanisms of 
economic exploitation, dehumanization, and political disempowerment which the system of 
slavery made possible. Thus, my claim that the introduction o f  “pro-slave” criminalization 
reforms was integral to the effort o f  Southern elites to accommodate the Abolitionist 
challenge provides a key for understanding why this regime was doomed to foil to have a 
significant impact on the prevalence of violence against slaves. In chapter 3, we showed 
that the patterns o f lynching which thrived in late nineteenth century Southern society had 
been folly embedded within the seamless network of formal and informal measures 
installed by Southern governments and elites in order to restore white supremacy in the 
wake of the constitutional reforms o f Reconstruction. My analysis o f the structure o f the 
politics o f race in the post-Reconstruction decades (combining firm regional support for 
Jim Crow with Northern reluctance to intervene in Southern “domestic a flairs”) illuminated 
why both national and Southern legislatures refrained from developing effective legal 
responses to lynching. However, it also implied that the passing o f such laws could not 
have minimized the prevalence o f  lynching (and, even less, o f numerous other forms o f 
racial degradation which were rife in the segregated public sphere o f Southern society) as 
long as this relentless network o f exclusionary mechanisms continued to operate.
In chapter 4, I have shown that the surge o f  anti-desegregation terror which had 
flared 15) in the South in the wake o f Brown (late 1950s) was part and parcel o f the broader 
array o f measures installed by local authorities in order to impede desegregation in public 
schools. The Southern backlash reflected the widespread popular resistance to what had 
been perceived by Southerners as a paternalistic and illegitimate attempt to impose racial 
integration “from above”, a public mood which was conducive to the resurgence o f white 
supremacist vigilantism. The new regime o f “federally protected activities” legislation was 
indeed embedded within a broader array o f policies introduced by the federal government 
in order to abolish the larger system which nurtured these forms o f white supremacist 
violence (that is: the Jim Crow system). This development was enabled by the polarization 
between the two regional systems o f racial stratification in the mid twentieth century and 
the (short-lived) dominance o f Northern racial moderates in shaping the contours o f  the 
politics o f race in the mid 1960s. I have shown that recorded rates o f  white supremacist
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violence in the South decreased significantly after the enactment o f  this legislation, 
although it was directly used for prosecuting racist perpetrators in only a meagre number o f 
cases. It might be overstated to argue that there is a causal relationship between the 
introduction of “federally protected activities” legislation and the decreasing rates o f this 
particular form o f victimizing blacks. However, this sequence seems to be consistent with 
my general argument that the preventive effects o f “pro-black” criminalization policies 
depend more heavily on their being supported by broader networks of extra-penal policies 
than on the severity or determinacy o f the punishment which they stipulate.
As shown in chapter 5, the lion’s share of recorded figures o f “hate crime” involves 
violence between African-Americans and Latino-Americans in the poor neighbourhood of 
inner-city ghettoes.29 It is plausible that these recorded figures reflect inequitable targeting o f 
black and Latino offenders by the police. However, they are also consistent with various other 
indicators of the disproportionate vulnerability of African-Americans to social harm, including 
to personal violence.30 As William J. Wilson has argued, this disproportionate vulnerability is 
produced by the demographic concentration o f large segments of the black and Latino 
populations in the urban ghettoes, in which levels of poverty, violence, joblessness and social 
isolation have been exacerbated dramatically since the 1970s. My analysis in chapter 5 showed 
that the enactment of hate crime laws was insulated from any serious attempt to develop policy 
measures for alleviating the socio-economic mechanisms which foment these patterns o f 
victimization. In feet, because the excessive use of penalization tend to aggravate rather than 
ameliorate the social pathologies which produce these overwhelming rates o f criminality in 
American urban ghettoes,31 hate crime policies seem to perpetuate the problem rather than to 
provide a cure. It also might have displaced the development o f  more effective instruments 
such as restorative justice and other community-level programs which seem to be much better 
equipped to dissuade reoffending. 32
29 See Chapter5 (section E l)o fth is  dissertation.
30 Wacquant (2008: 54-57); Sampson and Wilson (1995: 47).
31 Wacquant (2009); Clear (2009).
32 M iller(2008: 7).
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As I have argued in more detail elsewhere,33 similar drawbacks characterize many 
other “pro-minority” criminalization regimes which emerged over the last decades. For 
example, the interplay between intensified recourse to penalization and under-development of 
welfarist responses is noticeable in the transformation o f domestic violence policies over the 
last three decades. The salience of Tough on crime’ policymaking in post-1970s American 
politics enabled feminist activists to induce the reform o f policing, trial-procedure, and 
doctrinal arrangements which had long precluded the legal system from effectively protecting 
battered women.34 At the same time, as shown by feminist critics of the dominant sexual 
victimisation agenda, the curtailment of welfare expenditures and the increasing conditionality 
of eligibility to welfare under neo-Hberal policies have reduced the availability to battered 
women o f a wide range of social services which are necessary for tackling the socio-economic 
dimensions of this problem35 This lack of focus on welfare responses seems misguided given 
the remarkably higher rates of recorded victimization among populations which suffer from 
economic and social marginalizatioa36 Recent ethnographic research has suggested that 
prevailing patterns of domestic violence are fomented by the destabilising inpact of recent 
shifts in the political economy on family structures and on cultural values in minority 
communities. For example, as one major study on domestic violence in second- and third- 
generation migrant communities has shown, such violence reflects the thriving o f misogynist 
street culture which normalizes sexual conquest and paternal abandonment in these 
communities, brought about by the exacerbation of poverty and unemployment in de­
industrialized inner cities. 37
The tackling o f  the root causes of domestic violence necessitates the integration of 
policy instruments which can attenuate both the socio-economic and the cultural dimensions 
of this form o f offending. However, as Marie Gottschalk has argued, post-1970s campaigns 
in this field have marginalized the socio-economic aspects of domestic violence. 38 Similarly 
to the unfolding o f the anti-hate crime reformist agenda, the elevated public profile o f the 
problem regrettably materialized in an era in which such grievances have been predominantly
33 Aharonson (2010: pp. 22-25).
34 Simon (2007a: 189).
35 Bumiller (2008); Mills (2003).
36 Coker (2004).
37Boui£ois (1996).
38 Gottschalk (2006: 163).
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channelled to the penal sphere and have become insulated from a broader vision o f  social- 
democratic progressive reform This dynamic of cooptation is rooted, as shown by my 
analysis o f the origins of “pro-black” legislation, in the interaction between structural forces 
(pushing toward the containment o f reformist struggles within politically manageable 
ideological bounds) and social action (the strategic decisions o f  social movements to fit their 
agenda to the logic o f  dominant ideological trends).
C2. The Limitations of “Pro-minority” Criminalization as an Expressive Vehicle: The 
Dialectics ofRecognition and Lesitimation
One of the most prominent justifications o f  hate crime laws focuses on the expressive 
dimension o f this legislation. 39 It is argued that hate crime laws are necessary for expressing 
the entitlement o f all citizens to equal concern and respect.40 The focus on the expressive 
dimension as a self-standing justifying aim reflects recent developments both in criminal law 
theory (most notably, the flourishing o f communicative theories of punishment) 41 and in 
American political discourse at large (most notably, the proliferation o f the polities of 
recognition as a prominent platform of egalitarian reform) . 42 However, as I showed in this 
study, the attempt to capitalize on the expressive qualities of criminal law in order to facilitate 
wider egalitarian reforms is by no means new. It harks back to the antebellum era, when 
Abolitionists used evidence of racial brutality in plantations in order to de-legitimate 
Southern slave system, while, in response, Southern authorities passed “slave abuse” laws 
which sought to demonstrate the reconcilability o f slavery with principles o f  legality and 
humanity. One o f the distinctive contributions o f this dissertation was to trace the 
underpinnings and consequences o f  the use of “pro-black” criminalization campaigns and 
lawmaking as vehicles o f political communication throughout American racial history.
This investigation revealed that pub He debates over the appropriate legal responses to 
racist violence have served as salient sites o f struggle over the terms of African-Americans’ 
membership in the American polity. The consequences of such struggles were complex and
39 Lawrence (1999: 167-169); Kahan (1996).
40 Harel and Pachomovsky (1999).
41 D uff (1996); Kahan (1996).
42 Fraser (2000).
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double edged. The political effects of “pro-black” criminalization reforms, I argued, are best 
depicted in terms o f  a dynamic interplay between two competing communicative effects. On 
the one hand, such legislation has served as a vehicle of recognition and symbolic inclusion. 
The official acknowledgment o f the harmfulness and wrongfulness o f such conduct, and of 
the entitlement o f  African-Americans to equal legal protection, has served to symbolize their 
formal inclusion into the framework of American citizenship. Kimberle Crenshaw’s reminder 
that “the possibility for ideological change is created through the very process o f legitimation, 
which is triggered...when powerless people force open and politicize a contradiction 
between the dominant ideology and their reality” is highly important for recalling the 
significance of such reforms, even if, as she acknowledges, “because the adjustment is 
triggered by the political consequences o f the contradiction, circumstances will be adjusted 
only to the extent necessary to close the apparent contradiction".43 Our analysis stressed that, 
although such messages were rarely translated into effective enforcement policies, they 
nevertheless had entailed a transformative dimension.
On the other hand, the decision of progressive racial reformers to resort to ‘the 
victimization frame’ in order to protest against structural patterns o f social inequality 
entails attendant costs. As our analysis o f  the origins o f “pro-minority” criminalization 
observed, both governments and public opinion have been more willing to recognize the 
entitlement of African-Americans to equal concern and respect when this principle has 
been infringed by individual bigots than when it was compromised in putatively “non 
coercive” manner by State-sponsored policies or by the ‘invisible hand’ o f market forces.44 
However, because the willingness to recognize the harmfulness o f  these “pathological” 
cases of racial domination was interwoven with the resistance to acknowledge the 
illegitimacy o f the structure o f racial relations at large (which was rife with numerous 
“normalized” forms o f racial domination), it seems that the limited transformative 
potentiality o f  such recognition was intrinsic to its very conditions o f  existence.
Throughout American racial history, “pro-black” criminalization policies have affirmed 
the principle that race should not serve as a ground for depriving African-Americans o f basic
43 Crenshaw (1988: 1369).
44 Cf. Hale (1924).
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civil rights which criminal law enshrines. In the slavery era, this principle was applied to 
slaves’ right to life and (later on) to their right to basic standards of human dignity. In the civil 
rights era, this principle was expanded to include political and equal opportunity rights. In the 
post-1980 era, it was extended to encompass racial bias per se. Yet, the way in which criminal 
law frames this principle inevitably excludes the vast majority of social practices which 
infringe it. To emphasize, the inevitability o f such exclusion does not derive solely from racial 
prejudice. The limitations of criminal law as a vehicle of recognition are built into the 
discursive and institutional determinants which govern the types o f social harm which can (and 
those which cannot) be tangibly constructed as “criminal wrongs” and to be policed, 
prosecuted, and proven in a criminal trial.45
These structural limitations generate two major dilemmas for progressive social 
movements considering whether to have recourse to the expressive qualities o f  criminal 
law by means o f mobilizing “pro-minority” criminalization reforms. First, because criminal 
law is widely perceived to be dealing with the most harmful forms o f social action, 46 there 
is a danger that the establishment o f “pro-minority” criminalization regimes will channel 
public debate towards over-focusing on the narrow ambit o f conducts that can be processed 
as “criminal wrongs”. In this way, “pro-black” criminalization might obliquely divert 
public attention away from the large-scale mechanisms o f racially-skewed harm production 
which are built into the everyday functioning o f labour markets, social institutions, and the 
political system. This pitfall becomes particularly acute in the current political climate, 
amid the increasing salience o f crime as an issue o f  media coverage and electoral 
mobilization. This constellation, I showed in chapter 5, impels progressive social 
movements to prioritize the framing o f collective grievances in terms o f crime and 
victimization. 47 In the context ofthe struggle for racial justice, the proliferation o f  the anti­
hate crime campaign might have impoverished public debates on how race serves as a 
factor which shapes differential exposure to harm in contemporary American society. 
Without derogating from the severity o f the problems emphasized by this campaign, it is 
puzzling that the threat posed by individual racist bigots to the nation’s race relations
45 Hillyard (et al, 2004).
46 As implied by classical articulations ofthe harm principle.
47 Simon (2007a: 109).
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gained such a prominent place on the agenda ofblack activists in the very same moment in 
which neoliberal governments renounced their responsibility to provide social security 
through regulation o f the much more wide-ranging processes o f harm production built into 
post-industrialist economy. 48 This puzzle seems to be particularly acute with regard to 
African-Americans, who had clearly been positioned at the receiving end o f  the processes 
of economic and social marginalization which the post-Keynesian economy had fostered. 
However, it should also be considered in various other contexts in which identity-based 
degradation and economic marginalization are deeply intertwined. 49
Secondly, by reaffirming the image of the legal system as committed to the 
enforcement o f  individuals’ right to equal concern and, such legislation might imply that 
those policies and actions that have been legally and constitutionally approved are indeed 
compatible with this moral principle. Ironically, this high-profile legislation might make the 
most acute forms o f racially-patterned social harm less visible. Indeed, the question of what 
amounts to a racially-patterned deprivation of rights is increasingly complex and elusive 
today. The entrenchment o f the ethos of formal racial equality throughout the last decades 
created fundamentally polarized effects across class divides. While it facilitated the 
integration o f middle and upper class African-Americans into the highest ranks o f American 
polities, culture and economy, it has also served to foment popular resentment to the 
extension o f redistributive projects of racial egalitarianism The starkly disproportionate rates 
of African-Americans among those living in extreme poverty or behind bars provide grim 
evidence of the enduring significance o f race in shaping the life chances of individuals. 50
For these reasons, my analysis has shown that the expressive functioning of hate 
crime policies has been much more complex than acknowledged by exponents o f the 
expressivist rationale o f  such legislature While this legislation has enhanced solidarities with 
African-American victims o f interracial violence, this form o f  solidarity might be too ‘thin’ 
to bolster public support of more substantive enterprises o f egalitarian reform The 
expectation that “pro-minority” criminalization reforms would serve as a vehicle o f
48 Reiner (2007a: 4).
49 I have discussed this more in length elsewhere, see: Aharonson (2010: 20-22).
50 Western (2006: chapter 1).
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consciousness-raising5 1 is, in short, entirety incompatible with our socio-legal knowledge o f 
how criminal law works both as an expressive and as a regulatory tool Hate crime laws 
appear to be unable -  indeed, American “pro-black” criminalization never has been able -  to 
realize its stated aims in either preventive or expressive terms.
D. Epilogue: Law and Social Change -  A Final Reflection on an Old Conundrum
Our inquiry into the role played by “pro-black” criminalization regimes in facilitating and 
hindering the mobilization o f egalitarian racial reform in the US touched upon a fundamental 
problem in the socio togy o f  law, namely, the relationship between the functioning of law as a 
social force and its character as a social product. This relationship is particularly intricate 
when marginalized minority groups have recourse to legal institutions in search o f 
recognition and a remedy to particular symptoms of their predicament. On the one hand, law 
serves as a salient medium through which liberal democracies symbolize their commitment 
to principles o f liberty and equality. In the context ofthe governance of inter group inequality, 
law acquires this unique role by censuring racist, sexist or homophobic norms and thus 
presenting itself as transcending beyond social conflicts. At the same time, law 
communicates and enforces such messages via institutional apparatuses and cultural practices 
which take shape within social environment permeated with symptoms of such inequalities.
The recognition of this inherent tension within the liberal vision of “law as an 
emancipatory force” does not necessarily spell a dystopian denial of the possibility o f  social 
progression toward a fuller realization o f egalitarian norms. Nor should it necessarily imply 
that law cannot contribute to such processes. However, this observation should urge us to 
adopt a more realistic vision o f what criminalization (as well as other forms of juridifying 
social problems) can and cannot achieve. This vision should take on board both normative 
and socio logical perspectives in order to analyze the complex ways in which “pro-minority” 
legal reforms work both to enable and to constrain the pursuit o f a more just and equal 
society.
51 MacKinnon (1991a: 83-105).
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